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Abstract 
This thesis investigates various deviations from rational beliefs by combining 
methods from psychology and experimental economics. 
The first two studies focused on the jumping-to-conclusions bias, where 
delusional and delusion-prone individuals tend to make decisions based on less 
data than controls. In an incentivised and adapted “beads task” probability-
reasoning paradigm, the effects of delusion-proneness on decisions and on 
probability ratings were investigated. All participants, but especially more 
delusion-prone participants, made their decisions too early. Moreover, high 
delusion-prone participants’ probability ratings were less affected by incentives 
than low delusion-prone participants’. 
The same paradigm was used to explore an inaccurate, but potentially 
evolutionarily advantageous, belief: the sexual over-perception bias, where men 
perceive more sexual interest in women’s behaviour than women report or 
perceive. No evidence was found for men’s over-perception of a male 
character’s appeal to women in a belief-updating paradigm, which may reflect 
conceptual and methodological limitations of previous work on this topic. 
Perhaps, people deviate from rationality for certain purposes (e.g., evolutionary 
goals), while also holding an accurate, rational belief. The fourth study 
examined whether people are, at some level, aware that their optimistic beliefs 
are inaccurate, by combining two distinct belief-updating paradigms. 
Participants provided repeated answers to neutral questions and questions 
about undesirable future outcomes. Participants were equally accurate for 
neutral items, but were even more optimistic on the second guess for 
undesirable items, suggesting that optimism involves “real” self-deception.  
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The last study investigated another phenomenon where people may want to 
avoid undesirable information. Investors are less willing to invest when playing 
the trust game with another player than when playing a computerised lottery 
with the same odds of the outcomes, which suggests that observing potential 
betrayal carries an additional, emotional cost. It was found that beliefs about 
others’ trustworthiness could predict the level of such betrayal aversion.  
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1 General Introduction 
Across a wide range of domains, people tend to hold beliefs that are not 
supported by evidence. These beliefs can have disastrous consequences, and yet 
they persist, despite accumulation of evidence against them, making the beliefs 
more and more irrational. One such belief is the denial of climate change, where 
people are not concerned about global warming, either because they reject 
scientific evidence it is occurring or because they are overly optimistic that the 
consequences will be minor. This belief is found despite the occurrence of 
increasingly extreme weather conditions, such as hurricanes, droughts, and 
floods (Varki & Brower, 2013). Another example is the belief that the measles, 
mumps, and rubella (MMR) vaccine is dangerous (e.g., it is believed to cause 
autism). This leads to reduced immunisation rates, posing a threat to public 
health. Despite scientific discrediting of these beliefs and attempts to campaign 
for vaccinations, the beliefs about the dangers of the MMR vaccine remain 
(Nyhan, Reifler, Richey, & Freed, 2014). A further common example of beliefs 
that are not fully supported by evidence is the phenomenon of unrealistic 
optimism, where people underestimate their chances of experiencing 
unfortunate events. This could lead to increases in dangerous behaviours, such 
as smoking and unsafe sex (Sharot, 2011a). A related phenomenon is 
overconfidence, which involves overestimating one’s personal qualities, which 
can lead to financial recessions brought on by too many risky investments, or 
even wars (D. D. P. Johnson & Fowler, 2011). Furthermore, men tend to believe 
that women are more sexually interested in them than women really are, which 
could lead to unwanted sexual advances, if not sexual assaults (Farris, Treat, 
Viken, & McFall, 2008b). Some irrational beliefs, such as delusions, are less 
common in the general population, but represent first-rank symptoms of 
Chapter 1 
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disorders such as schizophrenia, which affects approximately 1% of the 
population  and has major consequences for society in terms of loss of 
functioning and increased costs of mental health care (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013; Coltheart, Langdon, & McKay, 2011). 
This thesis examines a selection of such deviations from rational beliefs. Some of 
the deviations from rational beliefs have been studied extensively, while others 
are more recently discovered, or hypothesised, phenomena. Across all studies, 
the main aim is to study the deviation from rationality with increased 
methodological rigour, by combining psychological and experimental 
economics approaches.  
In this introductory chapter, the concepts of rationality and deviations from it 
are first defined. Next, a continuum of deviations from rationality is specified, 
ranging from deviations that are observed in select (e.g., clinical) groups to 
deviations that are common within the general population. Then, considering 
the focus on combining psychological and experimental economics practices, 
some differences between these practices and the implications for this thesis are 
discussed. The introductions of the empirical chapters that follow will focus on 
the most relevant theories and rationales of the studies presented therein, but 
the general overview of topics is provided in this chapter.  
1.1 Beliefs, Rationality and Irrationality 
There is no consensus about what constitutes a belief, but McKay and Dennett 
(2009) offer the following working definition: “a functional state of an organism 
that implements or embodies that organism’s endorsement of a particular state 
of affairs as actual” (p. 493).  
Chapter 1 
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A belief can be conceptualised in a binary or in a probabilistic, continuous form. 
Under a binary conception, one believes something (p) or does not believe 
something ( p). On the continuous conception of beliefs, a belief expresses the 
probability of a proposition being correct, with 1 representing absolute 
conviction that it is true and 0 representing absolute conviction that it is false 
(Caplin, Dean, Glimcher, & Rutledge, 2010; Schwitzgebel, 2014). This thesis 
adopts the probabilistic notion of beliefs. 
Whereas binary beliefs can be correct or false, it is unclear what the notion of a 
false belief is on the probabilistic conception (McKay, 2012). A more useful 
notion, encompassing both binary and continuous conceptions, is that of 
“rationality”, and by adopting the probabilistic conception of belief, I thus focus 
on whether beliefs are rational or irrational, rather than correct or false.1 The 
distinction between rationality and irrationality is often disputed (Gigerenzer & 
Sturm, 2012). Rational beliefs must be consistent with other beliefs and 
intentions of the same person and they must be sensitive to available evidence 
and as such “conform to the best available standards of correct reasoning” 
(Bortolotti, 2009, p. 16). These best available standards are often considered to be 
provided by inductive or deductive logic rules (Gerrans, 2001). One often used 
logic rule is Bayes’ theorem: 
        
           
    
   
           
                         
 
                                                          
1 On the binary conception, it is possible for beliefs to be rational, yet false. Consider, for 
example, the false-belief task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983), which later became known as the 
Sally-Anne task (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985), where a participant is told that Sally 
and Anne are in a room together as Sally places a marble into her basket. Sally then leaves 
and Anne moves the marble from the basket to a box. Participants are asked where Sally 
will look for the marble when she returns. Sally should look for her marble in the basket, 
where she would believe it to be: a rational, yet false, belief.  
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Where P(H|D) is the posterior probability of the hypothesis given the data, 
which integrates the probability of the data given the hypothesis (i.e., the 
likelihood of the data; P(D|H)), the prior probability of the hypothesis being 
true (P(H)) and the probability of the data (P(D)). The probability of the data is a 
combination of how likely the data is to be found if the hypothesis would be 
true and if it would not be true (Dienes, 2008). As an example, consider the 
beads task, which forms the basic paradigm for the studies in Chapters 2 and 3, 
and is used to investigate probabilistic reasoning (Phillips & Edwards, 1966). 
Participants are presented with two jars: one has more green than red beads, the 
other more red than green beads. Beads are drawn at random from one of the 
(now-hidden) jars and participants have to decide from which jar they are 
drawn (described in more detail later, at 1.3.1 on page 28). The prior probability 
pertains to the probability that either jar is selected, before seeing any evidence. 
The likelihood of the data refers to the probability of drawing a bead of a certain 
colour from either jar. This depends on the ratios of red and green beads in the 
jars. For example, in a jar with a ratio of 85 red: 15 green, the likelihood of 
drawing a red bead would be .85. The posterior probability is the belief one 
holds after seeing evidence. Bayes’ theorem specifies the optimal procedure for 
arriving at this posterior probability, which is the probability used to decide 
which jar the beads are from.  
Besides arriving at the normative probability (i.e., updating beliefs in 
accordance with Bayes’ theorem), rationality requires an optimal consideration 
of the consequences of decisions made on the basis of beliefs. Often the 
probabilities of proposition A being more likely or less likely (more towards the 
opposite proposition  A) have different consequences, in terms of how 
rewarding they are expected to be if the proposition turns out to be true. For 
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example, if climate change is man-made, this would represent a state of the 
world where compromises would have to be made. If climate change is not 
man-made, the state of the world would not require compromise and people 
might experience less guilt. This means that the state of the world where the 
proposition “climate change is man-made” is false is expected to be more 
rewarding than the state of the world where it is true. Here, the possible states 
of the world carry different expected rewards. Using this notion of expected 
rewards, Caplin et al. (2010) define beliefs as “the probabilities attached to the 
states of the world that would generate such [expected rewards]” (p. 953). This 
operationalisation of beliefs is used in this thesis and expected rewards are 
manipulated through incentives (see later, at 1.7.2 on page 73). Therefore, 
rationality in this thesis combines arriving at the probabilities suggested by 
logical reasoning (i.e., applying Bayes’ theorem) and using these probabilistic 
beliefs to make optimal decisions (i.e., decisions that maximise expected 
rewards).2  
As described above, under the probabilistic conception of beliefs, rationality 
requires that beliefs conform to standards of correct reasoning (Bortolotti, 2009). 
Deviations from rationality (i.e., irrational beliefs), then, are defined as a 
deviation from the probability that one should assign to the proposition in 
question according to such standards (e.g., Bayes’ theorem, described earlier on 
page 18). Deviations from the normative probabilities, could arise due to 
departures from rational rules of inference (i.e., not applying Bayes’ theorem 
correctly) or due to holding different prior probabilities or likelihoods 
                                                          
2 Strictly speaking these decisions are only “optimal” from a risk-neutral perspective. Risk-
seeking or risk-averse individuals may make decisions that fail to maximise their expected 
outcome, but that nevertheless maximise their expected utility (and thus are rational) given 
their risk preferences. 
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(Matthews, 2005). For example, people with irrational beliefs could hold a 
different prior belief than people with rational beliefs (e.g., McKay, 2012), so that 
the same amount of evidence (in terms of the likelihood ratio: P(D|H)/P(D| H)) 
will lead to more updating of the posterior belief for one person than for another 
(Matthews, 2005).  
It is often found that humans’ decision-making deviates from that dictated by 
formal logic rules (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983, 1986). The irrational decisions 
are presumably based on irrational beliefs as Bortolotti (2009) argues that beliefs 
and behaviours should match.3 These deviations are systematic rather than 
unsystematic; unsystematic errors may be due to performance errors, such as 
distraction during the task (Stanovich & West, 1998, 2000). As an example of a 
systematic error, consider the Linda problem: based on a description of a 
woman, Linda, who is “single, outspoken, and very bright” and “was deeply 
concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated 
in anti-nuclear demonstrations [as a student]” (p. 297), 85% of participants 
thought it was more probable that she was a bank teller and an active feminist 
than that she was a bank teller (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). This “conjunction 
fallacy” violates formal rules of logic, where the probability that she is a bank 
teller must be bigger than the probability that she is a bank teller and a feminist, 
as the former would include the latter. Another example is the framing effect, 
where people are risk-averse when the choice between a safe option and a risky 
option is framed in the gain domain (e.g., “200 people will be saved” versus 
“there is 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved, and 2/3 probability that 
                                                          
3 This match between behaviour and beliefs has been debated (e.g., McKay & Dennett, 
2009), as discussed later in this thesis (e.g., at 1.2 on page 24). Especially in the case of 
delusions, the mismatch between beliefs and behaviour is considered to undermine the 
notion of delusions as beliefs.  
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no people will be saved”), but risk-loving in a loss domain (e.g., “400 people will 
die” versus “there is 1/3 probability that nobody will die, and 2/3 probability 
that 600 people will die”), although the safe and risky choices have equal 
expected values in both scenarios (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). This switch 
from risk-averse to risk-loving behaviour, especially by the same participants, 
depending on the framing of the question appears irrational, and formal rules of 
logic argue that the language used should not affect the decisions made. Such 
findings have led some to argue that humans are not rational (Kahneman, 2003; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1983, 1986).  
A counter-argument to this stance is provided by defenders of bounded 
rationality, who emphasise that decision-making and judgment under 
uncertainty are influenced by the environment (e.g. limited time). Furthermore, 
some participants do show rational decisions and judgments, suggesting that 
individual differences (e.g., intelligence, knowledge, or computational power) 
might contribute to deviations from rationality (Stanovich & West, 1998, 2000). 
In the bounded-rationality view, rational behaviour is said to be shaped “by a 
[pair of] scissors whose two blades are the structure of task environments and 
the computational capabilities of the actor” (Simon, 1990, p. 7) and just as one 
cannot understand how scissors work by only looking at one blade, one cannot 
understand rationality by only considering the mind (Gigerenzer & Sturm, 
2012). The ecological influence can lead to decisions deemed irrational when 
compared to normative rules, which assume unlimited time and cognitive 
resources and the application of the correct logic rules (Cosmides & Tooby, 
1996; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Gigerenzer & Sturm, 2012; Stanovich & 
West, 2000). Defenders of bounded rationality argue that irrational choice 
behaviour can often be ascribed to methodological artefacts and suggest that 
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reasoning should be assessed with rules appropriate for both the content and 
context of the problem (Gigerenzer, 1996; Stanovich & West, 2000; Sturm, 2012). 
For example, due to ambiguous language in the Linda problem, participants 
might misrepresent the choice between her being “a bank teller” or “a bank 
teller and a feminist” as a choice between her being “a bank teller and not a 
feminist” or “a bank teller and a feminist”. The description of Linda would 
suggest the latter is more probable, and, thus, if this alternative interpretation is 
applied, the choice made is actually rational (Gigerenzer, 1996). This could be 
especially influential as the meaning of probability might be unclear to 
participants, as not all participants naturally take it to mean frequencies 
(Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Wang, 2000). Indeed, when the Linda problem is 
presented as a question of frequencies (i.e., asking how many out of 200 women 
like Linda would be bank tellers and how many would be bank tellers and 
feminists), rather than of probabilities (i.e., asking the probability that Linda is a 
bank teller and the probability that she is a bank teller and a feminist), far fewer 
participants show the conjunction fallacy, arguably because they rely more on 
mathematical, rather than semantic, rules of inference (Hertwig & Gigerenzer, 
1999). The framing problem could also have been misconstrued: participants 
might not take the words “will be saved” as an absolute number, but rather as a 
minimum number, but this is not how “will die” is interpreted; if this is the case, 
participants’ risk-preference reversal based on the framing would be rational 
(Stanovich & West, 2000).  
Furthermore, as noted above, some researchers (e.g., Bortolotti, 2009) claim that 
rational beliefs should have matching behaviour. Others (e.g., Haselton & Buss, 
2000) reason back from observed behaviour to beliefs, and infer biased beliefs 
from biased behaviour. Yet, biased behaviour and biased beliefs can occur 
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jointly as well as separately from one another (Marshall, Trimmer, Houston, & 
McNamara, 2013). McKay and Dennett (2009) argue that biased behaviours can 
occur without biased beliefs. For example, although one may not have a strong 
belief that there is oncoming traffic, one may still check for it when crossing the 
street, in case there might be. Under uncertainty, nature may have maintained 
rational beliefs, but included a policy to behave in a way that is not in line with 
the rational beliefs, which may actually minimise costs (McKay & Dennett, 
2009). Therefore, the inference from observed biased behaviour to biased beliefs 
might not be valid.  
This thesis aims to focus on biased beliefs and most studies within this thesis 
measure whether probability estimates are systematically below or above a 
correct value, which Gigerenzer (2004) considers a common paradigm within 
social psychology. Any systematic deviation from the correct value is 
considered a deviation from rationality. The correct value can either be a value 
arrived at through Bayes theorem (Chapters 2, 3, and 4), a value taken from the 
literature (Chapter 5), or even a value determined by theoretical deduction 
(Chapter 6). Note that logic rules, such as Bayes’ theorem or maximisation of 
expected value, are used to determine most of these correct values, or, in other 
words, the normative standard (Sturm, 2012). 
1.2 Costs and Benefits of Different Types of Irrationality 
As mentioned above, different states of the world tend to carry different 
rewards (Caplin et al., 2010). These different rewards of different states of the 
world could result in biased beliefs, biased behaviour, or both, in order to 
maximise reward and minimise costs (Marshall et al., 2013; McKay & Dennett, 
2009). For example, someone with grandiose delusions might believe that they 
are able to fly, a belief that could be exciting and rewarding, but yet not translate 
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this belief into behaviour, such as jumping off a building, in order to minimise 
costs to survival in case the belief is wrong. This might be an example of a 
biased belief without a biased behaviour. In the street-crossing example, the 
behaviour of checking for oncoming traffic, regardless of the strength of the 
belief regarding whether there is such oncoming traffic, minimises the potential 
costs to survival if one were to be hit by oncoming traffic. This might be an 
example of biased behaviour without biased beliefs. Finally, believing that 
climate-control is not man-made reduces psychological costs of guilt and 
minimises efficiency costs, or even financial costs, if one behaves in line with the 
belief by driving rather than taking public transport or by opting out of paying 
the carbon offsetting fee. This might be an example of a biased belief combined 
with a biased behaviour.  
This thesis discusses several deviations from rationality, which carry different 
types and levels of costs. Overall, the balance of costs and benefits of 
irrationality in each case might explain why some irrational beliefs and 
behaviours are more common than others (e.g., uncommon deviations from 
rationality, such as delusions, are dysfunctional). I use such differences in the 
prevalence of different types of irrationality to loosely place the investigated 
deviations from rationality along a continuum of abnormal to normal 
irrationality. This continuum assumes the statistical meanings of the words 
“normal” and “abnormal”: “ordinary or usual” versus “different from what is 
usual or average” (Cambridge Dictionary, 2014).  
1.3 Delusions and the Jumping-to-Conclusions Bias 
Starting with an abnormal deviation from rationality, two studies within this 
thesis focus on the association between the so-called jumping-to-conclusions 
(JTC) bias (i.e., basing decisions on minimal evidence; further described under 
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1.3.1 on page 28) and the formation of delusions, which “are fixed beliefs that 
are not amenable to change in light of conflicting evidence” according to the 
fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-
V; American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 87). Delusions display a wide 
variety of contents; for example, persecutory delusions are beliefs that one is 
going to be harmed by others (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
Delusions form a key feature of schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic 
disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). They also appear in bipolar 
disorder, depression, dementias, or after brain damage (Coltheart et al., 2011; 
Garety & Freeman, 2013).  
Delusions carry costs to patients and their families in terms of suffering, 
employment difficulties, and social isolation, as well as costs to society in terms 
of healthcare, with specific concerns such as high relapse rates, potentially 
exacerbated by low adherence to medication, which, in turn, tends to be of only 
medium effectiveness (Knapp, 2005). Improved understanding of 
psychopathological conditions could potentially be achieved by focusing on 
individual symptoms rather than on diagnostic syndromes (Garety & Freeman, 
2013). For example, a specific focus on delusions, one positive symptom within a 
diagnostic syndrome such as schizophrenia, has led to various theories 
regarding their formation and maintenance (Garety & Freeman, 1999), such as 
an impaired theory of mind (for a review see Brüne, 2005) or reasoning biases, 
such as a bias against disconfirmatory evidence (e.g., Speechley, Ngan, Moritz, 
& Woodward, 2012) or the JTC bias. In this thesis, I focus on the theory that 
basing a decision on minimal evidence (i.e., showing the JTC bias; Huq, Garety, 
& Hemsley, 1988; P. Taylor, Hutton, & Dudley, 2014) contributes to the 
formation and maintenance of delusions. 
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Psychotic symptoms, such as delusions, are also found in non-clinical 
populations with prevalence rates of up to 20% (Peters, 2010; van Os, Linscott, 
Myin-Germeys, Delespaul, & Krabbendam, 2009), and their presence forms a 
risk factor for the development of diagnosable disorders (e.g., Heriot-Maitland, 
Knight, & Peters, 2012; Kelleher et al., 2012). The presence of psychotic 
symptoms and delusional ideation in the general population has led to the idea 
that psychosis might exist on a continuum, with clinical psychosis and delusions 
at an extreme end of the spectrum (e.g., Freeman, Pugh, & Garety, 2008; Peters, 
Joseph, & Garety, 1999).  
Considering the presence of delusional ideation in the general population and 
its potential precursory role in the formation and persistence of clinical 
delusions (Garety & Freeman, 2013), the investigation of reasoning processes in 
sub-clinical samples is highly relevant (L. O. White & Mansell, 2009). The 
knowledge gained from sub-clinical studies could potentially be used to inform 
intervention treatment programs, which in turn could be cost-effective 
compared to existing methods (e.g., McCrone, Craig, Power, & Garety, 2010). 
Although Andreou, Moritz, Veith, Veckenstedt, and Naber (2013) did not find 
an effect of dopamine agonists or dopamine antagonists on the JTC bias (i.e., 
basing decisions on minimal evidence), results from studies using patient 
samples could be more varied due to differences between participants in 
medication use, duration of illness, and other cognitive impairments (Colbert & 
Peters, 2002; Garety & Freeman, 1999). While the literature reviewed below 
encompasses findings from both clinical and non-clinical samples, the studies 
on the JTC bias within this thesis focus on delusion-proneness in non-clinical 
populations. This was done in order to investigate the association between 
Chapter 1 
28 
 
delusional ideation and the JTC bias under rigorous experimental control and at 
an early time in the potential developmental trajectory of a disorder.  
1.3.1 Jumping-to-Conclusions Bias and the Beads Task 
As mentioned above, a consistently found reasoning bias is known as the 
jumping to conclusions (JTC) bias (Garety & Freeman, 1999, 2013). A JTC bias is 
reflected by decision making based on minimal evidence (P. Taylor et al., 2014). 
The JTC bias is thought to contribute to delusion formation and maintenance, 
perhaps because individuals with this bias adopt bizarre and unjustified beliefs 
on the basis of minimal evidence and with minimal consideration of alternative 
conclusions (Garety & Freeman, 2013). The JTC bias has been found for clinical 
patients with delusions (e.g., Huq et al., 1988) and healthy controls who are 
delusion-prone (e.g., Colbert & Peters, 2002; McKay, Langdon, & Coltheart, 
2006), although some studies fail to find the JTC bias, even for delusional 
patients (e.g., McKay, Langdon, & Coltheart, 2007). It must also be noted that 
the results for comparisons between delusion-prone and non-delusion-prone 
participants are generally not as robust or as extreme as for comparisons 
between delusional and non-delusional participants (Freeman, 2007; Zawadzki 
et al., 2012). Yet, in a recent literature review investigating studies since 1999, 
Garety and Freeman (2013) found that 74% of clinical studies found an 
association between delusions or psychosis and the JTC bias, while 85% of non-
clinical studies found an association between delusion-proneness and the JTC 
bias.  
As mentioned earlier (under 1.1 on page 19), the JTC bias is often investigated 
using the beads task, which was initially used to investigate probabilistic 
reasoning in the general population (Phillips & Edwards, 1966). The beads task 
generally consists of the presentation of two jars, each containing beads of two 
Chapter 1 
29 
 
colours in a specific ratio. The ratios in the two jars are usually complementary 
(cf. Speechley, Whitman, & Woodward, 2010). For example: jar A contains 85 
red beads and 15 green beads, jar B contains 15 red beads and 85 green beads. 
The jars are hidden from view and the experimenter draws a series of beads, 
ostensibly at random, from one of the jars. In reality, this pseudo-random order 
is predetermined. The entire series of drawn beads is from the same jar and, 
although often not explicitly stated, the jar from which the beads are drawn is 
ostensibly chosen at random (i.e., both jars are equally likely to be chosen). The 
participant has to decide from which jar the beads are drawn. Once a decision 
has been made, the drawing is terminated and the participant gives a confidence 
rating for the decision made. The JTC bias is operationalised as participants high 
in delusional thinking using significantly fewer data compared to controls (Huq 
et al., 1988). A different operationalisation is based on a large proportion of 
delusional patients deciding after one or two draws (Garety & Freeman, 1999, 
2013; Moritz & Woodward, 2005). Considering a decision as JTC at one or two 
draws could be considered relatively arbitrary (e.g., why is deciding after three 
jars not JTC), and, as such, I did not use this operationalisation within this 
thesis.  
Based on different studies with different measures, the JTC bias has been 
suggested to involve several components: premature decisions after minimal 
data gathering (e.g., Colbert & Peters, 2002; Garety, Hemsley, & Wessely, 1991), 
over-confidence concerning the decision made (e.g., Huq et al., 1988; McKay et 
al., 2006), and over-adjustment after contradictory evidence (e.g., Garety et al., 
1991).  
These different components are commonly assessed through different versions 
of the beads task. In a draws-to-decision version, participants have to decide 
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from which jar the series of beads is drawn. After each bead, the participants are 
asked if they are certain which jar the beads are drawn from or if they need 
another draw. The trial is ended once a decision has been made (Moritz & 
Woodward, 2005). This version is more sensitive to the premature-decision 
component of the JTC bias than other versions. Another option is to request 
probability estimates (or graded estimates on a Likert scale) that the drawn 
sequence is from either of the jars after each draw for a fixed number of draws 
(Moritz & Woodward, 2005). This version is more sensitive to over-adjustment 
of probabilities after conflicting evidence than other versions. This thesis adopts 
both a draws-to-decision version (Chapter 2) and a probability-estimates version 
(Chapter 3), to investigate both decisions and beliefs that potentially underpin 
decisions.  
1.3.1.1 Variations of the Beads Task 
The JTC bias, or its components, are consistently found despite variations in the 
beads task. Common variations include different ratios of beads in the jars and 
variations in task content. 
The relatively easy 85:15 ratio has been used to prevent floor effects (i.e., 
immediate decisions) in patients (Garety & Freeman, 1999), but with more 
difficult ratios, such as 60:40, the JTC bias has also been found (e.g., Warman, 
Lysaker, Martin, Davis, & Haudenschield, 2007). Although most studies have 
used one ratio, some have included different conditions with different ratios 
(e.g., Dudley, John, Young, & Over, 1997b; Lincoln, Ziegler, Mehl, & Rief, 2010). 
In these different conditions, a main effect of condition is found, so that all 
participants draw more beads before deciding in a 60:40 ratio condition than in 
an 85:15 ratio condition. This effect merely reflects task difficulty, as it does not 
interact with delusional status and does not abolish the JTC bias, as delusional 
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patients consider less evidence than healthy controls in conditions with both 
easy and difficult ratios. Recently, using large, student samples, Cafferkey, 
Murphy, and Shevlin (2014) found no association between delusion-proneness 
and the JTC bias on a task using the 85:15 ratio (based on n=140), but there was 
an association between delusion-proneness and the JTC bias using the 60:40 
ratio (based on n=144). This suggests that in sub-clinical samples, as used in this 
thesis, the ratios might have to be more difficult to elicit a JTC bias.  
In terms of content, the beads task provides a relatively pure measure of 
reasoning in delusional participants because of its neutral nature with respect to 
delusional topics (Warman et al., 2007). However, Woodward, Munz, LeClerc, 
and Lecomte (2009) have argued that the beads task might be too abstract, 
which could interfere with comprehension. More concrete and realistic, yet 
emotionally neutral, contents have been used, without affecting the JTC bias. 
For example, Dudley, John, Young, and Over (1997a) asked participants to judge 
whether names of students came from a school mainly for boys or from a school 
mainly for girls, with male and female names in 60:40 ratios. Others (Speechley 
et al., 2010; Whitman & Woodward, 2011; Woodward et al., 2009) have adapted 
the content to a fisherman presenting fish (cf. beads) from one of two lakes (cf. 
jars) with different ratios of differently coloured fish. These contents did not 
affect the JTC bias. 
A different story might arise for information which is emotional or self-referent, 
which might increase salience and lead to a more extreme JTC bias. For 
example, in such studies, each participant was told that two groups of people 
had been asked to describe them. One survey group had supplied mostly 
positive descriptions (e.g., describing the participant as friendly) whereas the 
other had supplied mostly negative descriptions (e.g., describing the participant 
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as impatient). A series of these trait descriptions were then drawn and 
participants had to decide from which of the two survey groups the descriptions 
were being drawn. Dudley et al. (1997a) asked participants to imagine the 
survey groups described someone ostensibly similar to the participant. The JTC 
bias found for delusional patients was similar in this emotionally salient 
condition and in the neutral condition, which involved the standard beads-in-
jars content. Using the same content, however, Warman and Martin (2006) 
found an association between JTC and delusion-proneness only for the 
emotionally salient version, but not for the neutral beads task. Warman et al. 
(2007) asked participants to generate several comments about themselves or to 
select comments from a list of suggestions which they considered to be highly 
reflective of themselves. These comments were then used to construct the two 
surveys. On the draws-to-decision measure, Warman et al. (2007) found no 
difference in the JTC bias between their emotionally salient condition and the 
standard beads condition. However, an interaction between delusional status 
and task content was found for confidence levels: in the standard condition, 
delusional, delusion-prone, and non-delusion-prone participants did not differ, 
but in the emotionally salient condition, delusional patients were more 
confident about their decisions than the delusion-prone and non-delusion-prone 
individuals, who did not differ from each other. Fraser, Morrison, and Wells 
(2006) found that emotional content does lead to faster decisions, but does so 
equally for clinical groups and for healthy controls.  
Overall, the above studies suggest that changing the ratios or the content of the 
beads task does not affect the JTC bias, especially if the alternative content is 
also emotionally neutral. Accordingly, the draws-to-decision study in this thesis 
used a single ratio. However, in the second JTC study, a probability-estimates 
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version, we manipulated ratios to investigate probability reasoning. Both JTC 
studies adopted the fisherman scenario as it might be more relatable and 
engaging than beads in jars, while at the same time remaining neutral with 
respect to items on the delusional ideation measure we employed. 
1.3.1.2 Limitations of the Beads-Task Methodology 
The methodology of the beads task carries a few potential confounds of the JTC 
bias. The influence of miscomprehension, working memory deficits, probability 
reasoning deficits, and a lack of motivation are discussed below. The focus on 
these potential limitations does not imply that other factors, such as mood (e.g., 
Lee, Barrowclough, & Lobban, 2011) or anxiety (e.g., Lincoln, Lange, Buau, 
Exner, & Moritz, 2010), could not influence the JTC bias, but the selected factors 
are most relevant to the two JTC studies in this thesis. 
1.3.1.2.1 Miscomprehension 
It has been suggested that the irrational responses made on the beads task (i.e., 
deciding after one or two beads) could be due to poor task comprehension 
(Moritz & Woodward, 2005). In particular, people might think that jars are being 
swapped throughout the sequence or that they should base their judgment on 
each single bead rather than on the entire sequence. Misunderstanding could 
explain the over-adjustment and premature decisions components of the JTC 
bias.  
Some studies have specifically investigated the effect of miscomprehension on 
the JTC bias. Balzan, Delfabbro, and Galletly (2012) found that more than half of 
their participants misunderstood the beads task and jumped from thinking it 
was the suggested jar to the other after a single piece of conflicting evidence. Of 
the participants who did not comprehend the task (i.e., those who gave higher 
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ratings for the jar not suggested by the sequence seen so far), 37.8% made 
premature decisions (i.e., a “definite” rating after one bead) and 2.19% over-
adjusted, whereas of participants who did comprehend the task only 11.4% 
decided prematurely and 0.41% over-adjusted. Qualitative analysis indicated 
that participants thought the jars were being swapped (Balzan, Delfabbro, & 
Galletly, 2012). When Balzan, Delfabbro, Galletly, and Woodward (2012) 
included a clinical schizophrenic group, they again found high levels of 
miscomprehension. They also found high levels of premature decisions and 
high levels of over-adjustment for miscomprehending compared to 
comprehending participants. 
Including explicit instructions stating that all beads come from one and the same 
jar does not abolish the JTC bias, as delusional patients continue to make more 
premature decisions and over-adjust more than controls in studies with such 
explicit (and sometimes directive4) instructions (Balzan, Delfabbro, Galletly, et 
al., 2012; Garety et al., 1991; Woodward et al., 2009). Whitman, Menon, Kuo, and 
Woodward (2012) found that when participants were to select one of three lakes 
as the source of a collection of fish in a downstream lake, a relatively large 
number of participants did not select the most likely lake at an above-chance 
level. This also suggests participants do not comprehend the instructions as 
intended. 
As the JTC bias is still found despite explicit instructions, it seems likely that this 
bias is related to delusional reasoning. However, to ensure task comprehension 
                                                          
4 Directive, explicit instructions inform participants how to behave in response to 
disconfirming evidence: “participants were reminded that, in addition to changing 
containers completely upon presentation of a contrasting bead colour, they also had the 
option of changing their confidence within the same container (e.g., from ‘very likely’ to 
‘probably’)” (Balzan, Delfabbro, Galletly, et al., 2012, p. 536). 
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in this thesis, stringent methods were adopted. First, explicit instructions and 
several comprehension questions, which had to be answered correctly in order 
to continue, were included to minimise the risk of miscomprehension. Second, 
miscomprehension regarding the swapping of lakes within a sequence was 
eliminated by presenting all fish at once (second task in Chapter 2) or by only 
presenting one fish (Chapter 3).  
1.3.1.2.2 Working Memory Deficits 
Related to miscomprehension are potential working memory deficits, which 
would impair the ability to maintain and manipulate information, such as the 
rules of the task and the sequence of beads presented (Dudley et al., 1997b). 
Associations between the JTC bias and poor working memory have been found 
for participants at risk of developing a psychotic disorder (Broome et al., 2007) 
and for delusional patients (Freeman et al., 2014; Garety et al., 2013). Ochoa et al. 
(in press) also found associations between working memory and the JTC bias for 
both schizophrenic patients and healthy controls.  
Several studies have included a memory aid in the beads task, explicitly 
reminding participants of the ratios of the beads in the jars and showing the 
colours of the previously drawn sequence of beads. Most studies have found 
that schizophrenic or delusional patients still requested fewer beads than 
psychiatric and healthy controls, despite the presence of a memory aid (e.g., 
Dudley et al., 1997b; Lincoln, Ziegler, Mehl, et al., 2010; Moritz & Woodward, 
2005; Moritz, Woodward, & Lambert, 2007), but Menon, Pomarol-Clotet, 
McKenna, and McCarthy (2006) found that group differences were no longer 
significant in the presence of a memory aid.  
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It could be argued that the memory aids only help in reducing the load of 
maintaining information, but not for the manipulation of presented information. 
Impaired working memory could lead to additional noise in decision-making 
processes, which, in turn, could potentially account for the JTC bias 
(Moutoussis, Bentall, El-Deredy, & Dayan, 2011). To minimise noise as much as 
possible, the studies on the JTC bias in the present thesis included memory aids 
in the form of visually and numerically presenting the ratios of black to white 
fish in either lake and visually presenting the sequence of previously-seen fish.  
1.3.1.2.3 Probability Reasoning Deficits 
Delusional or delusion-prone participants might have general probability 
reasoning deficits which lead them to decide early, rather than that they jump to 
conclusions because of a specific cognitive bias.  
In various non-beads-task paradigms, delusional or delusion-prone participants 
provided similar probability ratings for stimuli as controls, although different 
decisions were made based on these similar probability ratings (see e.g., 
LaRocco & Warman, 2009; McGuire, Junginger, Adams Jr., Burright, & 
Donovick, 2001; Moritz, Woodward, & Hausmann, 2006). However, as this 
thesis uses the beads task, potential differences in probability reasoning and in 
decision-making within this paradigm are considered.  
In their reviews of the JTC bias, measured through different dependent 
variables (e.g., draws-to-decision, probability estimates), Garety and Freeman 
(1999) and Fine, Gardner, Craigie, and Gold (2007) conclude that the general 
probability reasoning of delusional or delusion-prone participants is not 
impaired, especially not when considering neutral events. It must be noted that 
the general population provides conservative probability estimates on the beads 
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task, so that after seeing a bead, the likelihood is not incorporated into the 
posterior probability sufficiently, which, as a result, is closer to the prior 
probability than Bayes’ theorem would suggest (Phillips & Edwards, 1966). 
Investigations of whether such conservative probability estimates in the general 
population also lead to more “conservative” decision-making in the beads task 
(i.e., deciding on the basis of a lot of evidence) have, to the best of my 
knowledge, not been conducted. The study reported in Chapter 2 addresses 
whether healthy participants are conservative in a draws-to-decision version of 
the beads task.  
Although probability reasoning appears unimpaired, the aforementioned 
differences in decision-making point to a possible explanation for the JTC bias: 
delusional or delusion-prone individuals might make decisions between 
competing hypotheses more easily compared with controls. For example, they 
might accept and act upon a hypothesis at a probability level of 78%, whereas 
controls might not consider this probability high enough to accept the 
hypothesis and might require a probability of 90%. This idea, known as the 
liberal acceptance account (e.g., Moritz et al., 2007; L. O. White & Mansell, 2009), 
states that probability reasoning in delusional or delusion-prone participants is 
not affected, but that they have a lower decision threshold for decisions, which 
can be reached after two beads, for example, and this would lead to the JTC bias 
(see Figure 1.1). 
Chapter 1 
38 
 
 
Figure 1.1 The liberal acceptance of hypotheses account for the JTC bias (adapted from 
Fig. 2 in Moritz et al., 2007). In a standard beads task, one jar contains 85% 
red beads and 15% green beads, and vice versa in the other jar. After seeing 
one or two red beads, controls and delusional or delusion-prone 
participants provide the same (conservative) probability estimates (grey 
bars) for either jar. However, controls have a higher decision threshold 
(dashed line) than delusional or delusion-prone participants (dotted line). 
After one red bead, the probability estimates for either jar do not reach 
either group’s decision threshold. After two red beads, however, the 
probability that they are from the red jar is high enough for delusional or 
delusion-prone participants to decide, but not yet for controls. This leads to 
the JTC bias, while probability reasoning is intact.  
Following this account, Moritz et al. (2007) suggested that in a more ambiguous 
situation, the JTC bias should be abolished as no hypothesis will reach the 
(lower) decision threshold. In their study, participants completed three tasks. 
The first two tasks were standard graded-estimates and draws-to-decision 
versions, respectively. In the first task, participants were also asked to indicate 
whether their provided probability judgment would be sufficient evidence for a 
decision. The third task involved probability judgments after each bead, but this 
time for each of four jars, each with different ratios of beads. As there were 
multiple alternatives, with similar ratios, no hypothesis should stand out, and 
therefore no JTC should occur. In the first two tasks, the decision threshold was 
Chapter 1 
39 
 
lower for schizophrenic patients than for controls; in the third task, however, no 
group differences occurred. This supports the liberal acceptance account (Moritz 
et al., 2007). However, L. O. White and Mansell (2009) did not find support for 
this account. In their study, delusion-prone participants and control participants 
performed several draws-to-decision versions of the beads task, including one 
with multiple jars. Delusion-prone participants decided on the basis of fewer 
beads compared with the controls in all conditions. L. O. White and Mansell 
(2009) argue that the discrepancy between theirs and Moritz et al.’s (2007) 
results might be due to Moritz et al. using a graded-estimates version, where a 
decision would not terminate trials. This might be less sensitive to a JTC 
reasoning style (Fine et al., 2007; Garety & Freeman, 1999), perhaps because 
participants decide faster when their decisions truly affect the trials.  
The JTC studies in this thesis included draws-to-decision (in Chapter 2) and 
probability-estimates (in Chapter 3) versions of the task. These different 
measures were used to investigate whether potential differences in probability 
estimates were associated with potential differences in decision-making 
between low-delusion-prone and high-delusion-prone participants. 
1.3.1.2.4 A Lack of Motivation 
Finally, the JTC bias could be affected by low levels of motivation. The standard 
beads task presents no incentive to arrive at the correct decision regarding 
which jar is the source of the sequence of beads, other than to impress the 
experimenter. Considering the reduced working-memory capacity of delusional 
or delusion-prone participants, they might be relatively unmotivated to engage 
with a pointless task and might be in a “rush” to finish the study (L. O. White & 
Mansell, 2009). This lack of motivation, rather than an interesting cognitive bias, 
could then lead to the same JTC behaviour on the beads task, especially 
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considering the notion that participants might only exert the required effort to 
reach rational decisions on reasoning tasks for which they are highly motivated 
(Kühberger, 2000). Perhaps, this lower motivation to arrive at a normatively 
correct conclusion about the jars could lead to the lowered decision-threshold 
suggested under the liberal acceptance account described above.  
This confound could be addressed by introducing incentives in the beads task, 
which has been done to a very limited extent. Woodward et al. (2009) 
incorporated two conditions in which correct responses were rewarded with 
$0.25 or with $5. The analyses showed no significant difference between 
conditions, so that rewarding correct responses did not seem to affect patients’ 
JTC bias. Woodward et al. (2009) suggested that this lack of an effect could be 
due to patients’ ceiling performance, where patients already performed the best 
they could and monetary incentives could not improve performance above this 
threshold.  
Lincoln, Ziegler, Mehl, et al. (2010) also used monetary incentives and did not 
find a difference in performance in this incentivised condition versus a non-
incentivised condition. Lincoln, Ziegler, Mehl, et al. (2010) gave participants an 
initial ten tokens, each worth €0.25 at the end of the experiment. For a correct 
decision, they could earn one token; an incorrect decision would cost five 
tokens. Furthermore, participants were instructed that at some point no more 
beads would be drawn and the absence of a decision would leave the number of 
tokens unchanged. In order to equal losses and gains, five out of six decisions 
had to be correct and, therefore, a decision should only be made after 83.3% 
(5/6=.833) certainty was reached. Participants in all three groups decided faster 
than the Bayesian conditional probabilities would dictate. Lincoln, Ziegler, 
Mehl, et al. (2010) suggest that, despite not yet reaching a certainty level of 
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83.3%, participants may have been afraid the trial would be terminated, leading 
them to decide early so as not to miss an opportunity to win a token.  
These studies do not seem to suggest that monetary incentives abolish the JTC 
bias, although neither tested specifically for the effect of such incentives. The 
two JTC studies in this thesis investigate the role of incentives further, as 
described in more detail in the introductions of Chapters 2 and 3. Furthermore, 
in order to investigate whether decision-making is really “premature” versus 
“conservative” (a question mentioned earlier, see 1.3.1.2.3 on page 37), the 
decision should be compared against an optimal decision point, much like 
conservative probability reasoning has been compared against the Bayesian 
posterior probability (Phillips & Edwards, 1966). In order for such a point to 
exist, one must consider both costs and benefits of deciding early, as elaborated 
upon in Chapter 2. Without such an objective point, it is not valid to label 
decisions as “premature” or “conservative”. Compare, for example, a situation 
where one compares the incomes of bankers and of movie stars. One could 
observe that bankers earn less than movie stars, but it would not be warranted 
to conclude from this that bankers are poor. Likewise, by just comparing people 
who use fewer data in their decision-making to people who use more data, one 
cannot label decisions made by the former as “premature” or those made by the 
latter as “conservative”. The study in Chapter 2 addressed this absolute, rather 
than relative, JTC bias. Differences between relative and absolute 
operationalisations have also been found for the optimism bias (discussed later 
at 1.5.1 on page 51). 
The JTC bias could be a precursor to delusions. Delusions are a psychologically 
and, arguably, biologically maladaptive phenomenon (McKay & Dennett, 2009), 
with the potential of harm to the self or others (e.g., in the Cotard delusion, 
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where one believes that one is dead, self-harm might be evoked to “prove” that 
one would not bleed) or of social isolation (e.g., when one believes others are 
conspiring against them, one may choose not to leave the house). Therefore, the 
JTC bias, which is associated with delusion formation, might represent an 
evolutionarily maladaptive deviation from rationality present in a minority of 
the population.5 From such maladaptive deviations from rationality, the thesis 
continues to investigate other types of biases, some of which might actually be 
biologically adaptive, as discussed below.  
1.4 Evolutionary Biases and Error-Management Theory 
Perfectly rational decisions require maintenance of accurate representations of 
all probabilities involved, as well as representations of the costs of erroneous 
decisions. The biological limitations of human brain capacity complicate such 
optimal decisions and, instead, lead to deviations from rational belief (D. D. P. 
Johnson, Blumstein, Fowler, & Haselton, 2013). Not all of these deviations need 
to be evolutionarily maladaptive, as is presumably the case with the JTC bias 
(McKay & Dennett, 2009). Sometimes, deviations from rational beliefs might be 
evolutionarily adaptive. In such cases, normative rationality is determined by 
utility maximisation given the goals and beliefs of the individual, while 
“evolutionary rationality”, with “rationality” at the locus of the genes 
themselves, is determined by maximisation of reproductive fitness (Stanovich & 
West, 2000). The idea of evolutionary influence on reasoning behaviour and 
belief revision is supported by the notion that there is variation in participants’ 
responses on the reasoning problems used to study rationality, such as the 
                                                          
5 Zolotova and Brüne (2006) found support for the notion that persecutory delusions are 
pathological exaggerations of threat recognition systems, which were adaptive in the 
ancestral environment. However, being pathological exaggerations, delusions should still 
be considered evolutionarily maladaptive.  
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Linda problem described earlier (under 1.1 on page 21). Some people do provide 
the normatively rational response. Variation in responses would suit the 
purpose of natural selection, which can select for the behaviours most adaptive 
in ever-changing environments (Greene & Levy, 2000). DeKay, Haselton, and 
Kirkpatrick (2000) argue that it is no surprise that human reasoning, formed 
through millennia of natural selection favouring processes which increased 
fitness, can fall short of the normative reasoning required in the problems used 
in rationality research, which are a few decades old, at best. Hence, sometimes, 
what is thought to be irrational compared to the normative response could be 
adaptive in an evolutionary sense.  
To determine whether responses are biologically adaptive, one should consider 
the costs and benefits of various decisions. For example, foraging for food 
would carry the costs of potential time and energy wasted looking for food in 
new places where there might be none, but the potential benefits include finding 
more food than available in the current location, which could then sustain a 
larger family and thus increase evolutionary fitness. Deciding not to forage 
could lead to starvation once the food source in the current location is depleted. 
However, given the uncertainty regarding whether there are other food sources, 
errors could be made. The two errors that could be made in this particular case 
are not to forage when better food sources are available, and to forage when no 
better food sources are available (Greene & Levy, 2000). 
As mentioned above, uncertainty can lead to errors in decision-making. The 
costs of different types of errors are often recurrently asymmetrical (D. D. P. 
Johnson et al., 2013). Although it might increase overall error rates, a bias 
against committing the more costly error(s) would be evolutionarily adaptive 
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(Haselton & Nettle, 2006; McKay & Efferson, 2010). This theory is known as 
error management theory (EMT; Haselton & Buss, 2000).  
EMT has been applied to many domains to explain various biases (Haselton & 
Nettle, 2006; D. D. P. Johnson et al., 2013). For example, in the perception 
domain, it would be evolutionarily less costly to anticipate the arrival of the 
source of a tone (e.g., a predator) too early and have ample time to prepare than 
to prepare too late (Neuhoff, 2001). Hence, the mind might be biased towards 
interpreting approaching sounds to be nearer than they are. Indeed, Neuhoff 
(2001) found that participants judge an approaching tone to be closer than it 
really is. Another example is the illusion of control, where people have a 
superstitious belief that their behaviour influences outcomes which are not truly 
contingent on their behaviour (Alloy & Abramson, 1982; A. J. L. Harris & 
Osman, 2012; Rudski, 2001). Believing that one’s behaviour can control 
outcomes can be beneficial, as an absence of this illusion of control, or even 
learned helplessness, is found in depressed participants (Alloy & Abramson, 
1982). Generally, believing that one’s behaviour controls outcomes when it does 
not, especially when the behaviour is not effortful, may be less costly than 
believing one’s behaviour cannot control outcomes while it can (A. J. L. Harris & 
Osman, 2012; Rudski, 2001). The costs of expending some energy to pointlessly 
press a lever are arguably less than the psychological costs of assuming chaos, 
which may lead to learned helplessness, which, in turn, is linked to depression. 
Therefore, the illusion of control might be an adaptive bias, and possibly 
explained by EMT. 
1.4.1 Sexual Over-Perception 
The most prominent example EMT has been applied to is the sexual over-
perception bias, where men perceive more sexual interest from a woman than 
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the woman herself reports or other women perceive (Haselton & Buss, 2000). In 
the mating domain, sexual interest is interpreted from behavioural signals, 
which are contaminated by noise (e.g., if playing "hard-to-get", sexually-
interested women might not display sexually-interested behaviours; Jonason & 
Li, 2013). This leads to the four alternatives in signal detection theory (see Figure 
1.2): correct rejections, where no sexual interest is perceived from the behaviour 
of non-sexually-interested women; hits, where sexual interest is perceived from 
the behaviour of sexually-interested women; false alarms, where sexual interest 
is perceived from the behaviour of non-sexually-interested women; and misses, 
where no sexual interest is perceived from the behaviour of sexually-interested 
women.  
Given that the perception of a woman’s sexual interest influences men’s 
courtship-initiating behaviour (Choi & Hur, 2013), the two errors a man can 
make in the perception of a potential mate’s sexual interest carry different costs. 
A false alarm would result in a waste of time and effort when making futile 
advances, while a miss would result in a missed opportunity to reproduce. 
According to EMT theorists, the costs of these errors are highly asymmetrical, 
and EMT accordingly predicts that errors should be biased towards false alarms 
rather than misses, to minimise overall fitness costs. Hence, men are predicted 
to over-perceive sexual interest from women, perhaps by adopting a more 
liberal threshold for assuming sexual interest (Farris, Treat, Viken, & McFall, 
2008a; Shotland & Craig, 1988).  
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Figure 1.2 A signal detection model of the four alternatives in interpreting a woman’s 
sexual interest (inspired by Fig. 2 in Farris et al., 2008b). A woman’s different 
behaviours towards a man can signal different levels of sexual interest (x-axis; 
ranging from, for example, making eye contact to touching a man’s genitals). 
Some behaviour is shown both by women who are not sexually interested 
(dashed line) and who are sexually interested (solid line), and the signalled 
level of sexual interest is ambiguous. Men have to interpret this ambiguous 
information and decide when they assume sexual interest (indicated by the 
black vertical line: assume a woman is not sexually interested with behaviours 
left to the line, assume a woman is sexually interested with behaviours right to 
the line). Correct interpretations can result in correct rejections (diagonally 
striped area) or in hits (light grey area). Incorrect interpretations lead to false 
alarms (vertically striped area) or to misses (dark grey area).  
Evidence in support of this prediction has accumulated, especially for 
behaviours that could be expressed in platonic as well as sexually-intended 
interactions (Lindgren, Parkhill, George, & Hendershot, 2008). Abbey (1982) first 
found this bias in an experiment where a male and a female actor had a 
conversation, while unbeknown to them, a male and a female observer observed 
the conversation. All four participants then judged the male and female actors 
on several traits, including promiscuity and flirtatiousness. Actors indicated 
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whether they were sexually attracted to and if they would want to date the other 
actor (i.e., their interaction partner). Observers judged whether they thought the 
two actors were sexually attracted to and would want to date each other. 
Overall, it was found that male actors and observers rated the female actor as 
more seductive and promiscuous than female actors rated themselves or than 
female observers rated the female actors. Male observers also considered the 
female actor to be more sexually attracted to and willing to date the male actor 
than did female observers (Abbey, 1982). Males also rated other men more 
highly on the sexual-intention-related items, suggesting that, perhaps, men 
generally perceive more sexual intentions in people’s behaviour compared to 
women (Abbey, 1982).  
Further research has also shown this male over-perception of sexual interest 
when males read a vignette describing interactions between male and female 
targets (Abbey & Harnish, 1995), instead of observing a dyad interacting 
(Abbey, 1982). Furthermore, the sexual over-perception bias can be exacerbated 
by situational cues, such as alcohol use and provocative clothing (Farris et al., 
2008b). Perilloux, Easton, and Buss (2012) found support for this sexual over-
perception bias and also showed that the level of sexual over-perception is 
moderated by attractiveness of both the perceiver and the actor. Men who 
considered themselves as more attractive also over-perceived more sexual 
interest from their female interaction partners. Moreover, the more attractive a 
female was rated by men, the more her sexual interest was over-perceived 
(Perilloux et al., 2012). Recently, Fletcher, Kerr, Li, and Valentine (2014) found 
that men, besides perceiving more sexual interest, also perceive more romantic 
interest, assuming females had a stronger desire to get to know them better or to 
go on a further date after a speed-date, than was actually the case. 
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After a review of the literature, Lindgren et al. (2008) argue that there is reliable 
support for the sexual over-perception bias shown by men. They note some 
limitations, however, such as that perceptions are measured only once and no 
information is available about possible changes in perception. Furthermore, 
although EMT offers a potential explanation of the sexual over-perception bias, 
different socialisation and cultural expectations can also lead men to have more 
sexual expectancies than women, leading them to perceive more sexual interest 
(Lindgren et al., 2008). The sexual over-perception study in this thesis addresses 
some limitations of both EMT’s theoretical underpinnings and of the evidence 
for the sexual over-perception bias, described in further detail in Chapter 4. 
To summarise, the sexual over-perception bias involves men having biased 
estimates of their prospects in the mating domain. Error management theory 
suggests that this bias has evolved because it leads to potential benefits in terms 
of biological fitness, at the expense of small costs, such as the psychological cost 
of rejection when pursuing females who are not interested. The focus of this 
thesis now shifts to a bias in estimates of future prospects present in both 
genders.  
1.5 Self-Deception 
Much like sexual over-perception has been theorised to be a result of 
evolutionary influences, von Hippel and Trivers (2011) argue that evolution 
may have promoted a capacity for self-deception. Self-deception is the 
motivated acquisition and retention of a belief in the face of countervailing 
evidence (Deweese-Boyd, 2012). There are various instances of self-deception 
(von Hippel & Trivers, 2011), including defensive strategies where hypotheses 
are maintained despite disconfirming evidence (Gur & Sackeim, 1979), and 
forms of self-enhancement. Self-deceptive self-enhancement describes the 
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phenomenon where the self is considered better, in some way, than appears 
justified (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009). If this better version of oneself is then 
signalled to others, it can increase one’s appeal as a social or reproductive 
partner, in turn enhancing reproductive fitness. This would mean self-
enhancement is evolutionarily adaptive (von Hippel & Trivers, 2011). Recently, 
Lamba and Nityananda (2014) have provided empirical support for the theory 
that self-deception is associated with others’ deception, as others are equally 
overconfident about someone’s abilities as the person is themselves.  
One example of self-enhancement is the “better-than-average” effect, where 
most people consider themselves above average on various desirable traits 
(Alicke, 1985). This is not just reported to impress others, without truly believing 
oneself to be more creative, intelligent, or mature. Williams and Gilovich (2008) 
found that participants were just as willing to play a bet where winning 
required them to score higher than a random other participant on a positive trait 
as they were to play a bet of a random draw using their percentile ratings. For 
example, if they indicated their score would be in the 60th percentile, their 
chances of winning in the random draw would be 60 out of 100. If they had not 
truly believed their reported percentiles, they should have favoured the 
percentile bet over the bet where they had to score higher than a random other 
person.  
Another example of self-enhancement is that people appear to think they are 
more attractive than they really are. Epley and Whitchurch (2008) presented 
participants with a set of pictures: one was an undistorted picture of the 
participant; others had been morphed into more attractive and less attractive 
representations of the participant. Participants had to indicate which picture 
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was the true representation of their own face, and tended to select slightly more 
attractive faces than their own.  
Unrealistic optimism, the phenomenon where good future outcomes are 
expected to be more likely, and bad future outcomes less likely, than indicated 
by an objective standard (Segerstrom, 2007; Shepperd, Klein, Waters, & 
Weinstein, 2013), could be considered another form of self-deception. People 
might self-deceive in thinking that they are more able to avoid misfortune and 
attract fortune than others. This bias is elaborated on below. 
Despite abundant examples of self-deception, the process underlying self-
deception is a long-debated issue (Mijovic-Prelec & Prelec, 2010). Several 
competing interpretations have been put forward.  
One interpretation draws an analogy between self-deception and interpersonal 
deception. Here, “person A deceives person B (where B may or may not be the 
same person as A) into believing that p only if A knows, or at least believes 
truly, that  p and causes B to believe that p” (Mele, 1997, p. 92). Hence, one 
belief ( p) must be held, but holding the other belief (p) must be desired. If self-
deception succeeds, one arrives at the belief p; if it fails, one maintains belief  p 
(D. L. Smith, 2011). A major paradox with this interpersonal analogy conception 
of self-deception is that one would have to hold beliefs p and  p at the same 
time (the “static” paradox). Another paradox (the “dynamic” paradox) is that 
one would have to deceive oneself into believing something that one knows to 
be false, and the knowledge of the deception process should undermine it and 
prevent adoption of the desired belief (Mele, 1997; Mijovic-Prelec & Prelec, 
2010). One response to these paradoxes is that one can hold two opposite beliefs 
(i.e., p and  p) at the same time, as long as one is held consciously and the other 
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subconsciously (Bandura, 2011; Gur & Sackeim, 1979), perhaps in different, 
autonomous modules of the mind (Kurzban, 2011). 
An alternative, “deflationary” account of self-deception avoids the paradoxes 
within the interpersonal-analogy account, without invoking several sub-selves 
at different levels of consciousness. Here, it is argued that there is no self-
deception when people are not aware of the falsity of what they are saying (p), 
because the truth ( p) is not known (Fridland, 2011). The truth can remain 
unknown through biased information processing, and even through 
unintentional, unmotivated, biasing processes, such as salience of certain types 
of information (Mele, 1997).  
Consider these two different conceptions within the optimism bias. On the 
classic conception of self-deception, a heavy smoker who believes her future 
health prospects are good may also represent a more accurate, and less rosy, 
state of affairs. In contrast, proponents of the deflationary view might argue that 
there is no need to suppose that she carries two conflicting representations. She 
may be processing evidence about the health implications of smoking in a 
biased fashion (Sharot, 2011) to arrive at one false representation. 
The study presented in Chapter 5 aimed to tease apart these two accounts of the 
processes underlying self-deception, focusing on the optimism bias. 
1.5.1 Unrealistic Optimism  
Unrealistic optimism is the phenomenon where good future outcomes are 
expected to be more likely, and bad future outcomes less likely, than indicated 
by an objective standard (Segerstrom, 2007; Shepperd et al., 2013). In moderate 
amounts, optimism can be beneficial as it has been associated with various 
positive outcomes, such as showing helpful financial behaviours for the future 
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(e.g., saving; Puri & Robinson, 2007), improving adjustment during life 
transitions due to better perceived social support (Brissette, Scheier, & Carver, 
2002), reducing stress (Solberg Nes & Segerstrom, 2006), and physical health (S. 
E. Taylor, Kemeny, Reed, Bower, & Gruenewald, 2000). Furthermore, people 
with major depressive disorder do not show these optimistic tendencies (Korn, 
Sharot, Walter, Heekeren, & Dolan, 2014), again suggesting that the optimism 
bias (in moderate amounts) is beneficial. However, this bias may also have 
significant drawbacks. For example, some authors have argued that unrealistic 
optimism has contributed to global economic crises (e.g., Sevincer, Wagner, 
Kalvelage, & Oettingen, 2014; Ubel, 2009). 
Unrealistic optimism is shown in many domains (Sharot, 2011a). Unrealistic 
comparative optimism is found when people report their chances of good 
outcomes compared to others’ chances (Shepperd et al., 2013). For example, 
people think their own marriages are less likely to result in divorce than are 
others’ marriages (Baker & Emery, 1993). Unrealistic absolute optimism is found 
when people report their chances compared to reality (Shepperd et al., 2013). 
For example, people expect to finish tasks faster than they do (Buehler, Griffin, 
& MacDonald, 1997; Buehler, Griffin, & Ross, 1995), and people underestimate 
their own chances of having alcohol-related problems later in life (Dillard, 
Midboe, & Klein, 2009). Optimism tends to be greatest for events which have 
not (yet) been personally experienced, which are rare, which are controllable, 
and which show symptoms early on (Weinstein, 1989).  
One potential argument is that unrealistic optimism is a reporting bias, where 
people do not truly believe what they report. However, much like participants 
still showed the better-than-average effect in Williams and Gilovich’s (2008) 
incentivised paradigm (discussed on page 49), Simmons and Massey (2012) 
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showed that, even when promised a large reward for accuracy, people reported 
optimistic beliefs that their favourite football team would win. This suggests 
that people truly believe their stated expectancies. These results do not clarify 
whether the false belief is held alongside another, sub-consciously held, 
veridical belief, or whether it is the only belief, arrived at through biased 
information processing. The former case would support the interpersonal-
analogy account of self-deception. The latter would support the deflationary 
account of self-deception. The study in Chapter 5 aimed to tease these two 
options apart, while incentivising the reporting of truly-held beliefs.  
The optimism studied in this thesis centres on the optimism bias for future 
(mis)fortune. Weinstein (1980) showed that people expected their own chances 
of experiencing positive events to be above average, while they estimated their 
chances of experiencing negative events as below average. Although some 
studies focus on overestimating the chances of experiencing positive events 
(e.g., Hoorens, Smits, & Shepperd, 2008), most focus on underestimating the 
chances of experiencing negative events. Optimism for such events tends to be 
stronger (Shepperd et al., 2013) and tends to carry more relevant consequences 
as people might not take the necessary precautions to protect against harmful 
behaviours (Weinstein & Klein, 1995). For these reasons, this thesis also focused 
on negative events. 
A. J. L. Harris and Hahn (2011) noted that statistical artefacts may have 
confounded unrealistic-optimism studies, especially comparative-optimism 
studies using rare events (Shepperd et al., 2013). These statistical artefacts 
include scale attenuation, minority undersampling, and base-rate regression. 
Scale attenuation could explain unrealistic optimism if a restricted response set, 
such as a 5-point Likert scale running from “much below average” to “much 
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above average”, is used. For a rare event, most people are at a below-average 
risk. Similarly, for rare events, the participant sample might genuinely not 
contain anyone from the minority sample who would experience the negative 
event. The participants in the study’s sample may thus be correct in their low 
expectations. Finally, when estimating an unknown, average person’s chances of 
experiencing a rare negative event, people’s estimates are often not extreme 
enough (i.e., they are not low enough/regressive). Yet, when estimating for 
oneself, enough information is available about behaviours that would decrease 
risks, so that low, non-regressive estimates are provided. This would then lead 
to unrealistic comparative optimism, where one’s own risk is considered to be 
lower than the average person’s risk (A. J. L. Harris & Hahn, 2011; Shepperd et 
al., 2013). Given these potential confounds, the unrealistic optimism studied in 
this thesis is limited to a paradigm least affected by such artefacts (Shah, 2012): 
optimistic belief updating (Sharot, Korn, & Dolan, 2011). 
In the optimistic belief-updating paradigm (Sharot, 2011a; Sharot, Guitart-
Masip, Korn, Chowdhury, & Dolan, 2012; Sharot et al., 2011) participants first 
indicate their chances of experiencing various adverse events. Participants are 
then presented with the base rate of the event happening to their demographic 
group; this constitutes the average person’s chance of experiencing the negative 
event. The base rate can provide desirable information (i.e., the event is less 
likely than initially thought) or undesirable information (i.e., the event is more 
likely than initially thought). Then, after having been presented with the base 
rates, participants are asked to provide their own chances again. Optimistic 
updating is investigated by comparing the amount of belief updating based on 
desirable information versus the amount of belief updating based on 
undesirable information. This paradigm includes adverse events with base rates 
Chapter 1 
55 
 
ranging from 10% to 70% and participants indicate their chances on a 0% to 
100% scale, avoiding rare events and minimising influences of scale attenuation. 
Furthermore, although base rates are presented, no comparison is made 
between estimates for the average person and for oneself, but rather for how 
desirable versus undesirable information is attended to, minimising the artefacts 
of minority undersampling and base-rate regression.  
Findings from this paradigm show that participants update their initial beliefs 
more when the base rate is lower than their initial guess (i.e., the base rate 
provides desirable information) than when the base rate is higher than their 
initial guess (i.e., it provides undesirable information), demonstrating an 
optimistic, selective updating of beliefs (Sharot et al., 2011). As such, the 
optimism bias is not just a bias of considering desirable events as more likely, 
and undesirable events as less likely, than they are (Shepperd et al., 2013). It also 
involves biased updating of beliefs about the probability of negative events, 
with an optimistic bias towards desirable information (i.e., information that 
indicates that undesirable events are less likely than initially thought).  
Such selective updating strongly suggests the bias is due to biased information 
processing, which could be carried out intentionally or unintentionally (Mele, 
1997). Intentionally biasing information processing would suggest the more 
veridical belief is actively avoided and thus support the interpersonal-analogy 
account of self-deception. Unintentional biased information processing would 
support the deflationary account of self-deception.  
To investigate whether biased information processing in the optimism bias is 
intentional or not, one could compare belief updating for undesirable items to 
belief updating for neutral, impersonal items. Biased processing, either 
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unintentionally or intentionally, is more likely for the former than for the latter; 
if the latter would be biased, it is unlikely that this would be due to intentional 
processes. For undesirable items, the base rates form an objective standard, 
where deviations from this standard on an individual level are still possible, 
given individuating information (e.g., a family history of a certain disease). Yet, 
for neutral, impersonal items, the objective standard would be the correct 
answer and deviations should not be found after having been presented with 
the answer, especially when participants are incentivised to provide accurate 
answers. Hence, based on wanting to maximise expected value by giving the 
correct answer for their own chances, participants would be justified in 
deviating from the base rate in the second estimate for undesirable items, due to 
individuating information they might have. They would not be justified in 
deviating from the correct answer for neutral items. As such, a difference in 
updating for the two types of items could simply be due to a maximisation of 
expected value, rather than due to self-deceptive optimism.  
In devising a possible solution to this problem of justifiable deviations in the 
second estimate for personal, negative items, but not for impersonal, neutral 
items within the belief-updating paradigm, we take inspiration from the crowd-
within literature (Herzog & Hertwig, 2009; Vul & Pashler, 2008). In this 
paradigm participants provide an estimated answer to a neutral question (e.g., 
“what percentage of the world’s airports are in the United States?”). They are 
then told to assume their initial answer was wrong, and asked to provide a 
second, alternative estimate (Vul & Pashler, 2008). Without directional feedback 
(cf. base rates in the optimistic belief-updating paradigm), the second estimates 
can be higher or lower than the first estimate. One’s intentions and desires 
might influence whether one gives a higher or lower second estimate compared 
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to the first estimate in the crowd-within paradigm. If there is no desire about the 
answer being either high or low, the second estimates are equally likely to be 
lower as they are to be higher than the first estimate. If there is a desire to hold a 
belief in a certain direction, second estimates might be systematically different 
from first estimates. We hypothesised there would be no desired directions for 
neutral questions, but there would be desired directions for undesirable 
questions. This was investigated in the study described in Chapter 5.  
Just as people appear to have irrationally optimistic beliefs about the future, 
some people have irrationally pessimistic, if not paranoid, beliefs about the 
intentions of others. Haselton and Nettle (2006) argued that both such biases can 
co-exist and be explained by error-management theory (EMT). This theory, as 
described earlier, holds that humans may have evolved cognitive systems 
biased towards making less costly errors when the costs of different types of 
errors are recurrently asymmetric. The optimism bias discussed above could be 
due to people overestimating the effectiveness of their own efforts to avoid 
misfortune. Thinking one’s efforts are effective, when they are not, may be 
overall less costly than assuming one’s efforts are not effective, when they are, 
which may lead one to not undertake action to prevent misfortune. Paranoid 
beliefs and distrust might arise because, over time, it would be beneficial to 
minimise the chance of failing to detect others’ negative intentions, at the cost of 
increasing the chance of inferring negative intentions when these are not really 
there (Haselton & Nettle, 2006). This thesis moves from optimistic beliefs about 
the future to more pessimistic beliefs about others’ intentions. In particular, the 
last part of the thesis will focus on apparent irrationality in trust behaviour.  
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1.6 Trusting in Trust Games 
Trust is generally defined as “a psychological state comprising the intention to 
accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or 
behaviour of another” (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998, p. 395). Trust 
could be measured through survey questions, such as “Generally speaking, 
would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in 
dealing with people?” (Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, & Soutter, 2000, p. 812). 
However, there is evidence that attitudinal self-report measures of trust, like 
answers to the question above, do not correlate with actual trust behaviours and 
correlate only weakly with one’s own trustworthy behaviour (Glaeser et al., 
2000).  
Given the relative lack of validity and reliability of survey measures of trust, 
another measure of trust focuses on behaviour in an economic game known as 
the trust game. The standard trust game involves two anonymous players 
interacting in two stages (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995). In the first stage, 
one participant, the sender, is endowed with a certain amount of money (e.g., 
£10) and can decide to send any portion (x), including nothing at all, of the 
endowment to the other player, the trustee. Whatever is not sent (£10-x) is kept 
by the sender. The portion sent (x) is then tripled (3x) and passed on to the 
trustee. In the second stage, the trustee can decide to return any portion (y), 
including nothing at all, of the received money (3x) to the sender. Panel A of 
Figure 1.3 shows the structure of this standard trust game. In a binary-choice 
version of the trust game (Camerer & Weigelt, 1988), the sender can decide to 
send a set amount of money (e.g., £10) or not in the first stage. If it is not sent, 
the game ends and both players receive a small reward (or in some cases the 
trustee does not receive anything). If it is sent, in the second stage the trustee 
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receives a multiple (multiplied by a factor >1) amount of the money sent (e.g., 
£30). The trustee can then decide to reward trust and send a set, fair amount of 
money back (e.g., £15) or to betray trust and keep (a large sum of) the received 
money (e.g., £22; Hong & Bohnet, 2007). Panel B of Figure 1.3 shows the 
structure of this binary trust game. The proportion of the endowment sent, or 
the choice to send a set amount, is considered a measure of trust. The returned 
proportion of the money received, or the choice to reward trust by returning a 
set, fair amount, is a measure of trustworthiness (N. D. Johnson & Mislin, 2011).  
 
Figure 1.3 The structure of the standard (panel A) and of the binary (panel B) trust game 
(panel B based on Figure 1 in Bohnet, Greig, Herrmann, & Zeckhauser, 2008). 
Stages at which a player makes a decision are shown in ovals; actions are 
represented by arrows; outcomes are depicted in rectangles. Note that in the 
standard trust game, the values x and y could be zero. Note also that the 
numbers provided are examples and studies have varied these amounts, 
including versions with no payment for the trustee if the sender opts out of the 
binary trust game (see the meta-analysis in N. D. Johnson & Mislin, 2011). 
From a neo-classical economics point of view, with assumptions of rationality 
based on maximisation of expected value, participants in the sender role in an 
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anonymous, one-shot trust game, should not trust, as participants in the trustee 
role have no incentive to reciprocate and thus should not return anything 
(Manapat, Nowak, & Rand, 2013; Weber, Malhotra, & Murnighan, 2004). Yet, 
Berg et al. (1995) found that, on average, senders sent 51.6% of their endowment, 
which was reciprocated by more than half of the trustees (sending back what 
had been invested or more). This is a common finding, as a meta-analysis of 162 
trust game scenarios showed that, on average, senders sent half of their 
endowment to the trustee, and the trustees return, on average, a bit more than 
the sum invested (N. D. Johnson & Mislin, 2011).  
As noted before, a normative standard like maximisation of expected value 
might be ignoring the influence of the environment (e.g., Sturm, 2012). In this 
case, the environment might have led to the evolution of trustworthy behaviour. 
Despite potential financial costs of being exploited, trust and trustworthiness 
tend to be beneficial for the economy and society at large (Hong & Bohnet, 2007; 
N. D. Johnson & Mislin, 2011). For example, correlational evidence shows that 
countries with higher levels of trust also have higher and more equal incomes 
(Knack & Keefer, 1997). Indeed, theories that trust is adaptive, leading to it 
being naturally selected for throughout evolution, have been put forth (Manapat 
et al., 2013; McNamara, Stephens, Dall, & Houston, 2009). 
Using the binary trust game as a model of naturally occurring cooperative 
interactions, McNamara et al. (2009) found that social awareness of variation in 
trusting and trustworthy behaviours can maintain such variation. At the 
extreme ends of trusting behaviour’s variation, senders would never or always 
trust, without gathering more information about the trustee’s trustworthiness. 
However, due to random mutations, some senders might be willing to gather 
and use more information in their decision whether to trust or not. Some 
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trustees might be aware of the possibility that a future sender might obtain 
information about the trustee’s past behaviours. This should then lead trustees 
to show trustworthy behaviour, at least on some occasions, so as to build a 
relatively trustworthy reputation. Senders, in turn, being aware of such 
variation in trustees’ trustworthiness, should be more willing to investigate the 
trustee’s past behaviours. With individual differences in the awareness of such 
variation in trusting and trustworthy behaviours, both are then maintained 
(McNamara et al., 2009). For such behaviour to robustly evolve, senders also 
need to use the information obtained about trustees’ trustworthiness in their 
decisions about which trustees to trust (Manapat et al., 2013). This then creates a 
free market where trustees need to meet the minimal demanded level of 
trustworthiness in order to be selected over competitor trustees (whose levels of 
trustworthiness may or may not be known), while making profit by occasionally 
betraying trust. Naturally occurring interactions in real life, throughout 
evolution, have often involved access to information regarding previous 
trustworthiness and involved choices of interaction partners. This might explain 
why trusting and trustworthy behaviours are still found in the (generally) 
anonymous, one-shot trust game (Manapat et al., 2013).  
Other factors than reputation management, such as geographical location, 
student samples, and whether people play against a real, other person or a 
computer, have been shown to influence trust and trustworthiness (N. D. 
Johnson & Mislin, 2011). This last influence, whether people play against 
another person or a computer, is highly relevant to the last study reported in 
this thesis. Different behaviours for playing against human players or a 
computer have been highlighted in the ultimatum game (Sanfey, Rilling, 
Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003). Here, two players have to divide an amount 
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of money between them. One player is the proposer and can propose an offer of 
how to divide the total sum. The other player, the responder, can either accept 
or reject the offer. If accepted, both players are paid the amount stated in the 
offer; if rejected, neither player gets paid anything. Participants in the role of the 
responder have been found to reject unfair offers (i.e., unequal splits with more 
money for the proposer) made by another human player at a significantly 
higher rate than that at which they reject computerised unfair offers (Sanfey et 
al., 2003). Rejecting any non-zero offer is irrational from the view of a standard 
economic model, as any non-zero offer would increase monetary payoff. 
However, unfair offers in the ultimatum game are often rejected, arguably 
because people want to punish the proposer for their unfairness and maintain a 
social reputation so as not to be exploited in the future (Nowak, Page, & 
Sigmund, 2000). Besides reputational concerns, Fehr and Gächter (2002) found 
that costly punishment can be an altruistic act, as it increases the probability that 
others will cooperate in future encounters, even when these encounters are with 
different people. These reasons may explain why Sanfey et al. (2003) found more 
rejections of unfair offers made by humans, who could be punished and might 
change their behaviour in the future, than of unfair offers made by a computer, 
which would not change its (random) choice based on having been punished.  
Overall, the theories explaining the differences in response to human and 
computerised unfair offers in the ultimatum game tend to extend to all 
cooperative interactions. Hence, differences between interacting with a human 
or with a computer should occur in the trust game as well. Indeed, a 
phenomenon known as betrayal aversion, described in more detail below, has 
been found when playing against humans, but not computers, in the trust game. 
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The fifth study of this thesis, reported in Chapter 6, focused on this 
phenomenon.  
1.6.1 Betrayal Aversion 
Betrayal aversion is the phenomenon where people avoid risk more when a 
person determines an uncertain outcome compared to when a random 
mechanism, such as a (computerised) lottery, determines the outcome (Aimone 
& Houser, 2012). 
Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) first reported this phenomenon. They used three 
variants of a one-shot game, in a between-subjects design: the decision problem, 
the risky dictator game, and the trust game. The decision problem (panel A in 
Figure 1.4) is a measure of risk-taking behaviour. Participants, as senders, have 
two options: opt out and receive a certain 10 points or opt into a lottery with 
potential outcomes of 8 points or 15 points with unknown probabilities 1-p and 
p, respectively. The risky dictator game (panel B in Figure 1.4) is similar to the 
decision problem, with the addition of another player who is a passive recipient. 
The passive recipient would also get 10 points if the sender opts out, or 22 or 15 
points if the sender opts in and receives 8 or 15 points, respectively. Finally, 
Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) used a binary trust game (panel B in Figure 1.3). 
In comparison to the risky dictator game, in the binary trust game the passive 
recipient becomes the trustee, an active player, and the computerised lottery 
determining the outcomes of the risky choice is replaced by the trustee’s 
decision between the two outcomes (Bohnet & Zeckhauser, 2004; Hong & 
Bohnet, 2007).  
In all three games, participants provided the minimal value they needed the 
probability of the good outcome (p) to be in order to opt in. Note that the 
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outcomes for the sender are the same across these three variants. Yet, the 
minimal acceptable probability to opt in was higher in the trust game than for 
the decision problem or the risky dictator game, while the latter two did not 
differ. Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) concluded that the bad outcome was more 
costly when chosen by the trustee than when selected in a lottery. Betrayal costs, 
which are “costs that make it less attractive to rely on a [t]rustee than a random 
device offering the same probabilities” (Bohnet & Zeckhauser, 2004, p. 478), are 
additional to the cost of choosing a risky option with the chance of receiving a 
worse outcome than would have been received if one had opted out. The 
reduced willingness to opt into a trust game, compared to the lotteries in the 
other games, was considered evidence of betrayal aversion. 
 
Figure 1.4 The decision problem (panel A) and the risky dictator game (panel B), which 
are contrasted with the binary trust game (panel B of Figure 1.3) to investigate 
betrayal aversion (based on Figure 1 in Bohnet et al., 2008). Stages at which the 
player or a computer makes a decision are shown in ovals; actions are 
represented by arrows; outcomes are depicted in rectangles. 
Using the same three games, Bohnet et al. (2008) replicated their result across a 
range of countries, consisting of the United States, Brazil, China, Oman, 
Switzerland, and Turkey. Hong and Bohnet (2007) and Aimone and Houser 
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(2011, 2013) also found betrayal aversion in their studies. However, 
Fetchenhauer and Dunning (2012) did not find evidence for the betrayal 
aversion phenomenon. There are a few methodological differences between 
these studies, discussed further in Chapter 6, which might explain why evidence 
of betrayal aversion has been found in some studies but not in others.  
Besides seeking support for betrayal aversion in a paradigm free from potential 
methodological confounds, the study in Chapter 6 tested a theory to explain the 
phenomenon, as few previous studied have attempted to do this. Instead, 
previous studies on betrayal aversion have generally focused on its presence 
(Bohnet & Zeckhauser, 2004; Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 2012), on the extent to 
which it can be generalised to other cultures (Bohnet et al., 2008), on whether it 
is influenced by status (Hong & Bohnet, 2007), or on how its presence can 
increase levels of trustworthiness (Aimone & Houser, 2011, 2013).  
Aimone and Houser (2012) form an exception to this and offer an explanation of 
betrayal aversion: in an attempt to regulate their emotions, participants might 
opt out of the trust game to avoid taking an action that could have unpleasant 
emotional consequences. Participants trusted less when they could be exposed 
to “personal betrayal” compared to conditions with potential exposure to 
“general betrayal” (Aimone & Houser, 2012). Personal betrayal was present 
when the focal participant’s assigned trustee selected the bad outcome after 
learning their assigned sender had opted in. In other conditions, participants 
might have been exposed to general betrayal, because they received the bad 
outcome from the computer, which, in turn, selected good and bad outcomes 
with probabilities equal to the proportion of trustees who selected the good and 
bad outcomes. Aimone and Houser (2012) claim to have accounted for 
inequality aversion confounding trust (i.e., opting out to avoid potential 
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inequality of outcomes) by including a condition where the computer selected 
an outcome, but still showing the assigned trustee’s payoff, and thus potential 
inequality of payoffs. However, a sender who receives the bad outcome from 
the computer still knows that some trustee chose the bad outcome. This trustee, 
whether it is the specific assigned trustee or not, would be paid more than the 
sender, and so inequality aversion might still affect the results in this study.  
The study in Chapter 6 avoids confounds of signalling distrust and of inequality 
aversion. Furthermore, it further develops the notion of emotional costs of 
betrayal, along with a prediction that these costs depend on prior beliefs 
regarding others’ trustworthiness. This theoretical prediction is elaborated on in 
Chapter 6. 
1.7 Experimental Practices in Economics versus Psychology 
All studies reported in this thesis involve some methods from experimental 
economics and, as such, straddle the theoretical and methodological divide 
between experimental psychology and behavioural economics (as in, e.g., 
Wischniewski & Brüne, 2011). In this section, some of the key methodological 
differences between these disciplines are reviewed. Furthermore, it is outlined 
how the different approaches were consolidated into the studies reported in the 
thesis.  
Whereas economists have tended to focus on rationality, psychologists have 
emphasised cognitive limitations and have highlighted how choices are 
sensitive to context, leading to irrational behaviour (Camerer, Loewenstein, & 
Prelec, 2004). This thesis focuses on deviations from rationality from a 
psychological perspective, using certain methods from behavioural economics, 
in an attempt to achieve the best of both disciplines. All reported studies were 
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conducted in the Economics Department’s EconLab at Royal Holloway, 
University of London (RHUL). Here, participants are seated at separate cubicles, 
with interconnected computers using Zurich Toolbox for Readymade Economic 
Experiments (z-Tree) software (Fischbacher, 2007). Participants do not speak to 
one another, they cannot see the monitors of other participants, and all identities 
remain anonymous, with everyone known only by their computer’s number. All 
experiments had detailed written instructions outlining participants’ tasks and 
the number of trials, and where necessary their assigned roles (i.e., a script; 
Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001), as well as comprehension questions. Participants’ 
earnings were kept confidential by using individual receipts.  
The two differences between economics and psychology methodologies most 
relevant to this thesis are the use of deception and the use of incentives.  
1.7.1 Deception  
Both fields seem to agree on the distinction between “real deception” and 
“deception by omission”. The former involves actively and intentionally 
misrepresenting aspects of the study to participants. The latter involves 
withholding information about certain aspects of the study, such as not 
informing participants of the exact hypotheses under investigation (Hertwig & 
Ortmann, 2008b). Whereas deception by omission is allowed in both fields 
(Ortmann & Hertwig, 2002), and might minimise the risk of demand effects 
(Bonetti, 1998), the two fields diverge with respect to their stances on the use of 
real deception (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001).  
Psychologists argue that deception is often needed to create the context for their 
topic of investigation (Ariely & Norton, 2007). For example, helping behaviour 
in emergencies can only be studied with experimental control if these 
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emergencies are created, rather than naturally occurring (Hertwig & Ortmann, 
2008a). Deception is often used to distract from the true purpose of the study, 
making the behaviour of interest more natural (Bonetti, 1998). Bröder (1998) 
provides an example of a topic of investigation that requires deception: 
incidental learning. First, participants are asked to perform an irrelevant task, 
such as rating the emotionality of a list of words. Then, they are unexpectedly 
asked to recall the words that were on the list. If they had been told there would 
be a memory test, the learning during the first stage would not have been 
incidental. Of course, this deception might be considered simply deception by 
omission, rather than active real deception (Ortmann & Hertwig, 1998). 
Nevertheless, other factors could influence findings if no active deception about 
the true purpose is used. For example, in studies without a clear, objectively 
correct answer (e.g., questionnaires), social desirability might influence 
participants’ self-presentation, such as avoiding racial stereotyping behaviour, 
and here active deception could be beneficial in masking the true purpose of the 
study and counter this effect (Weiss, 2001).  
Economists, however, consider the use of (active) deception in experiments a 
risk to the subject pool. Economists worry that if participants find out they have 
been deceived in one experiment, either through first-hand experience or by 
being (inadvertently) informed by peers, they will be suspicious in future 
experiments (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001). Contamination of the subject pool can 
also occur through second-hand experience with deception, which could arise 
from coverage of psychological studies in classes or even in the media (Hertwig 
& Ortmann, 2008a). Moreover, the “spill-over hypothesis” (Barrera & Simpson, 
2012) argues that the participant pool may contain participants who take part in 
a psychology study that uses deception, and subsequently become suspicious of 
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all experiments, whether conducted in an economics or a psychology lab. 
Another potential problem with the use of deception is that experimenters may 
face a more and more difficult challenge in making their participants believe the 
cover story for future studies as participants become more and more suspicious 
(Baron, 2001; Weiss, 2001). Although not negating the notion that participants 
might become suspicious after finding out they have been deceived, participants 
have been reported to generally understand and accept the need for deception, 
still cooperate in future investigations, and even enjoy studies despite the use of 
deception (Kimmel, 1998). But, as Ortmann and Hertwig (1998) point out, this 
only provides reassurance regarding participants’ attitudes towards (future) 
psychological experiments, and not regarding their actual behaviour in such 
experiments.  
The evidence for the behavioural effects of deception is mixed. After having 
reviewed relevant literature, Bonetti (1998) concluded that the use of deception 
does not alter participants’ behaviour and can enable the study of more natural 
behaviour. However, after a more extensive systematic literature review, 
Hertwig and Ortmann (2008a) concluded that first-hand experience with 
deception can alter behaviour, or at least increase the suspicion of being 
deceived again in future experiments.  
Hertwig and Ortmann (2008a) argue that different dependent variables can be 
differentially influenced by previous experience with deception. On the basis of 
a literature review, they argue that suspicious participants show less social 
conformity than non-suspicious participants (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2008b). Here, 
the conformity consisted of contributing a certain amount to a common good, 
for example, and suspicion that one is not truly playing against other players 
may lead to more selfish behaviour (less conformity), leading to a systematic 
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effect of suspicion. Yet, Jamison, Karlan, and Schechter (2008) found that, of the 
participants who returned after an initial experiment in which some were 
deceived and some were not, previously-deceived and previously-non-deceived 
participants did not differ in their generous behaviour in the prisoner’s dilemma 
or in the dictator game in the second experiment. Barrera and Simpson (2012) 
also did not find differences in dictator-game or trust-game behaviour between 
previously-deceived and previously-non-deceived participants.  
When it is clear what action to take if being deceived (e.g., keeping the entire 
amount in a dictator game without experiencing guilt, because one does not 
believe there is another player), the effect of suspected deception can be 
systematic. When it is unclear what action to take if being deceived, the 
suspicion of deception might increase non-systematic (i.e., random) variability 
(Hertwig & Ortmann, 2008b), which makes statistical tests conservative (Barrera 
& Simpson, 2012). Indeed, Jamison et al. (2008) found that previously-deceived 
participants showed more inconsistent behaviour on a risk-preferences measure 
in a subsequent study than non-previously-deceived participants. The variance 
in the number of safe gambles chosen in the former group was also higher than 
in the latter. Jamison et al. (2008) suggest that participants were not taking the 
experiments seriously as a result of having been deceived previously. However, 
Barrera and Simpson (2012) did not find a difference in variance or in the 
proportion of inconsistent responders between previously-deceived and 
previously-non-deceived participants on this same risk-preferences task. 
Possibly, the results presented by Jamison et al. (2008) were confounded by 
selection effects, as they found that previously-deceived females were less likely 
to participate in the second study than previously-non-deceived females. 
Barrera and Simpson (2012) avoided this potential influence of selection effects 
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by making participants’ participation credit contingent on participating in two 
studies and noted drop-out rates of 8% compared to 40% in the Jamison et al. 
(2008) study. 
Although the evidence regarding the effects of deception is far from conclusive, 
the studies reported in this thesis did not use deception. Overall, avoiding the 
potential risk of polluting the subject pool with suspicion about the use of 
deception in future studies was considered more important than the 
convenience that deception would offer. An additional reason to avoid 
deception is that the use of deception would jeopardise the reputation of the 
EconLab at RHUL and would prohibit publication in economics journals (Cook 
& Yamagishi, 2008). Avoiding deception required creative and convoluted 
solutions to problems that would have easily been solved through deception. 
For example, most experiments necessitated an additional round to be used for 
payment. In this round, the presented information was drawn truly at random, 
at the time the experiment was conducted. The other rounds had predetermined 
sequences of information, which were equal across all sessions and across 
participants, to facilitate analyses (Bardsley, 2000). The studies in this thesis are 
unique in the length to which they go to maintain methodological purity, which, 
to the best of my knowledge, is not done to such an extent in other studies on 
the topics of this thesis (e.g., in the extensive literature on the beads task). 
Economics only proscribes active deception (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2008b), while 
withholding information is permitted (Barrera & Simpson, 2012). So, for several 
studies, it was possible to omit information: for example, participants were told 
they were paid for one of the rounds or for several questions, but not told which 
ones these were. Then, in the debrief it was explained that the round they were 
paid for was based on a random selection of information, while the other rounds 
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were predetermined, yet still based on an initial random draw, to facilitate 
analyses.  
The possibility of avoiding deception suggests that psychologists’ frequent use 
of deception is unwarranted and violates the American Psychological 
Association’s rule of only using deception in those cases where it is necessary 
and where non-deceptive methodologies will not suffice (Hertwig & Ortmann, 
2008a). Indeed, deception is often used for convenience (Hertwig & Ortmann, 
2008b). For example, in interactive games, when the behaviour of interest is that 
of only one of the two players, psychologists often deceive their participants 
into thinking that they are playing against another person, where in reality the 
other person’s choice is simulated by a computer or is omitted altogether. This is 
done to minimise researchers’ expenses for participants whose behaviour they 
are not interested in. For example, Shariff and Norenzayan (2007) investigated 
whether religious primes would affect monetary donations in the dictator game. 
Instead of truly randomly allocating participants to the roles of dictator or 
receiver, a confederate acted as the receiver, so that all participants were 
dictators. In this case, research expenses and logistics were minimised through 
deception.  
This same expenses problem was encountered for the last study of this thesis, 
where the behaviour of interest was that of the sender in the trust game, but 
trustees had to be real people, rather than a computer. One possibility would 
have been to have people play both the role of sender and of trustees, and then 
randomly pair each participant with another player and randomly assign roles 
and pay the outcome made in the assigned roles. However, this has been found 
to negatively affect trustworthiness compared to trustee’s decisions in trust 
games where each participant plays one role only (N. D. Johnson & Mislin, 
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2011). Therefore, our preference was to have participants play one role. This 
could have meant that a lot of data would have been collected and money 
would have been spent on participants whose data was not analysed (Cook & 
Yamagishi, 2008). Instead, after the trustees had made their relevant decisions 
for the trust game, they continued to provide data for an unrelated pilot study. 
This illustrates one way to avoid wasting researchers’ money for data that is not 
directly related to the behaviour of interest, while maintaining methodological 
diligence.  
1.7.2 Monetary Incentives 
Economics and psychology also have different views on the use of incentives in 
experiments, so that generally economics experiments involve real monetary 
incentives, while psychology experiments involve no or merely hypothetical 
monetary incentives (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001). Economists argue that 
monetary incentives motivate good performance (without leading to satiety, 
which might be the case for other incentives). They also provide a direct 
translation of economic normative theory, which assumes that maximisation of 
expected value drives behaviour (Ariely & Norton, 2007), to laboratory-based 
experiments (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001). Incentives are also used to create an 
ecologically valid environment in the lab, as different decisions in the real world 
carry different costs and benefits (Rosenboim & Shavit, 2012). Furthermore, 
investigations of the effects of incentives have shown that incentives improve 
performance, when they have an effect, and in any case they reduce variability 
in performance, especially in studies on judgments and decision-making 
(Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001; V. L. Smith, 1991). On the basis of these arguments, 
economists argue that many observed deviations from rational behaviour can be 
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explained by a lack of monetary incentives in the relevant studies (V. L. Smith, 
1991).  
Psychologists, on the other hand, tend to argue that the participants in most 
experiments’ samples are cooperative, intrinsically motivated, and achievement-
oriented, which will lead to maximal performance without the need for 
monetary incentives (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001). External monetary incentives 
could reduce this intrinsic motivation. Furthermore, psychologists seem to 
argue that explicitly defining costs and rewards renders decisions made in the 
lab less ecologically valid (Ariely & Norton, 2007).  
Investigations into the effects of extrinsic, monetary rewards have not been 
conclusive, but tend to suggest that their inclusion aids research on judgment 
and decision-making, if only by reducing variability (Hertwig & Ortmann, 
2001). Differences between real or hypothetical rewards have not been found in 
delay discounting tasks (Madden et al., 2004), but have been found for risk 
preference tasks, albeit only for high rewards (Holt & Laury, 2002). Yet, in 
decisions involving social interaction, real rewards form a stronger incentive 
than hypothetical rewards and participants might overestimate their own and 
their partner’s cooperation in hypothetical situations compared to real situations 
(Vlaev, 2012). For example, Parco, Rapoport, and Stein (2002) have shown that 
the size of incentives can affect behaviour in trust scenarios, which implies that 
the presence versus absence of incentives must also influence behaviour in such 
scenarios. One way in which incentives could influence behaviour is by 
increasing concentration on task stimuli and details, which may impair 
performance on attentional blink paradigms where increased attention is given 
to distracters (Bijleveld, Custers, & Aarts, 2011), but may potentially aid 
performance in judgment and decision-making paradigms. Another reason to 
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include explicit extrinsic incentives is that performance of participants 
participating for course credit might vary across the term time, due to variation 
in intrinsic motivation across the term time, as various external pressures such 
as exams tap limited cognitive resources. Nicholls, Loveless, Thomas, Loetscher, 
and Churches (2014) used a sustained-attention paradigm, where participants 
had to respond to the presentation of all digits except “3”. They found that 
course-credit participants’ performance dropped from the start compared to the 
end of term, compared to paid participants. The contradictory effects of 
incentives might be explained by the type of monetary incentive. In a meta-
analysis, Eisenberger and Cameron (1996) found that only rewards which were 
independent of performance (e.g., show-up fees) were detrimental to intrinsic 
motivation, while performance-based rewards, which focus on the quality of the 
performance, improved attitudes towards the task. Rewards for simply 
completing the task did not seem to affect intrinsic motivation.  
In this thesis, Hertwig and Ortmann’s (2001) recommendations to include 
incentives and avoid deception were followed, considering the potential impact 
they might have on the types of studies reported and the fact that studies were 
performed at different times during the year. Furthermore, in the study in 
Chapter 3, the inclusion of incentives was investigated as one of the 
independent variables, to address the question of the effect of incentives on the 
JTC bias empirically. Performance-based or decision-based incentives were 
included for all studies (except for one condition in the study in Chapter 3, 
where a participation incentive was used, to compare its effects to performance-
based incentives). The average payment in each study was planned to be £8 to 
£10 per hour, in line with EconLab regulations. These real incentives could 
improve performance (Bardsley et al., 2010), and should reduce variability 
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(Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001). These incentives necessarily posed certain financial 
constraints on the amount of data that could be collected (Baron, 2001), in terms 
of sample size, study duration, and number of studies conducted within the 
thesis. Sample size was prioritised, as several studies required enough variation 
on one of the measures to assess how it related to other variables (e.g., delusion-
proneness, beliefs regarding others’ trustworthiness). Several variables were 
manipulated within subjects, as the inclusion of extra trials was deemed 
financially more efficient than adding another between-subject condition where 
additional time would be needed for participants to read instructions and 
receive payment.  
1.8 Thesis Overview 
In the next five empirical chapters, the specific theories and rationales relevant 
to the studies in question are elaborated upon. Here a brief overview is 
provided.  
The first two studies (Chapters 2 and 3) focus on the widely cited claim that 
delusion-prone individuals “jump to conclusions” (JTC). Specifically, the studies 
involved incentivised draws-to-decision (Chapter 2) and probability-estimates 
(Chapter 3) versions of the beads task. The use of incentives is crucial given the 
potential confounding effect the lack of incentives may have had on motivation 
in previous studies. Moreover, in Chapter 2 incentives are used to generate 
optimal decision points, enabling the first evidence of absolute “jumping to 
conclusions” (as opposed to the standard, relative finding that delusion-prone 
individuals reach conclusions earlier than controls). These studies also 
minimised the influence of potentially impaired working memory on the JTC 
bias.  
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Chapter 2 contains two variants of the draws-to-decision version of the beads 
task. The first task involved a dynamic updating component to decision-making 
as information was presented sequentially and participants had to indicate at 
each step if they wanted to gather more information or decide. The second task 
required participants to indicate how much information they wanted to see, all 
at once, before seeing any information, in order to make their decision.  
Chapter 3 investigates the effects of incentives on beliefs in a probability-
estimates version of the beads task, while also investigating potential differences 
in reasoning with regards to prior probabilities and likelihoods. Again, the JTC 
bias is considered in a relative and absolute sense.  
The study in Chapter 4 addresses potential limitations to predictions made by 
error-management theory (EMT) with regards to the sexual over-perception bias 
and to evidence adduced in support of it. First, the sexual over-perception bias 
might not be a biased belief, but rather could be merely behavioural in nature 
(McKay & Dennett, 2009). Second, results in support of this bias are found in 
paradigms that only present one piece of evidence, so that different prior beliefs 
might explain the different posterior beliefs, rather than a theoretically 
interesting cognitive bias. The study in this thesis investigates the sexual over-
perception bias further in an adaptation of the updating paradigm used in 
Chapters 2 and 3.  
In Chapter 5, it is explored whether the optimism bias is found in a crowd-
within paradigm. If, in this updating paradigm without directional feedback, 
second estimates are systematically different from first estimates, this suggests 
estimates are updated in a desired direction. The study in Chapter 5 tests if such 
second estimates are systematically rosier than first estimates for undesirable 
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questions, but not for neutral questions. In this way we shed light on the 
processes underpinning self-deception. 
The last study, reported in Chapter 6, investigates whether betrayal aversion in 
the trust game is found in a design free from the methodological confounds of 
inequality aversion and the signalling of distrust, which may have led to mixed 
evidence for betrayal aversion. Furthermore, it tests whether the level of 
betrayal aversion could be related to prior beliefs about people’s 
trustworthiness.  
Finally, the various studies are discussed, implications and future suggestions 
are considered, and conclusions are reached in Chapter 7.  
On a general note, an attempt has been made to move toward the “new 
statistics” (Cumming, 2014), by reporting effect sizes for all effects, including 
non-significant effects, and by reporting 95% confidence intervals (95%-CIs) of 
differences (and, where specified, of means) throughout the thesis. However, 
traditional null-hypothesis significance testing (NHST) is still employed as the 
main statistical analysis, because although Bayesian statistics are becoming 
more accessible (e.g., Masson, 2011), these accessible Bayesian methods still 
need to be fully validated (personal communication with Masson, April 29, 
2014). 
For the experiments reported in this thesis, established effect sizes were 
typically unavailable, limiting the utility of power calculations to determine the 
required sample sizes. Instead, we based our sample sizes on those used in the 
most relevant literature. For example, the sample sizes in the studies 
investigating the association between delusion-proneness and the JTC bias 
(Chapters 2 and 3) were equal to or larger than those reported in other JTC 
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studies using sub-clinical populations (e.g., Balzan, Delfabbro, & Galletly, 2012; 
Colbert & Peters, 2002; LaRocco & Warman, 2009; McKay et al., 2006; Warman et 
al., 2007). As another example of determining the most relevant literature, 
consider the optimism study (Chapter 5), where the literature on the optimistic 
belief-updating bias consists largely of imaging studies, which tend to have 
small sample sizes (e.g., n=20 in Sharot et al., 2011). We therefore determined 
our sample size based on those used in the crowd-within literature, specifically 
on equivalent laboratory-based, rather than online, studies (n=101 in Herzog & 
Hertwig, 2009). 
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2 Delusion-Proneness and Data Gathering Biases6 
2.1 Background 
That delusional and delusion-prone individuals “jump to conclusions” (JTC) is 
one of the most important and influential claims in the literature on cognitive 
theories of delusions. As described in Chapter 1, the beads task is generally used 
to investigate the JTC bias. In this task, participants are shown two jars filled 
with beads of different colours, in opposite ratios across the jars. The jars are 
hidden and a sequence of beads is drawn from one of the two jars. In the 
standard draws-to-decision version of the beads task, participants have to 
decide which of the two jars the beads come from by requesting as many beads 
as they want from the sequence. Compared to control participants, delusional 
and delusion-prone participants make this decision on the basis of less evidence. 
As a result, a tendency to gather insufficient evidence when forming beliefs and 
making decisions is thought to be a core cognitive component of delusion 
formation (Fine et al., 2007; Garety & Freeman, 2013). 
However, although the JTC effect is well replicated and robust to many 
modifications of the basic beads-task paradigm, there are some fundamental 
limitations with the way this task is typically administered that call the above 
interpretation into question. The key problem is that the terminology of 
“jumping to conclusions” implies that people gather insufficient evidence and 
reach decisions prematurely, yet the standard JTC bias, reported in over 50 
studies (see reviews by Garety & Freeman, 1999, 2013), is of a relative nature: 
                                                          
6 Part of this chapter has been published in Van der Leer, Hartig, Goldmanis, and McKay 
(in press). 
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delusional or delusion-prone participants request fewer pieces of evidence 
before deciding than healthy controls. However, just as one cannot conclude 
that bankers are poor because they earn less than movie stars, one cannot 
conclude delusional or delusion-prone participants decide too early because they 
decide earlier than healthy controls. The notions of premature or late decisions 
are only meaningful if there is an optimal point at which a rational person 
should decide. For an optimal decision point to exist, there needs to be both an 
(opportunity) cost of incorrect decisions and a cost associated with gathering 
more information. Investigations using the beads task typically do not 
incentivise participants (cf. Lincoln, Ziegler, Mehl, et al., 2010; Woodward et al., 
2009), and no previous study has incorporated both of these elements.7 
Therefore, the most that can be said is that deluded and delusion-prone 
participants reach conclusions on this task more quickly than control 
participants, but the standard, non-incentivised, paradigm cannot justify the 
suggestion that they “jump to conclusions”. 
2.1.1 The Present Study 
The present study consisted of two separate, but related tasks.  
The first task (“dynamic task”) incorporated a dynamic decision-making process 
where, after seeing each fish, participants had to choose whether to make their 
                                                          
7 Lincoln, Ziegler, Mehl, et al. (2010) did create a decision threshold. Participants were given 
an initial ten tokens, each worth €0.25, and they could earn one more token by deciding on 
the correct jar or lose five tokens by deciding on the incorrect jar. To maintain or increase 
the level of rewards, five out of six decisions had to be correct, which meant that a decision 
should be made only after a certainty level of 83.3%. However, this incentive scheme did not 
generate a stopping rule. Without costs for gathering information, one should draw 
infinitely to reach the maximal level of certainty to base any decision on, which is the level 
participants are generally instructed to reach: “as certain as they could be as to which of the 
jars the beads were being drawn from” (Broome et al., 2007, p. s39).  
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decision about which lake the fish were coming from, or to see another fish. In 
this sense, it was similar to the standard draws-to-decision version of the beads 
task. New elements to the task were the rewards for a correct decision and small 
costs to see more data. Together, these two elements produced an optimal 
decision point within each sequence of fish, i.e., a point at which expected 
payoff would be maximal (see Appendix A).8 Previous fish were shown as a 
memory aid. After each choice between more data or deciding on a lake, 
participants also rated their confidence that the fish were coming from either 
lake. 
In contrast to the dynamic decision-making process in the first task, the second 
task (“static task”) had a one-shot decision-making process. Participants had to 
indicate how many fish they wanted to see before they saw any fish. Again, a 
small price was requested for each fish and a reward was provided for correct 
decisions, leading to optimal numbers of fish to request (see Appendix A). After 
indicating how many fish they wanted to see, participants were shown their 
requested number of fish all at once and were required to decide on one of the 
two lakes. As in the dynamic task, participants rated their confidence in the two 
lakes after making their decision regarding the two lakes. 
In this second task, the effect of miscomprehension about swapping sources of 
the information was eliminated. It also eliminated the possibility that any JTC 
bias might be due to the additional time and effort required to see more 
information, as the one-shot nature of the task meant that equal amounts of time 
and effort were required to see a few or many fish.  
                                                          
8 Strictly speaking these decision points were only “optimal” from a risk-neutral 
perspective. Risk-seeking or risk-averse individuals may have made decisions that failed to 
maximise their expected outcome, but that nevertheless maximised their expected utility 
(and thus were rational) given their risk preferences. 
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Both these tasks used incentives to create optimal decisions points to enable 
investigation of an absolute JTC bias, in addition to a relative JTC bias. This 
investigation formed the primary aim of the study presented in this chapter.  
A secondary aim was to minimise several confounds, including mis-
comprehension, motivation, and working memory. Both tasks address these 
confounds, but to different degrees. The dynamic task is very closely related to 
the standard paradigm, but minimises miscomprehension (see Balzan, 
Delfabbro, & Galletly, 2012) through detailed instructions and comprehension 
checks, and increases motivation by including incentives. The static task departs 
from the standard paradigm, but eliminates the confound of a lack of 
motivation in terms of effort and time. Furthermore, it minimises the working-
memory load, as information does not need to be updated, but instead is 
presented all at once. An interesting effect of the means of presenting the data 
has been found for probability estimates provided by healthy controls: 
probability estimates were affected more strongly when information is 
presented gradually (i.e., stepwise selections presented sequentially) than when 
the entire selection is presented instantaneously (Whitman & Woodward, 2011). 
This was investigated only in healthy participants, so it is unknown if and how 
this manipulation would affect the JTC bias. However, the probability-estimates 
version used by Whitman and Woodward (2011) might be too weak to elicit the 
JTC bias, as the JTC bias is more robustly found with the draws-to-decision 
version (Fine et al., 2007; L. O. White & Mansell, 2009). Our second task is 
equivalent to a draws-to-decision version in which all the evidence is presented 
instantaneously and can thus shed light on the effect of presenting information 
instantaneously. 
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Finally, risk-aversion was measured and accounted for in analyses (cf. Lincoln, 
Ziegler, Mehl, et al., 2010). Additionally, given the unclear role of intelligence in 
performance on the beads task (Ziegler, Rief, Werner, Mehl, & Lincoln, 2008), 
intelligence was also measured and accounted for in analyses.  
2.1.2 Hypotheses 
The following findings were predicted across both tasks:  
 First, a relative effect of delusion-proneness on draws-to-decision was 
expected such that the more delusion-prone participants were, the less 
evidence they would gather for their decision.  
 Second, an absolute effect of delusion-proneness was also expected, 
where high-delusion-prone participants would jump to conclusions with 
respect to the optimal decision point, but low-delusion-prone participants 
would not.  
 Third, a relative effect of delusion-proneness on confidence levels was 
expected, such that the more delusion-prone participants were, the more 
confident they would be in their decision (as in, e.g., McKay et al., 2006).  
2.2 Methods 
2.2.1 Participants 
Participants (n=115, 60 females, 55 males; mean (SD) age = 19.92 (2.9) years) 
were students from RHUL, recruited using the Online Recruitment System for 
Economic Experiments (Greiner, 2004). Participants received £6 for participation 
and a performance-based bonus between £0 and £7.50 (mean (SD) bonus = £6.35 
(£1.36)). The Psychology Department Ethics Committee of RHUL approved this 
study.  
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2.2.2 Materials 
2.2.2.1 Fisherman-Adapted Beads Task 
Before the start of the experiment, participants were issued written instructions 
providing information about the ratios of black to white fish in the two lakes 
(i.e., 25%:75% or 75%:25%), the facts that the fisherman never visited both lakes 
on one trip and was equally likely to visit Lake A as he was to visit Lake B, the 
rewards and costs, and the means of responding (see Appendix B). Figure 2.1 
shows an example of a trial in this task. Participants had to correctly answer 
eleven comprehension questions before starting the experiment (see Appendix 
B). Answers were checked and participants were referred back to the written 
instructions when an incorrect answer was given. Visual stimuli were based on 
those used by Speechley et al. (2010).  
 
Figure 2.1 An example of a trial in the dynamic beads task. The fisherman displays a 
series of six fish (B-W-W-B-W-B), which he has caught from one of the two 
lakes. Lake A has more white fish than black fish (represented visually and 
by a stated ratio), while Lake B has more black than white fish.  
In the dynamic task, participants saw one fish and were then given the option to 
choose between deciding on a lake and winning a reward if correct, or seeing 
another fish for a small price. If participants chose to see another fish, this 
procedure was repeated. In each series, they could request to see at least eleven 
more fish; with some series going up to seventeen fish, although this maximum 
was not conveyed to participants to avoid decisions being made based on the 
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expected ends of a trial (cf. Lincoln, Ziegler, Mehl, et al., 2010). Upon seeing the 
last fish of a trial, participants had to make a decision between Lake A and Lake 
B. After seeing each fish, participants rated their confidence in either lake. 
Separate confidence ratings were requested for Lake A and for Lake B 
(Speechley et al., 2010). This was repeated for seven series of fish; each series 
was presented as a new fishing trip, further indicated by the fisherman’s shirt 
changing colour.  
The first trial consisted of a randomly drawn series of fish9, which was the same 
for all participants in one session, but differed across sessions. This trial was 
used for payment: participants were informed that the series of fish on one trial 
would be drawn at random and that they would be paid based on their 
performance on this trial; they did not, however, know which of the trials was 
the random trial. By including this truly random sequence we avoided 
deceiving our participants and thus conformed to a key methodological 
principle of experimental economics (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001). This trial was 
not used for analyses, as it differed per session.  
The next five trials (trials A-E in Table 2.1) were tailored to have varying 
optimal decision points, which were reached at a difference of three fish of the 
majority colour over the minority colour (see Appendix A). The sequences of the 
trials were drawn based on the same process as that used for the randomly 
drawn sequence used for payment, except that after the optimal decision point, 
all subsequent fish in the series were changed to the majority colour. This 
strengthened the stopping rule and we no longer introduced contradictory 
                                                          
9 One lake was selected at random, each with a probability of .5. The sequence of fish was 
drawn at random from the selected lake, in accordance with the ratios of black and white 
fish in that lake (e.g., if the mostly black lake was selected, black fish were presented with a 
probability of .75 and white fish with a probability of .25).  
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evidence after the optimal decision point. The seventh trial (trial F in Table 2.1) 
only showed fish of one colour, in order to investigate decision making without 
contradictory evidence. For all trials, the potential bonus after seeing one fish 
was 100 points; the cost per fish was 2 points. Each experimental point was 
worth £0.05.  
Table 2.1 The sequences of fish in the trials of the dynamic task; optimal decision 
points are underlined.  
Trial #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 #8 #9 #10 #11 #12 #13 #14 #15 #16 #17 
A B W B B B B B B B B B B B B B   
B B W W W W W W W W W W W W W    
C B W B B W B B B B B B B      
D W B B W B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
E B W B W W B B B B B B B B B B   
F W W W W W W W W W W W W W     
 
In the static task, participants saw the fisherman and the ratios of black to white 
fish in the two lakes; these ratios were the same as in the dynamic task. Before 
seeing any fish, participants were then asked to indicate how many fish they 
would like to see before deciding between Lake A and B. They could choose 
between one and ten fish. Next, they were shown their requested number of fish 
and were required to decide between the two lakes. Participants rated their 
confidence in either lake after their decision between the lakes. Separate 
confidence ratings were requested for Lake A and for Lake B (Speechley et al., 
2010). This was repeated for five series (trials G-K in Table 2.2); each series was 
presented as a new fishing trip on which the potential reward and the costs per 
fish differed. The combination of black and white fish shown for a given 
requested number of fish was randomly drawn based on the 25:75 ratios before 
the experiment began; this sequence was then used in all sessions to facilitate 
analyses of confidence levels. A sixth trial with a truly randomly drawn 
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combination of fish of the requested number was included for payment, but not 
included in the analyses as it differed per session. Table 2.2 shows the 
predetermined fish, the rewards and costs, and the optimal decision points. 
Table 2.2 The rewards and costs and the colours of the fish in the trials of the static 
task, optimal decision points are underlined.  
Trial Reward Price per fish #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 #8 #9 #10 
G 100 2 W B W W W W W B W W 
H 50 3 B B B B W W B B B B 
I 200 2 B W B W W W W W B W 
J 50 1 W B W W W W W W W B 
K 50 2 B W B W B B B B B B 
 
2.2.2.2 Risk Aversion 
We administered a computerised risk-aversion measure (Holt & Laury, 2002), 
see Table 2.3. This measure involved ten decisions between two gambles. For 
example, the seventh decision was between Option A “A 7/10 chance of winning 
£2.00, a 3/10 chance of winning £1.60” and Option B “A 7/10 chance of winning 
£3.85, a 3/10 chance of winning £0.10” (Holt & Laury, 2002, based on p. 1645). 
Starting at 10%, the probability of the high payoff outcome in each gamble 
increased by 10% in each successive decision, such that the expected value of the 
“risky” Option B increased. Each participant’s risk preference score was defined 
by their switching point from Option A to Option B (i.e., the number of times 
they chose Option A). Risk-neutral responding implied choosing Option A for 
the first four decisions, and choosing Option B thereafter. Choosing Option A 
fewer than four times implied risk-seeking behaviour, while choosing it more 
than four times indicated risk-averse behaviour.  
  
Chapter 2 
89 
 
Table 2.3 The risk aversion measure by Holt and Laury (2002, p. 1645). The choices 
indicate risk neutrality.  
Option A  Option B 
1/10 chance of £2.00,  
9/10 chance of £1.60 
← 1/10 chance of £3.85,  
9/10 chance of £0.10 
2/10 chance of £2.00,  
8/10 chance of £1.60 
← 2/10 chance of £3.85,  
8/10 chance of £0.10 
3/10 chance of £2.00,  
7/10 chance of £1.60 
← 3/10 chance of £3.85,  
7/10 chance of £0.10 
4/10 chance of £2.00,  
6/10 chance of £1.60 
← 4/10 chance of £3.85,  
6/10 chance of £0.10 
5/10 chance of £2.00,  
5/10 chance of £1.60 
→ 5/10 chance of £3.85,  
5/10 chance of £0.10 
6/10 chance of £2.00,  
4/10 chance of £1.60 
→ 6/10 chance of £3.85,  
4/10 chance of £0.10 
7/10 chance of £2.00,  
3/10 chance of £1.60 
→ 7/10 chance of £3.85,  
3/10 chance of £0.10 
8/10 chance of £2.00,  
2/10 chance of £1.60 
→ 8/10 chance of £3.85,  
2/10 chance of £0.10 
9/10 chance of £2.00,  
1/10 chance of £1.60 
→ 9/10 chance of £3.85,  
1/10 chance of £0.10 
10/10 chance of £2.00,  
0/10 chance of £1.60 
→ 10/10 chance of £3.85,  
0/10 chance of £0.10 
 
2.2.2.3 Delusion Proneness 
We used the 21-item Peters et al. Delusions Inventory (PDI; Peters, Joseph, Day, 
& Garety, 2004) to measure delusional ideation, with items such as “Have your 
thoughts ever been so vivid that you were worried other people would hear 
them?” and “Do you ever feel as if there is a conspiracy against you?”. If an item 
was endorsed, participants also had to indicate their level of distress, 
preoccupation and conviction for that item on 5-point scales. The yes/no 
endorsement summed scores could range from 0-21; the separate dimensions’ 
summed scores from 0-105; and the total summed score from 0-336. 
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2.2.2.4 Intelligence 
We used the short 12-item version of Raven’s advanced progressive matrices 
(APM; Arthur & Day, 1994) to measure intelligence. This measure has a low 
sensitivity to age, gender, and cultural differences (Colbert & Peters, 2002), 
which are factors not expected to affect the experimental tasks. The 12 items in 
the short form of the APM are items 1, 4, 8, 11, 15, 18, 21, 23, 25, 30, 31, and 35 
from Set II of the long, 36-item APM. The psychometric properties of these items 
are similar to all 36 items of the full APM (Arthur & Day, 1994). A time limit of 
15 minutes was set for these twelve items, based on the average duration Arthur 
and Day (1994) measured. The example item was item 8 from Set I of the APM, 
while verbal instructions based on the manual (Raven, Court, & Raven, 1992) 
were also displayed on the screen. Intelligence was defined as the total number 
of correctly answered items of the Raven’s 12-APM (APM-scores).  
2.2.3 Procedure 
The experiment lasted approximately 75 minutes. Participants were tested in 
groups ranging from 20-26 people. All sessions were conducted on a local 
computer network using z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007) in the EconLab at 
RHUL. Before the experiment began, participants provided written informed 
consent. Next, they were issued detailed instructions and after correctly 
answering the comprehension questions, participants completed the dynamic 
task. They then read instructions regarding the static task and completed the 
task after correctly answering the comprehension questions. The static task was 
always conducted after the dynamic task, to avoid confusion about the rules of 
the task, in view of the contribution miscomprehension seems to make to the 
JTC bias (Balzan, Delfabbro, & Galletly, 2012; Balzan, Delfabbro, Galletly, et al., 
2012). The tasks were analysed separately, given potential order effects. 
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The middle five trials of the dynamic task and the first five trials of the static 
task were presented in counterbalanced order across testing sessions. 
Incomplete counterbalancing was accomplished through Latin square 
counterbalancing, using maximally different orders for each session (see Table 
2.4). To discourage participants from making formal calculations (e.g., using 
phones), each decision (i.e., seeing more fish or choosing a lake) had a time limit 
of 20 seconds. The first decision of each task had a time bonus of 40 seconds, to 
allow participants to get acquainted with the task. After the two tasks, 
participants completed the risk-aversion measure, the 12-APM, the PDI, and 
some demographic questions (gender, age, field of study). At the conclusion of 
the sessions, participants were paid their earnings (i.e., show-up fee and 
potential bonus) and dismissed.  
Table 2.4 Latin-square counterbalanced orders of the analysed trials in the dynamic 
and static task across the testing sessions. 
Session Task First 
trial 
Second 
trial 
Third 
trial 
Fourth 
trial 
Fifth 
trial 
1 Dynamic A B C D E 
 Static G H I J K 
2 Dynamic B D A E C 
 Static H I K G J 
3 Dynamic C E D B A 
 Static I K J H G 
4 Dynamic D A E C B 
 Static J G H K I 
5 Dynamic E C B A D 
 Static K J G I H 
 
2.2.4 Statistical Analyses 
The dependent variable on each trial was the number of fish seen before making 
a decision (i.e., draws to decision in the dynamic task and number of fish 
requested in the static task). The number of fish seen before making a decision 
was averaged across the five counterbalanced trials (separately for the dynamic 
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and static tasks). Furthermore, the number of fish seen before deciding in a 
completely white sequence was a separate dependent variable. We analysed this 
sequence separately because it may have been prone to order effects as it was 
always presented as the last trial (in case the sequence raised suspicion about 
the randomness of the draw). 
To investigate the relative JTC bias, regression analyses were conducted with 
delusion-proneness (i.e., continuous PDI-scores) as the predictor and draws to 
decision as the outcome variable (McKay et al., 2006). Hierarchical regression 
analyses were also conducted, where the first model accounted for intelligence 
(APM-scores), which may influence the ability to calculate the optimal decision 
point, and for risk-aversion, as decisions had financial consequences. The 
second model investigated if delusion-proneness could explain additional 
variance in the draws to decision.  
Furthermore, we used one-sample t-tests to investigate an absolute JTC bias for 
the whole sample, and for low-delusion-prone and high-delusion-prone 
participants separately. To make this latter distinction, we used a median split 
to convert the continuous PDI-scores into a categorical factor, excluding 
participants who fell at the median (LaRocco & Warman, 2009; Warman et al., 
2007). The mean draws-to-decision of each group was compared to the optimal 
number of draws before deciding.  
Finally, we investigated whether decisions were made with higher confidence 
by high-delusion-prone participants than by low-delusion-prone participants. 
The confidence in the chosen lake was used as the dependent variable. We also 
investigated whether draws-to-decision and confidence levels were correlated. 
Due to insufficient power, we could not analyse confidence levels for each fish 
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in a sequence, except for the first fish in each sequence. We analysed if delusion-
proneness was associated with increased confidence levels for the first fish, 
averaged across the five sequences in the dynamic task, and for the completely 
white sequence separately.  
2.3 Results 
2.3.1 Data Screening 
First, the data was inspected for outliers based on Cook’s distances, 
Mahalanobis’ distances, and standardised residuals with values outside the 
range from -2 to 2. Three participants were outliers across the three analyses. 
These were excluded, reducing the sample size to 112. One participant’s PDI-
score was an outlier according to the Mahalanobis distance. However, this 
participant’s score (i.e., 253) was well within the full possible range (i.e., 1-336) 
of the variable of interest. Therefore, the PDI-scores were square-root 
transformed. After this transformation no more outliers were detected through 
Cook’s and Mahalanobis’ distances and the standardised residuals indicated 
that fewer than the allowed 5% of the participants were outliers (Field, 2009). 
Further statistical assumptions were checked for n=112. Absence of 
multicollinearity was confirmed by the fact that there were no strong 
correlations between predictors, the tolerance values were >.966, and the VIF 
values were all <1.036. The predictors were linearly related with the outcome, as 
inclusion of the squared predictors did not lead to significantly better models. 
The standardised residuals were normally distributed. Homoscedasticity was 
confirmed as the plots of standardised residuals and predicted scores showed 
that the variance was equal across the range of the predicted scores. No 
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violations of assumptions were detected and analyses were thus conducted 
using this sample of n=112. 
2.3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2.5 shows descriptive statistics for age, PDI-scores, APM-scores, risk-
aversion, gender, and subject of study.  
Table 2.5 Descriptive statistics for age, PDI-scores, APM-scores, and risk-aversion.  
Variable Subcategory N Median Mean Standard 
deviation 
Range 
Age  112 19 19.94 2.920 17-35 
PDI-scores  112 68.5 75.06 40.611 10-253 
APM-scores  112 7 6.62 2.945 1-12 
Risk-
aversion 
 112 6 5.41 1.732 0-9 
Gender Female 59 (52.7%)     
Male 53 (47.3%)     
Subject 
studied 
Economics 19 (17.0%)     
Mathematics 11 (9.8%)     
Psychology 12 (10.7%)     
Various 70 (62.5%)     
 
For the one-sample t-tests used to investigate absolute JTC, we employed a 
median split to classify participants as low-delusion-prone or high-delusion-
prone. Although the median in the current sample (i.e., 68.5) was lower than 
that generally reported in the literature (e.g., Balzan, Delfabbro, & Galletly, 2012; 
LaRocco & Warman, 2009; Warman et al., 2007; 75.5, 90, and 97.5, respectively), 
it was higher than the median score of 49 originally found by Peters et al. (2004).  
Participants from certain educational backgrounds (i.e., economics, psychology, 
or mathematics) might have approached the tasks in this experiment differently. 
However, these three subjects were equally represented (χ²(2)=2.714, p=.257, 
φC=.110), with the majority of the sample coming from various other educational 
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backgrounds that were not expected to influence performance in this 
experiment (e.g., management, history, or geology; see Table 2.5).  
2.3.3 Dynamic Task 
2.3.3.1 Draws to Decision 
A linear regression showed that delusion-proneness was a significant predictor 
of the number of draws to decision (F(1,110)=5.520, p=.021, R²ADJUSTED=.039; see 
Table 2.6, model 1). The more delusion-prone a participant was, the fewer draws 
they requested before deciding. A hierarchical linear regression accounted for 
risk-aversion and intelligence. The first step included risk-aversion and 
intelligence, which significantly explained 19.4% of the variance 
(F(2,109)=14.373, p<.001, R²ADJUSTED=.194). Risk-aversion was not a significant 
predictor, while intelligence was (see Table 2.6, model 2.1). Adding delusion-
proneness as a third predictor significantly improved the model 
(ΔF(1,108)=6.128, Δp=.015, ΔR²=.042; F(3,108)=12.076, p<.001, R²ADJUSTED=.230). 
Delusion-proneness and intelligence were significant predictors in this model, 
while risk-aversion was not (see Table 2.6, model 2.2). Figure 2.2 shows the 
relationships between the predictors and draws to decision in the dynamic task. 
One-sample t-tests were conducted to investigate the absolute JTC bias. These 
tests indicated that the mean draws to decision, across trials, were significantly 
different from optimal (i.e., 6.6) for the whole sample (mean (SE) difference =  
-2.566 (.165); t(111)=15.506, p<.001, d=2.944, 95%-CI [-2.894, -2.238]). Moreover, 
fewer fish than optimal were considered by both low-delusion-prone 
participants (-2.286 (0.220); t(55)=10.377, p<.001, d=2.798, 95%-CI [-2.727, -1.844]) 
and high-delusion-prone participants (-2.846 (0.243); t(55)=11.702, p<.001, 
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d=3.156, 95%-CI [-3.334, -2.359]). This indicates that both groups decided 
prematurely in comparison with an objective, rationally optimal decision point.  
Table 2.6 B-values, standard errors (SE), β-values, and p-values for each of the 
predictors in the steps of the regression models for the draws to decision in 
the dynamic task. Square-root transformed PDI-scores represented 
delusion-proneness; APM-scores represented intelligence.  
Model Predictor b 95%-CI of b SE β p 
1 Delusion-proneness -.166 [-0.307, -0.026] .071 -.219 .021 
2.1 Intelligence .271 [0.171, 0.372] .051 .456 <.001 
 Risk-aversion .009 [-0.162, 0.180] .086 .009 .913 
2.1 Intelligence .269 [0.170, 0.367] .050 .452 <.001 
 Risk-aversion -.029 [-0.199, 0.141] .086 -.029 .737 
 Delusion-proneness -.160 [-0.287, -0.032] .064 -.210 .015 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Relationships between the predictors (squares: intelligence as represented 
by APM-scores; triangles: risk-aversion; diamonds: delusions-proneness as 
represented by square-root transformed PDI-scores) and the number of fish 
seen before deciding in the dynamic task. The distances from the dotted line 
(the optimal number of fish to have seen before deciding) indicates the 
deviation from the optimal decision point.   
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2.3.3.2 Confidence Levels 
Confidence levels at the moment of deciding were significantly correlated with 
draws to decision (r(112)=.304, p=.001), so that the more fish were seen before 
deciding, the more confident participants felt. A linear regression showed that 
delusion-proneness did not significantly predict confidence levels at the 
moment of deciding (F(1,110)=.182, p=.671, R²ADJUSTED=-.007; b (SE)=.245 (.575), 
95%-CI of b [-0.894, 0.385], β=.041). Another linear regression showed that 
delusion-proneness also did not significantly predict confidence levels after 
seeing the first fish in the sequence (F(1,110)=2.063, p=.154, R²ADJUSTED=.009;  
b (SE)=1.113 (.775), 95%-CI of b [-0.422, 2.647], β=.154). 
2.3.3.3 Completely White Sequence of the Dynamic Task 
This completely white sequence minimises the need to integrate information, 
which is thought to be one impairment contributing to the JTC bias (Fine et al., 
2007; Young & Bentall, 1995). As this sequence (trial F) was always presented 
last, there may have been practice effects or fatigue on this trial compared to the 
counterbalanced trials A-E and it was thus analysed separately.  
2.3.3.3.1 Draws to Decision 
As with the above analyses for the dynamic task’s sequences with contradictory 
information, a linear regression conducted for the sequence of only white fish 
indicated that delusion-proneness was a significant predictor of draws to 
decision (F(1,110)=7.429, p=.007, R²ADJUSTED=.055; see Table 2.7, model 1). The 
more delusion-prone a participant was, the fewer fish they saw before deciding. 
As above, a hierarchical linear regression accounting for risk-aversion and 
intelligence was run to investigate if adding delusion-proneness could predict 
additional variance not already accounted for. The first step of this model, 
including risk-aversion and intelligence, significantly explained 8.7% of the 
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variance (F(2,109)=6.321, p=.003, R²ADJUSTED=.087). Risk-aversion was not a 
significant predictor, while intelligence was (see Table 2.7, model 2.1). Adding 
delusion-proneness as a third predictor significantly improved the model 
(ΔF(1,108)=6.128, Δp=.008, ΔR²=.057; F(3,108)=6.883, p<.001, R²ADJUSTED=.137). 
Delusion-proneness and intelligence were significant predictors in this model, 
while risk-aversion was not (see Table 2.7, model 2.2).  
One-sample t-tests were conducted to investigate an absolute JTC bias on this 
sequence as was done for the sequences with contradictory information above. 
These tests indicated that the mean draws to decision were significantly 
different from optimal (i.e., 3) for the whole sample (mean (SE) difference =  
-0.357 (.165); t(111)=3.702, p<.001, d=.703, 95%-CI [-0.548, -0.166]). When split by 
delusion-proneness, only high-delusion-prone participants showed an absolute 
JTC bias (-.554 (0.146); t(55)=3.786, p<.001, d=0.719, 95%-CI [-0.847, 0.261]). Low-
delusion-prone participants requested an optimal number of fish on this 
completely white sequence (-.161 (0.122); t(55)=1.322, p=.192, d=0.251, 95%-CI  
[-0.404, -0.083]).  
Table 2.7 B-values, standard errors (SE), β-values, and p-values for each of the 
predictors in the steps of the regression models for the draws to decision in 
the completely white sequence of the dynamic task. Square-root 
transformed PDI-scores represented delusion-proneness; APM-scores 
represented intelligence.  
Model Predictor b 95%-CI for b SE β p 
1 Delusion-proneness -.112 [-0.193, -0.030] .041 -.252 .007 
2.1 Intelligence .110 [0.048, 0.172] .031 .317 .001 
 Risk-aversion .025 [-0.081, 0.131] .054 .043 .639 
2.2 Intelligence .108 [0.048, 0.169] .031 .312 .001 
 Risk-aversion -.001 [-0.105, 0.104] .053 -.001 .992 
 Delusion-proneness -.107 [-0.186, -0.028] .040 -.242 .008 
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2.3.3.3.2 Confidence Levels 
As for the sequences with contradictory information above, confidence levels at 
the moment of deciding were significantly correlated with the draws to decision 
in the completely white sequence (r(112)=.400, p<.001), so that the more fish 
were seen before deciding, the more confident participants felt. A linear 
regression showed that delusion-proneness did not significantly predict 
confidence levels at the moment of deciding (F(1,110)=.014, p=.906, R²ADJUSTED= 
-.009; b (SE)=.092 (.776), 95%-CI of b [-1.447, 1.630], β=.011). Another linear 
regression showed that delusion-proneness significantly predicted confidence 
levels after seeing the first fish in the sequence (F(1,110)=5.803, p=.018, 
R²ADJUSTED=.050; b (SE)=1.979 (.822), 95%-CI of b [0.351, 3.607], β=.224). 
2.3.4 Static Task 
2.3.4.1 Draws to Decision 
As for the dynamic task above, a linear regression showed that delusion-
proneness was a significant predictor of draws to decision (F(1,110)=5.054, 
p=.027, R²ADJUSTED=.035; see Table 2.8, model 1). The more delusion-prone 
participants were, the fewer fish they requested. Again, a hierarchical linear 
regression accounted for risk-aversion and intelligence. The first step, including 
risk-aversion and intelligence, significantly explained 10.8% of the variance 
(F(2,109)=14.373, p=.001, R²ADJUSTED=.108). Risk-aversion was not a significant 
predictor, while intelligence was (see Table 2.8, model 2.1). Adding delusion-
proneness as a third predictor significantly improved the model 
(ΔF(1,108)=4.288, p=.041, ΔR²=.033; F(3,108)=6.748, p<.001, R²ADJUSTED=.134). 
Intelligence and delusion-proneness were significant predictors in this model, 
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while risk-aversion was not (see Table 2.8, model 2.2). Figure 2.3 shows the 
relationships between the predictors and draws to decisions in the static task. 
Table 2.8 B-values, standard errors (SE), β-values, and p-values for each of the 
predictors in the steps of the regression models for mean deviations from 
optimal decisions in the static task. 
Model Predictor b 95%-CI for b SE β p 
1 Delusion-proneness -.167 [-0.313, -0.020] .074 -.210 .027 
2.1 APM-scores .205 [0.095, 0.316] .056 .331 <.001 
 Risk-aversion .113 [-0.074, 0.301] .095 .107 .234 
2.2 APM-scores .203 [0.094, 0.312] .055 .327 <.001 
 Risk-aversion .078 [-0.110, 0.266] .095 .074 .413 
 Delusion-proneness -.148 [-0.289, -0.006] .071 -.186 .041 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Relationships between the predictors (squares: intelligence as represented 
by APM-scores; triangles: risk-aversion; diamonds: delusion-proneness as 
represented by square-root transformed PDI-scores) and the number of fish 
requested in the static task. The distances from the dotted line (the optimal 
number of fish to have requested) indicates the deviation from the optimal 
decision.  
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As for the dynamic task, one-sample t-tests were conducted to investigate 
absolute JTC in the static task. These tests indicated that the mean draws-to-
decision were significantly different from optimal (i.e., 5.4) for the whole sample 
(mean (SE) difference = -.496 (.173); t(111)=2.873, p=.005, d=0.545, 95%-CI [-0.839,  
-0.154]). When split by delusion-proneness, only high-delusion-prone 
participants showed an absolute JTC bias (-.739 (0.257); t(55)=2.880, p=.006, 
d=0.547, 95%-CI [-1.254, -0.225]). Low-delusion-prone participants requested an 
optimal number of fish (-.254 (0.229); t(55)=1.107, p=.273, d=0.210, 95%-CI [-0.713, 
0.206]).  
2.3.4.2 Confidence Levels 
As for the dynamic task, confidence levels at the moment of deciding were 
significantly correlated with the amount of data gathered in the static task 
(r(112)=.341, p<.001), so that the more fish were requested for a decision, the 
more confident participants felt about their decision. A linear regression 
indicated that delusion-proneness did not significantly predict confidence levels 
at the moment of deciding (F(1,110)=1.099, p=.297, R²ADJUSTED=.001; b (SE)=-.490 
(.467), 95%-CI of b [-1.416, 0.436], β=-.099). 
2.4 Discussion 
In this study, the JTC bias was investigated in incentivised dynamic and static 
decision-making tasks. The dynamic task involved sequential presentation of 
information, where after each fish, which could be black or white, the 
participants could ask to see another fish or could decide on one of two lakes as 
the source of the fish. In the static task, in contrast, participants had to indicate 
how many fish they would like to see, all at once, before seeing any fish. The 
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dynamic task is modelled after the classic beads task, which is the most 
commonly used paradigm to investigate the JTC bias.  
In the dynamic task, delusion-proneness predicted the draws taken to reach a 
decision, both before and after accounting for risk-aversion and intelligence. The 
higher the scores for delusion-proneness, the fewer fish participants saw before 
deciding. This was found across trials which included conflicting information 
within the sequences and also for a sequence of only white fish. This provides 
support for a relative JTC bias. Our entire sample also showed an absolute JTC 
bias in the dynamic task: both low-delusion-prone and high-delusion-prone 
participants saw less evidence than would have been optimal. Delusion-
proneness and confidence ratings were not robustly associated in the dynamic 
task. 
In the static task, delusion-proneness also predicted the amount of evidence 
requested for a decision, both before and after accounting for risk-aversion and 
intelligence. As with the dynamic task, the higher the scores for delusion-
proneness, the fewer fish participants requested to see to base their decision on. 
This also supports the relative JTC bias finding. In this task, only high-delusion-
prone participants showed an absolute JTC bias, as they requested significantly 
fewer fish than would have been optimal. Low-delusion-prone participants 
requested an optimal number of fish. Delusion-proneness and confidence 
ratings were not associated in the static task.  
The standard relative JTC-finding was found in both tasks: the more delusion-
prone participants were, the less evidence they used as a basis for a decision. 
Interestingly, an absolute JTC bias was found in the dynamic task for the 
majority of participants, as both low-delusion-prone and high-delusion-prone 
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participants tended to decide faster than they should have (in order to maximise 
their expected payoff). In the static task, only high-delusion-prone participants 
were found to decide on the basis of less information than optimal, while low-
delusion-prone participants decided on the basis of an optimal amount of 
information. This suggests that delusion-proneness is also associated with an 
absolute JTC bias.  
It must be noted that it appears that the absolute JTC bias could be influenced 
by the task environment to a certain extent, as it was found for everyone in the 
dynamic task, but only for high-delusion-prone participants in the static task. 
This suggests the absolute JTC bias could be exacerbated by potentially 
impaired cognitive capacity. If updating beliefs as one gathers information in 
the dynamic task is too taxing, early decisions might be made to avoid having to 
maintain and process information in working memory. A lack of motivation 
might also exacerbate the JTC bias on the dynamic task compared to the static 
task, as seeing more fish on the dynamic task would prolong the task and 
require more responses, whereas the amount of time and effort that had to be 
invested on the static task was the same regardless of the number of fish seen. 
These effects might be more pronounced for participants higher in delusion-
proneness. 
The liberal acceptance account of the JTC bias suggests that delusional or 
delusion-prone participants have a lower decision threshold and thus do not 
require as high a level of probability of being correct as healthy controls before 
deciding (e.g., Moritz et al., 2007). This, in turn, would suggest that confidence 
levels at the moment of deciding would be lower for participants who are more 
delusion-prone. However, McKay et al. (2006) and Warman (2008) found that 
participants who were more delusion-prone reported greater confidence, a 
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finding in the opposite direction to that suggested by the liberal acceptance 
account. We did not find confidence levels to be associated with delusion-
proneness. Langdon, Ward, and Coltheart (2010) and Langdon, Still, Connors, 
Ward, and Catts (2014) did not find a difference in confidence ratings between 
delusional patients and controls either. This might be due to confidence ratings’ 
reduced sensitivity to the JTC bias compared to a draws-to-decision measure 
(Bentall, Corcoran, Howard, Blackwood, & Kinderman, 2001; Fine et al., 2007). 
Fine et al. (2007) delineate several accounts of the JTC bias. The first two 
accounts are based on disturbed information integration. First, the account 
based on work by Menon et al. (2006) stipulates that evidence in the beads task 
is assigned extra weight, because stimuli acquire extra salience in patients with 
schizophrenia (Kapur, 2003). This would lead to early decisions and increased 
confidence in the hypothesis being held for any given piece of information. 
Although we did find a reduced number of draws to decision, we did not find a 
difference in confidence at the moment of deciding. It must be noted that 
confidence at the moment of deciding could be unaffected under this account. 
Both low-delusion-prone and high-delusion-prone participants might decide 
when they are 80% confident that the lake they choose is the correct lake; the 
latter group might simply reach this level of confidence earlier due to increased 
confidence in each piece of information leading up to the required level. Due to 
rapidly-decreasing sample sizes, we could not compare confidence levels for 
each fish in the sequence, but only for the first fish, for which no differences in 
confidence levels were found. Our results cannot shed light on potentially 
increased confidence for any accumulating information, which needs to be 
integrated with previous evidence, for high-delusion-prone participants. Also 
note that, in the static task, high-delusion-prone participants requested less 
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information than would be optimal, perhaps because evidence in itself, even in 
an abstract, hypothetical form, is already assigned extra weight. Overall, our 
results fit the information-integration account, although the results with regards 
to confidence levels could be explored in more detail in future research. Another 
account suggests that the JTC bias is a consequence of difficulties with 
processing sequential information (Young & Bentall, 1995). This would lead to a 
reduced number of draws to decision. Our results from the dynamic task are in 
line with this account. However, on the static task, where information was 
presented instantaneously, rather than sequentially, an effect of delusion-
proneness was found for the number of fish requested to see, which would not 
be expected on the basis of this account.  
Fine et al. (2007) also outline motivational accounts. One account posits that 
delusional participants have a high need for closure, which leads them to decide 
early, and leads to more certainty. Our findings are not in line with this account, 
as in the static task, closure could have been obtained equally fast by using more 
evidence, but yet the JTC bias was still found. Our findings also negate an 
alternate explanation of the JTC bias: fewer draws might be due to delusion-
prone and delusional participants being less motivated to persevere in a 
seemingly worthless task and in more of a “rush” to finish the experiment (L. O. 
White & Mansell, 2009). In other words, sampling more information could be 
perceived as more costly for delusional and delusion-prone participants. 
Moutoussis et al. (2011) did not find support for this idea when comparing 
decision models, including a costed-Bayesian model, for data on a non-
incentivised beads task. In the dynamic and static tasks described here, various 
motivational confounds were minimised or virtually eliminated (e.g., providing 
monetary incentives in both tasks, avoiding additional time and effort 
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associated with gathering more evidence in the static task, minimising cognitive 
load by not requiring decision updating in the static task) and the standard 
relative finding, where delusion-proneness was positively associated with JTC, 
was replicated. This undermines the rushing account.  
Another account states that the JTC bias is part of a confirmatory reasoning 
style, where there is a reduced number of draws due to a limited motivation to 
search for disconfirming evidence (Dudley & Over, 2003). This confirmatory 
reasoning style is commonly found for threat-related material, even by healthy 
controls, when it is important to find supporting, rather than falsifying, 
evidence for a claim (e.g., "if there is smoke, then there is fire"; Dudley & Over, 
2003). Our results might speak to this account. If a smaller sample is considered, 
perhaps the chance of encountering disconfirming evidence is minimised (i.e., 
“if I do not look, it is not there”; much like people afraid of heights would close 
their eyes when on a cliff, for example). A desire to avoid disconfirming 
evidence might then lead delusion-prone participants to consider fewer fish. 
This account does not hypothesise an effect on confidence levels. 
Overall, the findings of the present study are in line with the conclusion by Fine 
et al. (2007), who state that only the information-integration account and the 
confirmatory reasoning style are supported by the findings of their review. 
2.4.1 Potential Limitations 
The beads task was incentivised to generate optimal decision points, but the 
incentives also minimised the confound where a low motivation might lead 
delusion-prone participants to decide quickly in order to finish the experiment 
earlier. If this confound is operating, however, they may also try to finish the 
PDI more quickly and answer “no” for endorsement of questions, to avoid the 
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three follow-up questions of conviction, preoccupation, and distress. There is 
evidence that individuals filling out the PDI are more likely to endorse earlier 
items than later items, especially when the scale is included in a larger battery of 
tests (R. Ross, personal communication, Aug. 31, 2013). If delusion-prone 
participants are especially inclined to want to finish tasks and questionnaires 
more quickly, the PDI might systematically underestimate their delusion-
proneness (undermining the validity of the PDI). If this is the case, delusion-
prone participants should decide too quickly on the beads task and have low 
scores on the PDI. In other words, a positive association between the decision 
point and the PDI-scores would be expected. The association found here, 
however, was negative, so that decisions on the beads tasks were earlier as PDI-
scores were higher. Therefore, the motivation to finish tasks and questionnaires 
quickly does not seem to impact our results, which followed the hypothesised 
direction. Furthermore, higher endorsement scores, sub-scale scores, and total 
scores on the 21-PDI all distinguish patients from a healthy sample (Peters et al., 
2004). If individuals high in delusional thinking would be less likely to endorse 
items, such criterion validity would not be found. This again speaks against this 
potential limitation.  
A second potential limitation concerns the static task, in which participants were 
presented with ten listed options. Although the mean rational number of fish to 
request was 5.4, participants may have requested to see five fish because they 
considered the centre of the scale of options an easy, “neutral” point, much like 
the neutral response alternative on Likert scales (Nowlis, Kahn, & Dhar, 2002). 
Indeed, across all five trials in the static task, the most frequently requested 
number of fish was five fish. However, this bias on the centre of the scale was 
not different for low and high delusion-prone participants (2 (delusion-
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proneness) × 10 (number of fish requested) Fisher’s exact tests for each trial, all 
ps>.172), so our finding that high-delusion-prone participants requested fewer 
data than low-delusion-prone participants cannot be due to anchoring. 
Nevertheless, in future studies it might be beneficial to ask participants to enter 
the number of fish they request, rather than presenting a list of ten options with 
a clear centre option.  
2.5 Conclusion 
Studies in experimental psychology have often claimed that delusional and 
delusion-prone participants “jump to conclusions” on probabilistic reasoning 
tasks. However, this term suggests that premature decisions are made, but such 
a notion is only meaningful when there is in fact an optimal point at which a 
rational individual should decide. No previous studies have included both 
rewards for correct decisions and costs for gathering information, making the 
claim that delusional and delusion-prone participants “jump to conclusions” 
unwarranted. In this study, stringent experimental economics methods were 
adopted to minimise effects of potential confounds (e.g., miscomprehension, 
limited motivation, impaired memory) and optimal decision points were 
created through rewards and costs. We found that, in a dynamic task, all 
participants tended to decide before the optimal decision points, but in the static 
task only high-delusion-prone participants did this. Furthermore, we replicated 
the relative JTC bias (i.e., high-delusion-prone participants saw fewer fish before 
deciding than low-delusion-prone participants) in both tasks, also when 
accounting for risk-aversion and intelligence. In conclusion, our findings 
support the claim that delusional ideation is associated with a tendency to 
“jump to conclusions”, in both a relative and an absolute sense. 
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3 Delusion-Proneness and Probability Estimates10 
3.1 Background 
In Chapter 2, evidence for the jumping-to-conclusions (JTC) bias was found in 
two data gathering versions of the beads task. Participants saw two lakes filled 
with fish of different colours, in opposite ratios across the lakes and a fisherman 
who was fishing from one of the two lakes. Participants could choose how many 
fish they wanted to see from the fisherman’s catch before deciding which of the 
two lakes he was fishing from. We employed both a dynamic draws-to-decision 
version of the task, in which fish were presented sequentially, and a static one-
shot version of the task, in which participants decided how many fish they 
wanted to see before they saw any fish. In contrast to these data-gathering 
variants of the beads task, in this chapter we used an adaptation of the 
probability-estimates version of the beads task to investigate the beliefs that 
underpin data-gathering decisions. In standard probability-estimates versions, 
participants are shown a sequence of beads and after each bead they provide the 
probabilities that the sequence of beads is coming from either of two jars (Garety 
& Freeman, 1999). In such versions, the JTC bias manifests in higher 
probabilities being provided by deluded or delusion-prone participants than by 
healthy controls (relative JTC bias) or than Bayes’ theorem (see below and 
Chapter 1) would warrant (absolute JTC bias).  
Our aims in the present study were three-fold: 1) To investigate JTC in a variant 
of the probability-estimates paradigm designed to minimise common 
confounding factors; 2) to investigate systematically the effect of incentives in a 
                                                          
10 Part of this chapter has been published in Van der Leer and McKay (2014). 
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probability-estimates paradigm; and 3) to investigate different aspects of 
probability reasoning. 
As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, performance on the beads task is vulnerable 
to several potential confounds. The strain on working memory and a lack of 
motivation were the most relevant confounds addressed in the study reported 
in this chapter. Working memory deficits might impair the ability to maintain 
and manipulate information, which, in turn, may influence the JTC bias 
(Freeman et al., 2014; Garety et al., 2013). In terms of facilitating the maintenance 
of information, several studies have included a (visual) memory aid, but this 
generally did not abolish the bias (e.g., Dudley et al., 1997b; Moritz & 
Woodward, 2005). The study reported here aimed to facilitate the manipulation 
of information by presenting only one piece of information in each trial, rather 
than a sequence. This also prevented the common misunderstanding that the 
sources of the information (e.g., the lakes or jars) switch throughout the 
sequence (Balzan, Delfabbro, & Galletly, 2012; Balzan, Delfabbro, Galletly, et al., 
2012).  
Deviations from optimal performance might be due to a lack of incentives to 
perform optimally. Only two previous studies have included incentives in the 
beads task (Lincoln, Ziegler, Mehl, et al., 2010; Woodward et al., 2009), but both 
adopted the draws-to-decision version. Thus, no previous study has 
incentivised a probability-estimates version and the present study was the first 
to do so, with a systematic investigation of the effects of incentives as a second 
aim of the present study. We compared performance on incentivised and non-
incentivised versions of the probability-estimates version of the beads task. 
Furthermore, a risk-aversion measure was included, because participants might 
differ on this variable, independently from a JTC bias, as Lincoln, Ziegler, Mehl, 
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et al. (2010) noted, though neither they nor Woodward et al. (2009) included 
such a measure.  
Furthermore, the third aim of the present study was to investigate different 
aspects of probability reasoning. As indicated in Chapter 1, rational beliefs and 
decisions are often compared to normative standards, such as a value calculated 
using Bayes’ theorem (Dienes, 2008): 
        
           
    
   
           
                         
 
Bayes’ theorem has previously been used to determine optimal, rational 
performance on the probability-estimates version of the beads task where 
participants provide subjective probabilities for how likely a sequence of beads 
is to come from either of two jars (Huq et al., 1988; Speechley et al., 2010). 
Applied to the beads task, the priors (P(H) and P( H)) would pertain to how 
likely each jar is to be selected, which generally should be 50% for each jar as 
one is selected at random (Garety & Freeman, 1999). The likelihoods (P(D|H) 
and P(D| H)) are determined by the ratios of the beads in the jars and the 
colour(s) of the bead(s) shown. The posterior probability (P(H|D)) integrates 
these factors and constitutes what participants are required to report. Whenever 
the priors of two alternatives hypotheses are equal, as is (at least implicitly) the 
case in the beads task, the posterior probability is determined by the likelihoods 
(Dienes, 2008).  
As Matthews (2005) noted, differences in subjective posterior beliefs between 
groups, such as delusional patients and healthy controls, could be due to 
different priors and to different likelihood ratios (P(D|H)/P(D| H)) being 
assigned. If one holds an extreme prior belief, such as believing with full 
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conviction that the experimenter will pick the predominantly white jar to draw 
beads from (i.e., P(White jar)=1 and P(Black jar)=0), no number of black beads 
would be able to change this belief. This resonates with the idea Hemsley and 
Garety (1986) put forth: the strength with which delusions are held, and their 
resistance to modification by experience, could be due to very high prior 
probabilities. No amount of experience might then change the belief.  
Alternatively, McKay (2012) postulated that delusional inferences might arise 
from a bias towards “explanatory adequacy”. On this account, delusional 
patients would place too much emphasis on the likelihood ratio and would not 
consider prior beliefs sufficiently. When people have a bias towards explanatory 
adequacy, they might favour the hypothesis that best explains the observed data, 
without properly considering the prior probability of that hypothesis (Coltheart, 
Menzies, & Sutton, 2010). For example, consider a woman who experiences 
pressure on her skull and hears a constant buzzing sound (Maher, 1988, as cited 
in Langdon & Bayne, 2010). These data could be explained by the hypothesis 
that she has bees in her head. In fact, the likelihood of her experiences if there 
are bees in her head would be much higher than if there were no bees in her 
head. Ignoring the extremely low prior probability of the “bees in head” 
hypothesis, the woman arrives at the conclusion that she has bees in her head. In 
reality, this woman experienced pressure and tinnitus from a tumour which 
softened her skull.  
If the “explanatory adequacy” theory holds, an interesting investigation in the 
beads task would be to vary the prior probabilities of the jars being selected. If 
delusional or delusion-prone participants indeed have a bias towards 
explanatory adequacy, they might rely too much on likelihoods (i.e., the colour 
of the bead and the jar in which that colour is predominant), while not 
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adequately taking into account the prior probability of the jar being chosen. To 
the best of our knowledge, this variation of the task has not previously been 
tested and is also explored in the study presented in this chapter. 
3.1.1 The Present Study 
The present study was based on the lakes-and-fish adaptation of the classic 
beads task (Whitman & Woodward, 2011). Whereas usually there is a single 
fisherman, in our paradigm there were five fishermen, living at different 
distances from the two lakes (see Figure 3.1 on page 115). This enabled variation 
of the prior distribution over the two lakes.  
Participants completed 26 trials. On each trial one of the five fishermen 
displayed a fish he had caught from one of the two lakes. The fisherman’s house 
was depicted in the background, and the location of each fisherman’s house in 
relation to the two lakes determined the probability that he would fish from 
either lake, thus providing information about the prior distribution over the two 
lakes. For example, the fisherman second from the left would visit Lake A four 
out of six times (P(Lake A)=.67), as the fisherman was described as fishing six 
days a week and resting on Sunday. The fish displayed by the fisherman could 
be black or white. On each trial the two lakes contained black and white fish in 
one of three complementary ratios: 50:50/50:50, 60:40/40:60, or 85:15/15:85. This 
provided information about the likelihood of a fish of a certain colour being 
caught from each of the two lakes. Aside from the colour of the fish displayed 
by the fisherman, there were thus two key types of information that could vary 
on each trial: 1) Which of the five fishermen was depicted fishing, and 2) the 
ratios of black and white fish in the two lakes.  
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On each trial participants indicated which lake they thought the fish had been 
caught from; this was done either by betting money on the lake they thought it 
was from or by providing probability estimates. A single fish was displayed on 
each trial (see Figure 3.1 on page 115 for an example trial) to minimise working-
memory demands and to avoid miscomprehension regarding the swapping of 
lakes (Balzan, Delfabbro, & Galletly, 2012; Balzan, Delfabbro, Galletly, et al., 
2012). As such, each trial in the current paradigm is equivalent to the first fish or 
bead in the standard probability-estimates paradigm.  
The 26 trials encompassed three conditions, based on whether the prior 
distribution over the lakes was non-uniform (and thus informative) or uniform, 
and whether the ratio of black to white fish in the lakes was unequal (and thus 
informative) or equal:  
 Prior condition (10 trials): non-uniform prior distribution over the lakes; 
equal ratio of black to white fish in each lake (i.e., 50:50/50:50). 
 Standard (likelihood) condition (8 trials): uniform prior distribution over 
the lakes; unequal ratio of black to white fish in each lake (i.e., 60:40/40:60 
or 85:15/15:85). This is the standard scenario in beads-task studies. 
 Combined condition (8 trials): non-uniform prior distribution over the 
lakes; unequal ratio of black to white fish in each lake. In this condition, 
both the colour of the caught fish and the location of the fisherman were 
informative.  
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Figure 3.1 Visual representation of a trial in the combined condition. In this case, the 
fisherman lives closer to Lake B (on the right) and thus visits this lake more 
often (4 out of 6 times). The displayed fish is white, which is the 
predominant colour in Lake B (60 white: 40 black), also favouring the 
hypothesis that the fisherman was fishing from Lake B.  
3.1.2 Hypotheses 
Three main effects and an interaction were predicted.  
 First, a main effect of condition was expected. We hypothesised that 
participants would find it easier to take into account just one type of 
information (i.e., either priors or likelihoods) than to integrate both types, 
leading to larger deviations from Bayesian posteriors in the combined 
condition than in the prior or standard conditions. 
 Second, a main effect of group (betting versus control) was expected. We 
hypothesised that participants in the betting group would be more 
motivated to make accurate decisions than those in the control group, 
leading to smaller deviations from Bayesian posteriors in the betting 
group than in the control group.  
 Third, a main effect of delusion-proneness was expected. High-delusion-
prone participants were expected to show a JTC-bias and thus to bet 
more money on or over-estimate the lake with the highest Bayesian 
posterior, compared to low-delusion-prone participants.  
 Finally, an interaction between conditions and delusion-proneness was 
expected. We predicted that high-delusion-prone participants would use 
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prior information less when other information was available, compared 
to low-delusion-prone participants. Thus we predicted that the difference 
between conditions would be greater for high-delusion-prone 
participants than for low-delusion-prone participants. 
3.2 Methods 
3.2.1 Participants 
Participants (n=129, 83 females, 45 males, 1 unknown gender; mean (SD) age = 
20.36 (3.1) years) were students from RHUL, recruited using the Online 
Recruitment System for Economic Experiments (Greiner, 2004). Participants in 
the betting group received £5 for participation and between £0 and £4 as a 
bonus, depending on their bets (mean (SD) = £2.50 (£0.87)). Participants in the 
control group received £8 for participation. The Psychology Department Ethics 
Committee of RHUL approved this study.  
3.2.2 Materials 
3.2.2.1 Fisherman-Adapted Beads Task 
Before the start of the experiment, participants were provided with written 
instructions providing information about the ratios of black to white fish in the 
two lakes (i.e., likelihoods), the fishermen (i.e., priors), and the means of 
responding (see Appendix C). The response bar ran from “Lake A” on the left to 
“Lake B” on the right. Participants could indicate how much they wanted to bet 
on either lake or how likely they thought either lake was by moving a slider 
within this response bar. Indicator stripes for 25% Lake A, 50%/50%, and 75% 
Lake A were provided, but the numerical value of the response was not shown. 
Participants had to answer comprehension questions correctly before starting 
Chapter 3 
117 
 
the experiment (see Appendix C). Answers were checked and participants were 
referred back to the written instructions when an incorrect answer was given.  
In three within-participants conditions differences in priors and likelihoods 
were represented by which of five fishermen was fishing and by different ratios 
of black to white fish in the lakes, respectively. Twenty-six trials were created to 
incorporate the possible combinations of priors and likelihoods per condition, 
while keeping the number of trials in the different conditions similar; the colour 
of the caught fish and in which lake that colour was the predominant colour was 
determined pseudo-randomly with the constraints that each trial could only be 
presented once. Visual stimuli were based on those used by Speechley et al. 
(2010). Participants were informed that the distance of a fisherman’s house to a 
lake was directly proportional to the number of times he would go fishing in 
that lake. Figure 3.1 (on page 115) shows the fourth fisherman from the left, 
living closer to Lake B, and the colour of the caught fish matches the 
predominant colour of that lake, so both pieces of information (i.e., prior and 
likelihood) favour the hypothesis that the fisherman was fishing from Lake B 
(Bayesian posterior probability that the white fish is from Lake B and not Lake 
A = .7511).  
3.2.2.2 Risk Aversion 
For a description of the computerised risk-aversion measure (Holt & Laury, 
2002), see Chapter 2 (2.2.2.2, on page 88).  
3.2.2.3 Delusion Proneness 
For a description of the 21-item Peters et al. Delusions Inventory (PDI; Peters et 
al., 2004), see Chapter 2 (2.2.2.3, on page 89).  
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3.2.3 Procedure 
The experiment lasted approximately one hour. Participants were tested in 
groups ranging from 16-26 people. All sessions were conducted on a local 
computer network using z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007) in the EconLab at 
RHUL. Before the experiment began, participants provided written informed 
consent, read instructions, and completed comprehension questions. 
Participants signed up for a session without any knowledge of the different 
groups. In the betting group, participants were given £4 to distribute over the 
two lakes as they wished. They were informed that one randomly chosen trial 
would be paid out according to their distributions of the money. In the control 
group, participants simply provided an estimate of how probable each lake was; 
these decisions were without financial consequence. The response bar was the 
same for both groups. To the extent that the slider was moved toward “Lake A”, 
Lake A was considered more likely (in the control group) or more money was 
bet on Lake A (in the betting group); positioning the slider exactly between Lake 
A and B indicated that the participant did not think either of the lakes was more 
likely than the other or that they equally split their bets across the two lakes. The 
26 trials were presented in random order for each participant. So that 
participants would not have time to calculate the posterior (e.g., using their 
phone), each trial had a time limit of 20 seconds. Then, participants completed 
the risk-aversion measure, the PDI, and some demographic questions (gender, 
age, subject studied). At the end of the experiment, one of the trials was 
randomly selected for the betting group. For that trial, the correct lake was 
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drawn based on the Bayesian posterior probability.12 Participants were paid out 
the money they bet on the correct lake on that trial as a bonus. 
3.2.4 Statistical Analyses 
The dependent variable on each trial was the deviation of each participant’s 
subjective probability for each lake from the Bayesian posterior probability. To 
calculate the average deviations, first, for all trials where the Bayesian posterior 
was below .5 (i.e., Lake A, on the left, was more likely than Lake B, on the right), 
the Bayesian posteriors and participants’ decisions were subtracted from 1, so 
that they were coded in the same direction as the other trials (i.e., those where 
Lake B was more likely than Lake A). Then, for each trial, the Bayesian posterior 
was subtracted from the participants’ decision. Deviations were directional, so 
that negative values indicated underestimation, while positive values indicated 
overestimation. Next, the average deviations per condition were calculated (i.e., 
across 10 trials in the prior condition; across 8 trials in the standard condition; 
across 8 trials in the combined condition). In the betting group, the amounts 
participants bet on each lake were converted into proportions representing 
probability estimates. The control group already provided such probability 
estimates. In principle, the responses in both groups were comparable, since the 
sliding bar was the same in both groups.  
We ran two sets of complementary analyses. In the first type of analysis we used 
a median split to convert the continuous PDI scores into a categorical between-
participants factor (e.g., LaRocco & Warman, 2009; Warman et al., 2007). We 
                                                          
12 For the randomly chosen trial, Lake A had a posterior probability of .25 and Lake B of .75. 
A random number between 1 and 100 was generated to determine which lake the fish was 
from. The numbers 1 to 25 represented the posterior probability of Lake A, while the 
numbers 26 to 100 represented Lake B. Therefore, the lake with the highest Bayesian 
posterior was not always the correct lake. 
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then ran mixed factorial analyses of variance (ANOVA), with condition (prior, 
standard or combined) as a within-participants factor, and group (betting versus 
control) and delusion-proneness (low versus high) as between-participants 
factors. Since the betting group took risks betting their money, ANCOVAs 
controlling for risk-aversion were also conducted. Greenhouse-Geisser-corrected 
degrees of freedom are reported when the assumption of sphericity was 
violated.  
The second type of analysis consisted of regression analyses with PDI-scores 
analysed as a continuous measure to investigate direct links between delusion-
proneness and deviations from Bayesian reasoning (McKay et al., 2006). This 
was done by regressing PDI-scores, group, and the interaction between PDI-
scores and group on the deviations from Bayesian posteriors. This was done per 
condition. Again, we checked whether results remained the same when risk-
aversion was controlled for in the betting group.  
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Data Screening 
First, the data was inspected for outliers in the planned regression and factorial 
analyses. For the factorial analyses, outliers were identified through boxplots; 
for the regression analyses, outliers were determined based on standardised 
residuals, Cook’s distance, and Mahalanobis distances. Four participants were 
outliers across the two types of analyses. These were excluded from the 
analyses, reducing the sample size to 125. Next, outliers on regression analyses 
were identified based on standardised residual values outside the range from -2 
to 2. This inspection indicated that an additional 16 participants were outside 
this acceptable range; as this is more than the acceptable 5% of the total number 
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of participants (Field, 2005), the 16 participants were excluded from all analyses 
to enable comparison across analyses, reducing the sample size to 109. 
Further statistical assumptions were checked for n=109. For the factorial 
analyses, the normality of the dependent variable was checked and met 
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests’ ps>.069). For the regression analyses, absence of 
multicollinearity was confirmed by the fact that there were no significant, strong 
correlations between predictors, the tolerance values were >.978, and the VIF 
values were all <1.022. The predictors were linearly related with the outcome, as 
inclusion of the squared predictors did not lead to a significantly better model. 
The residuals were normally distributed. Homoscedasticity was confirmed as 
the plots of standardised residuals and predicted scores showed that the 
variance was equal across the range of the predicted scores (i.e., randomly 
scattered). As all assumptions were met with n=109, analyses were conducted 
using this sample. 
3.3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for age, PDI, and risk-aversion are provided in Table 3.1 
and for the subject studied and gender in Table 3.2. As participants in the 
betting group essentially performed a different task than participants in the 
control group, analyses were conducted separately for each group. In order to 
compare across these two groups, the participants should come from the same 
underlying population. None of the continuous variables were significantly 
different in the betting group compared to the control group (age: t(107)=1.057, 
p=.293, d=0.204, 95%-CI [-0.557, 1.830]; PDI: t(107)=0.473, p=.637, d=0.091, 95%-CI 
[-10.995, 17.882]; risk-aversion: t(107)=0.725, p=.725, d=0.140, 95%-CI [-0.789, 
1.130]). The number of males and females did not differ significantly between 
the betting and control groups, χ²(2)=1.491, p=.475, φC=.117. The breakdown of 
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subjects studied was different across the groups, χ²(3)=10.437, p=.015, φC=.309. 
Separate chi-square tests for the categories Economics, Management, 
Psychology, and Other (e.g., Zoology, History) were conducted, with a multiple-
comparisons-corrected α-level of .0125 (=.05/4). None of the tests for the specific 
major subject groups were significant at the corrected level (Economics: 
χ²(1)=4.000, p=.046, φC=.500; Management: χ²(1)=0.800, p=.371, φC=.200; 
Psychology: χ²(1)=0.059, p=.808, φC=.059; Other: χ²(1)=5.786, p=.016, φC=.321).  
Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics for age, PDI, and risk-aversion. Values are provided for 
the total sample and split by betting and control groups. 
Variable Sample N Median Mean Standard deviation Range 
Age Total  109 20 20.32 3.141 18-42 
Betting  52 20 20.65 4.191 18-42 
Control  57 20 20.02 1.685 18-25 
PDI Total 109 67 69.15 37.844 7-170 
Betting  52 66 67.35 36.114 10-152 
Control 57 67 70.79 39.604 7-170 
Risk-
aversion 
Total  109 7 7.26 2.514 1-10 
Betting 52 7 7.35 2.634 1-10 
Control 57 7 7.18 2.421 1-10 
 
Table 3.2 Descriptive statistics for gender and subject studied. Values (n (percentage)) 
are provided for the total sample and split by betting and control groups. 
Variable Category Total sample Betting Control 
GenderA Female 71 (61.5%) 32 (61.5%) 39 (68.4%) 
Male 37 (33.9%) 19 (36.5%) 18 (31.6%) 
Subject 
studied 
Economics 16 (14.7%) 12 (23.1%) 4 (7.0%) 
Management 20 (18.3%) 12 (23.1%) 8 (14.0%) 
Other 56 (51.4%) 19 (36.5%) 37 (64.9%) 
Psychology 17 (15.6%) 9 (17.3%) 8 (14.0%) 
A One participant in the betting group did not indicate their gender. 
In the factorial analyses PDI-scores were converted into a categorical between-
subjects factor using a median split. Although the median in the current sample 
(i.e., 67) is lower than that generally reported in the literature (Balzan, 
Delfabbro, & Galletly, 2012; LaRocco & Warman, 2009; Warman et al., 2007; 75.5, 
90, and 97.5, respectively), it is higher than the median score of 49 originally 
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reported by Peters et al. (2004). Participants with a PDI score at the median were 
excluded from the analysis (LaRocco & Warman, 2009), reducing the sample 
size to n=107. 
3.3.3 Factorial Analyses 
Error! Reference source not found. (on page 125) shows the results of a 2 (group: 
betting vs. control; between-subjects) × 2 (delusion-proneness: high versus low 
based on median split; between-subjects) × 3 (condition: prior vs. standard vs. 
combined; within-subjects) mixed ANOVA.  
Condition had a significant main effect (F(1.848,190.302)=19.532, p<.001, 
ηp²=.159). Planned comparisons, with Bonferroni corrections, indicated that 
higher estimates were provided in the prior condition (mean (SE) = 1.590 (.515)) 
than in the standard (-2.974 (.779); p<.001, 95%-CI [2.450, 6.679]) and combined  
(-2.022 (.659); p<.001, 95%-CI [1.953, 5.272]) conditions. The estimates in the two 
latter conditions did not differ (p=.620, 95%-CI [-0.871, 2.775]).  
The two between-participants factors, delusion-proneness and group, did not 
have significant main effects (F(1,103)=.510, p=.477, ηp²=.005, 95%-CI [-1.235, 
2.626], and F(1,103)=0.560, p=.456, ηp²=.005, 95%-CI [-1.202, 2.660], respectively). 
Low-delusion-prone (-.788 (.685)) and high-delusion-prone (-1.483 (.692)) 
participants did not differ in their estimates. Participants in the control (-1.500 
(.672)) and the betting (-.771 (.704)) groups did not differ in their estimates. 
The interaction between group and condition was significant 
(F(1.848,190.302)=3.149, p=.049, ηp²=.030). In the control group, estimates in the 
prior condition (2.209 (.710)) were higher than in the standard (-4.288 (1.075); 
p<.001, 95%-CI [3.578, 9.417]) and than in the combined (-2.420 (.909); p<.001, 
95%-CI [2.338, 6.920]) conditions, while the latter two did not differ (p=.221, 
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95%-CI [-0.649, 4.385]). In the betting group, estimates for the prior condition 
(.972 (.745)) were higher than those in the combined condition (-1.625 (.953); 
p=.029, 95%-CI [0.195, 4.998]), but not different to those in the standard condition 
(-1.660 (1.127); p=.116, 95%-CI [-0.429, 5.691]), nor did the estimates in the latter 
two conditions differ (p=1.00, 95%-CI [-2.673, 2.603]. 
The interaction between delusion-proneness and condition was not significant 
(F(1.848,190.302)=.816, p=.435, ηp²=.008).  
The interaction between group and delusion-proneness was marginally 
significant (F(1,103)=3.652, p=.059, ηp²=.034). Low-delusion-prone participants in 
the control group (-2.082 (.950)) showed a trend to provide lower estimates than 
low-delusion-prone participants in the betting group (.507 (.986); p=.062, 95%-CI 
[-0.128, 5.306]). High-delusion-prone participants in the control group (-.917 
(.950)) gave estimates similar to those provided by high-delusion-prone 
participants in the betting group (-2.049 (1.006); p=.415, 95%-CI [-1.613, 3.876]).  
The three-way interaction was significant (F(1.848,190.302)=4.620, p=.013, 
ηp²=.043). In the control group, low-delusion-prone and high-delusion-prone 
participants did not differ in the prior (2.071 (1.005) vs. 2.347 (1.005), 
respectively; p=.846, 95%-CI [-2.542, 3.094]), standard (-5.664 (1.520) vs. -2.912 
(1.520), respectively; p=.203, 95%-CI [-1.511, 7.016]), or the combined conditions 
(-2.653 (1.286) vs. -2.187 (1.286), respectively; p=.798, 95%-CI [-3.140, 4.072]). In 
the betting group, low-delusion-prone and high-delusion-prone participants did 
not differ in the prior (.943 (1.043) vs. 1.001 (1.063), respectively; p=.969, 95%-CI 
[-2.895, 3.011]) or in the combined condition (-.906 (1.334) vs. -2.343 (1.361), 
respectively; p=.453, 95%-CI [-2.343, 5.216]), but in the standard condition, the 
estimates from low-delusion-prone participants were higher than those from 
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high-delusion-prone participants (1.485 (1.578) vs. -4.804 (1.609), respectively; 
p=.006, 95%-CI [1.820, 10.758]).  
 
Figure 3.2 Means (± 95%-CIs) of the average deviations from Bayesian posteriors across 
the three conditions for the control and betting groups and split by 
delusion-proneness (low and high PDI; based on a median split).  
When risk-aversion was accounted for, a 2 (group) × 2 (delusion-proneness) × 3 
(condition) mixed ANCOVA indicated that condition did not had a significant 
main effect anymore (F(1.861,189.773)=.232, p=.777, ηp²=.002. The two between-
participants factors, delusion-proneness and group, did not have significant 
main effects (F(1,102)=.584, p=.447, ηp²=.006, 95%-CI [-1.187, 2.675], and 
F(1,102)=0.629, p=.430, ηp²=.006, 95%-CI [-1.159, 2.703], respectively).  
Chapter 3 
126 
 
The same ANCOVA, accounting for risk-aversion, showed that the interaction 
between group and condition was significant (F(1.861,189.773)=3.387, p=.039, 
ηp²=.032). In the control group, estimates in the prior condition (2.218 (.713)) 
were higher than in the standard condition (-4.341 (1.066); p<.001, 95%-CI [3.670, 
9.450]) and than in the combined condition (-2.440 (.911); p<.001, 95%-CI [2.368, 
6.950]), while the latter two did not differ (p=.206, 95%-CI [-0.615, 4.417]). In the 
betting group, estimates for the prior condition (.962 (.748)) were higher than 
those in the combined condition (-1.604 (.955); p=.032, 95%-CI [0.165, 4.967]), but 
not than those in the standard condition (-1.605 (1.117); p=.125, 95%-CI [-0.462, 
5.596]), and the estimates in the latter two did not differ either (p=1.00, 95%-CI  
[-2.638, 2.636]. 
As with the ANOVA reported above, the interaction between delusion-
proneness and condition was not significant when accounting for risk-aversion 
(F(1.861,189.773)=.944, p=.385, ηp²=.009).  
After accounting for risk-aversion, the two-way interaction between group and 
delusion-proneness was significant (F(1,102)=4.040, p=.047, ηp²=.038). Low-
delusion-prone participants in the control group (-2.131 (.951)) provided lower 
estimates than low-delusion-prone participants in the betting group (.605 (.990); 
p=.049, 95%-CI [-5.465, -0.009]). High-delusion-prone participants in the control 
group (-.911 (.950)) gave estimates similar to those provided by high-delusion-
prone participants in the betting group (-2.103 (1.006); p=.391, 95%-CI [-1.552, 
3.937]).  
The three-way interaction remained significant when accounting for risk-
aversion (F(1.861,189.773)=5.211, p=.008, ηp²=.049). In the control group, low-
delusion-prone and high-delusion-prone participants did not differ in the prior 
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(2.092 (1.010) vs. 2.345 (1.009); p=.860, 95%-CI [-2.579, 3.084]), the standard  
(-5.787 (1.508) vs. -2.896 (1.506); p=.178, 95%-CI [-1.338, 7.119]), or the combined 
(-2.700 (1.290) vs. -2.181 (1.288); p=.777, 95%-CI [3.098, 4.136]) conditions. In the 
betting group, low-delusion-prone and high-delusion-prone participants did not 
differ in the prior (.900 (1.051) vs. 1.024 (1.069); p=.934, 95%-CI [-2.856, 3.104]) or 
in the combined condition (-.813 (1.343) vs. -2.394 (1.365); p=.412, 95%-CI [-2.225, 
5.388]), but in the standard condition, the estimates from low-delusion-prone 
participants were higher than those from high-delusion-prone participants 
(1.485 (1.578) vs. -4.804 (1.609), respectively; p=.004, 95%-CI [2.218, 11.119]).  
In general, accounting for risk-aversion did not change the results, except that 
the main effect of condition disappeared and that the interaction between group 
and delusion-proneness became significant, rather than marginally significant. 
How accounting for risk-aversion led to the absence of an effect of conditions 
was further investigated by including a between-subjects factor for risk-
aversion, consisting of a median split, in the model. This 3 (condition) × 2 
(group) × 2 (delusion-proneness) × 2 (risk-aversion: high versus low) mixed 
ANOVA indicated that risk-aversion interacted significantly with condition 
(F(1.859,158.050)=4.151, p=.020, ηp²=.047). Highly risk-averse participants showed 
an effect of condition: deviations in the prior condition (1.944 (.782)) were higher 
than in the standard (-5.083 (1.139); p<.001, 95%-CI [3.844, 10.212]) and combined 
(-2.481 (1.000); p<.001, 95%-CI [1.883, 6.967]) conditions, and the deviations in 
the latter two conditions did not differ (p=.066, 95%-CI [-0.122, 5.327]). For 
participants low in risk-aversion there was no effect of condition as deviations 
in the prior condition (1.094 (.862)) did not differ from those in the standard  
(-.964 (1.256); p=.469, 95%-CI [-1.456, 5.570]) or combined (-.761 (1.103); p=.330, 
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95%-CI [-0.950, 4.659]) conditions, and the deviations in the latter two conditions 
also did not differ (p=1.00, 95%-CI [-3.209, 2.803]).  
In order to investigate whether probability estimates provided by low-delusion-
prone and high-delusion-prone in both the betting and control groups, and in 
each condition, deviated significantly from the Bayesian posterior probabilities, 
one-sample t-tests were conducted. Table 3.3 reports these results. A Bonferroni 
correction for multiple comparisons was not applied, as the conservativeness of 
this test (i.e., .05/12=.004) could mask interesting patterns of results. As such the 
results should be interpreted with caution, as there is an increased probability of 
Type I errors. Overall, participants in the control groups tended to overestimate 
probabilities in the prior condition, while tending to underestimate them in the 
standard and combined conditions. In general, participants in the betting group 
were quite accurate across conditions.  
Table 3.3 Results of one-sample t-tests, which indicate whether probability estimates 
were different from the Bayesian posterior probability. This was done per 
group and per condition. Uncorrected p-values are reported.  
Group Condition Delusion-proneness One-sample t-test result 95%-CI 
Control Prior Low t(27)=2.795, p=.009, d=1.076 [0.551, 3.591] 
  High t(27)=2.420, p=.023, d=0.931 [0.357, 4.337] 
 Standard Low t(27)=-4.493, p<.001, d=1.729 [-8.251, -3.077] 
  High t(27)=-1.977, p=.058, d=0.761 [-5.934, 0.111] 
 Combined Low t(27)=-2.476, p=.020, d=0.953 [-4.851, -0.454] 
  High t(27)=-1.823, p=.079, d=0.702 [-4.648, 0.274] 
Betting Prior Low t(25)=.843, p=.407, d=0.337 [-1.361, 3.246] 
  High t(24)=.786, p=.439, d=0.321 [-1.626, 3.627] 
 Standard Low t(25)=.999, p=.327, d=0.400 [-1.577, 4.547] 
  High t(24)=-2.409, p=.024, d=0.983 [-8.920, -0.689] 
 Combined Low t(25)=-.661, p=.515, d=0.264 [-3.732, 1.919] 
  High t(24)=-1.440, p=.163, d=0.588 [-5.702, 1.016] 
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3.3.4 Regression Analyses 
Linear regression analyses showed that the predictors (PDI-scores, group, and 
the interaction between PDI-scores and group) did not significantly predict 
deviations in the prior condition (F(3,105)=.475, p=.701, R²ADJUSTED=-.015) or in the 
combined condition (F(3,105)=.178, p=.911, R²ADJUSTED=-.023). In the standard 
condition, however, group was a significant predictor of deviations, as was the 
interaction between PDI-scores and group (model statistics: F(3,105)=3.363, 
p=.021, R²ADJUSTED=.062; predictor statistics: see Table 3.4, models 1).  
A set of hierarchical linear regressions was conducted to account for risk-
aversion. The first step, with risk-aversion as the sole predictor, did not lead to a 
significant model for deviations in the prior (F(1,107)=.010, p=.920, R²ADJUSTED= 
-.009), standard (F(1,107)=1.403, p=.239, R²ADJUSTED=.004), or combined 
(F(1,107)=.364, p=.548, R²ADJUSTED=-.006) conditions (see Table 3.4, models 2.1). 
Although adding PDI-scores, group, and the interaction between PDI-scores 
and group as additional predictors did not significantly improve the model for 
the prior condition (ΔF(3,104)=.470, Δp=.704; F(4,104)=.355, p=.840, R²ADJUSTED= 
-.024) or for the combined condition (ΔF(3,104)=.201, Δp=.895; F(4,104)=.240, 
p=.915, R²ADJUSTED=-.029), it did for the standard condition (ΔF(3,104)=3.706, 
Δp=.014; F(4,104)=3.157, p=.017, R²ADJUSTED=.074). After accounting for risk-
aversion, in the standard condition, group and the interaction between group 
and PDI-scores were significant predictors of deviations (see Table 3.4, models 
2.2). Overall, the deviations in the betting group increased in value comparing 
the control group (coded as 0) to the betting group (coded as 1), which, counter-
intuitively, means an increase in accuracy, considering the underestimation in 
the control group. However, comparing participants with high PDI-scores in the 
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control and betting groups, those in the betting group underestimated the 
probabilities more than those in the control group.  
Table 3.4 B-values, confidence intervals for the b-values, SEs for the b-values, ß-values 
and significance values for the predictors in the regression analyses, 
conducted per condition. PDI = delusion-proneness. Group coding: 0 = 
control, 1 = betting. 
Condition Model Predictor b 95%-CI of b SE β p 
Prior 1 PDI .008 [-0.028, 0.043] .018 .054 .676 
  Betting group -.344 [-4.597, 3.909] 2.145 -.033 .873 
  
PDI*Betting 
group 
-.011 [-0.066, 0.043] .027 -.089 .682 
 2.1 Risk-aversion -.021 [-0.424, 0.383] .203 -.010 .920 
 2.2 Risk-aversion -.021 [-0.430, 0.388] .206 -.010 .919 
  PDI .008 [-0.028, 0.044] .018 .055 .674 
  Betting group -.321 [-4.619, 3.977] 2.167 -.030 .883 
  
PDI*Betting 
group 
-.012 [-0.066, 0.043] .028 -.091 .678 
Standard 1 PDI .008 [-0.046, 0.062] .027 .037 .765 
  Betting group 8.858 [2.408, 15.309] 3.253 .533 .008 
  
PDI*Betting 
group 
-.089 [-0.172, -0.007] .042 -.448 .034 
 2.1 Risk-aversion -.378 [-1.009, 0.254] .319 -.114 .239 
 2.2 Risk-aversion -.479 [-1.092, 0.134] .309 -.144 .124 
  PDI .010 [-0.043, 0.064] .027 .047 .702 
  Betting group 9.392 [2.947, 15.838] 3.250 .565 .005 
  
PDI*Betting 
group 
-.096 [-0.178, -0.013] .041 -.481 .023 
Combined 1 PDI .001 [-0.044, 0.047] .023 .008 .949 
  Betting group 1.512 [-3.881, 6.906] 2.720 .114 .579 
  
PDI*Betting 
group 
-.010 [-0.079, 0.059] .035 -.061 .779 
 2.1 Risk-aversion -.155 [-0.663, 0.354] .256 -.058 .548 
 2.2 Risk-aversion -.171 [-0.688, 0.347] .261 -.064 .514 
  PDI .002 [-0.043, 0.048] .023 .013 .922 
  Betting group 1.702 [-3.737, 7.142] 2.743 .128 .536 
  
PDI*Betting 
group 
-.012 [-0.082, 0.057] .035 -.076 .729 
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3.4 Discussion 
Participants’ deviations from Bayesian posteriors were investigated over three 
within-participants conditions, in which either the prior distribution, the 
likelihood distribution, or both distributions were non-uniform. This was 
investigated in a control group, who provided probability estimates for the 
lakes, and a betting group, who had to bet their endowment on the two lakes in 
their desired proportion. Analyses focused on averaged deviations from 
Bayesian posterior probabilities per condition, i.e., the extent to which 
participants underestimated or overestimated the probability that the presented 
fish was from the lake with the highest actual Bayesian posterior.  
Although an effect of condition was found, it was not in the hypothesised 
direction. Participants tended to overestimate the posteriors in the prior 
condition, but underestimated the posteriors in the standard condition and in 
the combined condition. This effect was moderated by group. The control group 
gave significantly higher estimates in the prior condition than in the other two. 
For the betting group, the estimates in the standard condition were between 
those in the prior and the combined conditions, which were significantly 
different from each other. Furthermore, risk-aversion influenced the effect of 
condition, so that an effect of condition was only found for participants who 
were more risk-averse. Overall, the similarity in response between the standard 
and combined condition suggests that participants tend to use likelihood 
information more than prior information when both types of information are 
available. The hypothesised main effects of delusion-proneness and of group 
were not found. These two factors did interact, however, as low-delusion-prone 
participants gave lower estimates in the control group than in the betting group. 
Yet, high-delusion-prone participants responded similarly in both groups.  
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The hypothesised interaction between condition and delusion-proneness was 
not significant, but the analyses indicated a three-way interaction. There was a 
difference between low-delusion-prone and high-delusion-prone participants in 
the standard condition in the betting group, which was not found in the control 
group, and not for either group in the prior or combined conditions. The effect 
remained when controlling for risk-aversion. In the betting group, low-delusion-
prone participants were accurate, while high-delusion-prone participants 
underestimated the posteriors, when only likelihood information was to be 
used. This effect was supported by the fact that the interaction between 
continuous PDI-scores and group significantly predicted average deviations in 
the standard condition. None of the predictors (PDI-scores, group, or their 
interaction) significantly predicted deviations in the prior or the combined 
conditions.  
Therefore, the JTC effect was found in the condition that most resembles the 
standard beads task paradigm. For the control group, the relative JTC bias was 
found as high-delusion-prone participants provided higher probability 
estimates than low-delusion-prone participants, although this difference was 
not statistically significant. In the betting group, low-delusion-prone 
participants were accurate, while high-delusion-prone participants 
underestimated.  
In the standard beads task, the prior probability of either jar is always 50%/50% 
and likelihoods are non-uniform, and delusion-prone participants are found to 
decide on a lake on the basis of less evidence than non-delusion-prone 
participants (i.e., the JTC-bias). In the present study we investigated whether a 
non-uniform distribution of prior probabilities would also elicit a difference in 
responses between low-delusion-prone and high-delusion-prone participants. 
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This expected effect was not found. However, participants did seem to be more 
accurate (i.e., deviated less from the Bayesian posterior) in the condition with 
uniform likelihoods but non-uniform prior probabilities, compared to the two 
conditions with non-uniform likelihoods. A potential explanation is that 
differences in prior probabilities were visually more salient than the ratios of 
black to white fish in the lakes. 
Interestingly, differences between low-delusion-prone and high-delusion-prone 
participants were only found in the condition most commensurate with the 
literature on JTC-effects on the beads task. As most previous studies have not 
incentivised the task, the control group in our study is similar to the standard 
probability-estimates version of the beads task. Our finding that low-delusion-
prone participants in this group provided numerically lower estimates than 
high-delusion-prone participants is consistent with the commonly reported 
finding that delusion-prone participants “jump to conclusions” relative to 
controls.  
Yet, this only describes relative “jumping”. Although caution with 
interpretation is warranted due to an increased chance of Type I errors, results 
from one-sample t-tests suggested that absolute “jumping” did not occur, as 
high-delusion-prone participants were below the Bayesian posterior in both 
groups. Phillips and Edwards (1966) have found conservatism in a probabilistic 
reasoning task in a healthy population. They found that conservatism was not 
affected by different prior distributions, but it was found to be stronger with 
likelihoods ratios further from 50:50. This might also speak to why the 
deviations in the prior condition in the present study were different from those 
involving likelihood information. With likelihood ratios further from 50:50, as in 
our conditions with 60:40 or 85:15 ratios, more conservatism could be expected 
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on the basis of the findings by Phillips and Edwards (1966), and, indeed, 
deviations indicated underestimation of the Bayesian posteriors.  
The difference between the control and the betting group suggests that 
incentivising the task can shed light on aspects of the JTC-bias. Our results 
imply that high-delusion-prone participants performed at a ceiling level, where 
rewards did not improve performance, as Woodward et al. (2009) suggested for 
clinical patients. Low-delusion-prone participants were sensitive to the reward 
and provided estimates that were not significantly different from Bayesian 
posteriors in the betting group, while they were different in the control group. 
Phillips and Edwards (1966) found that, for healthy participants, the inclusion of 
incentives reduced conservatism. This is consistent with our finding that low-
delusion-prone participants in the betting group provided estimates not 
significantly different from the Bayesian posteriors, while low-delusion-prone 
participants in the control group underestimated them.  
3.4.1 Potential Limitations 
In the present study, participants did not see the numerical value of their 
decision when they moved the slider of the response bar. This was done to 
prevent participants from feeling that they should calculate the exact posterior 
(e.g., by using their phone). However, we may have unwittingly introduced 
measurement error here. For example, a participant might correctly infer the 
posterior probability of the two lakes yet misestimate the point on the response 
bar that corresponds to this correct probability. Future studies could incorporate 
a few control trials, where participants are asked to place the slider at specified 
values. The deviation in these trials could then represent measurement error.  
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Demand characteristics were a potential confound. This study was conducted in 
a behavioural economics laboratory, where participants may have felt they were 
supposed to adopt certain economic strategies. One particular confound could 
be that participants in the betting group may have tried to maximise their 
expected value and therefore bet all their money on the most likely lake, rather 
than splitting their reward according to their subjective probabilities of each 
lake. This would decrease accuracy, in particular leading to overestimation of 
the lakes, which is also expected when participants jump to conclusions. 
However, results from the betting group showed that Bayesian posteriors were 
either accurately estimated or underestimated; there was no evidence of 
overestimation.  
The potential use of an expected-value strategy in the betting group means 
participants’ beliefs about the posteriors of each lake may not have been 
straightforwardly revealed by their decisions. One potential way to get at these 
beliefs on any given lakes-and-fish trial would have been to present participants 
with a table of lotteries (cf. risk-aversion measure by Holt & Laury, 2002), and 
for each lottery in the table to ask participants to choose whether they would 
prefer to play that lottery or to play the lottery represented by the current lakes 
and fish trial (the latter lottery would involve receiving £4 if a given lake was 
the lake being fished from, and £0 otherwise). One would then select one of 
these choices at random, and the participant would play the lottery chosen in 
that case. The benefit of this procedure is that decisions would transparently 
reveal beliefs (i.e., that reported probabilities equal subjective probabilities; Holt 
& Smith, 2009), assuming that participants understood the procedure. The major 
disadvantage of this procedure is the significant risk of confusion and 
miscomprehension: this elaborate task could confuse many of our participants 
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and so create more problems than it is worth. This concern is especially 
pertinent given recent evidence that miscomprehension confounds results even 
in the standard beads task (Balzan, Delfabbro, & Galletly, 2012). On balance, we 
decided to adopt an imperfect, but comprehensible, strategy rather than a 
perfect strategy that might not be understood.  
3.5 Conclusion 
The study reported in this chapter adopted a probability-estimates version of 
the beads task. Rigorous methods were developed to minimise the influence of 
potential confounds concerning working-memory deficits, miscomprehension, 
and a lack of motivation. From estimates provided for a single fish, rather than a 
sequence, it became clear that incentives can affect probability reasoning 
differently in low-delusion-prone and high-delusion-prone participants. 
However, this was limited to a standard condition with uniform prior 
probabilities and varying likelihoods. Within this condition, in the control 
group, the relative JTC bias was replicated, in that high-delusion-prone 
participants provided higher estimates than low-delusion-prone participants. 
Yet, in the incentivised betting group, this pattern was reversed. Furthermore, 
no evidence was found for an absolute JTC bias, as neither low-delusion-prone 
nor high-delusion-prone participants overestimated the Bayesian posterior 
probabilities, in either group, in this condition.  
Together with the findings in Chapter 2, these results only partially support the 
liberal acceptance account, which stipulates unaffected probability reasoning, 
but a lowered decision-threshold (Moritz et al., 2007). High-delusion-prone 
participants in the study in Chapter 2 behaved less conservatively than the 
probability estimates found in this chapter would suggest they should. Of 
course, the studies in the two chapters used different samples, so a direct 
Chapter 3 
137 
 
comparison of each participant’s behaviour and probability reasoning is not 
available. Nevertheless, taken together, these results would support the liberal 
acceptance account. Furthermore, we found that the probability reasoning of 
low-delusion-prone and high-delusion-prone participants was similar in two 
out of the three within-subject conditions in both control and betting groups. 
Against the liberal acceptance account, however, we did find a marked 
difference in probability reasoning for low-delusion-prone and high-delusion-
prone participants in the standard condition. Furthermore, the results 
concerning confidence levels in Chapter 2 were not supportive of the liberal 
acceptance account either. Future investigations with clinical populations may 
shed further light on whether results from our incentivised tasks would support 
the liberal acceptance account.  
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4 Sexual Over-Perception Bias 
4.1 Background  
As described in Chapter 1, the sexual over-perception bias refers to the 
phenomenon where men perceive more sexual interest from a woman than the 
woman herself reports feeling and more than female observers perceive (Abbey, 
1982; Haselton & Buss, 2000; Lindgren et al., 2008). Error management theory 
(EMT) has been suggested as an explanation of this bias (Haselton & Buss, 2000). 
The claim is that for men in the ancestral past, it would have been less costly to 
mistakenly infer sexual interest and be disappointed (i.e., a false alarm) than it 
would have been to mistakenly infer the absence of sexual interest and miss a 
potential reproductive opportunity (i.e., a miss). Evolutionary pressures would 
thus have selected for this bias, which would persist in modern-day men.  
Although several researchers claim their results support the predictions made 
by EMT with regards to the sexual over-perception bias (Haselton & Buss, 2000; 
Lindgren et al., 2008), there are some limitations both to the theoretical 
underpinnings of this bias and to the evidence adduced in support of it. The 
theory predicts that men supposedly believe women are more interested than 
women really are. However, it is possible that the relevant bias does not involve 
biased beliefs, but rather only biased behaviour. McKay and Dennett (2009) 
have noted that many examples arguably explained by EMT involve behaviour 
minimising costly errors, but that these behaviours could be created without 
invoking a bias in beliefs. For example, one may not strongly believe there is 
oncoming traffic, but may check for it regardless when crossing the street, just to 
be prudent. Similarly, the error costs of misreading sexual interest could be 
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minimised through biased behaviour, without invoking biased beliefs. A man 
might not strongly believe a woman to be sexually interested, but still approach 
her, thinking his chances are low but that it is still better to at least give it a try 
(Haselton, Nettle, & Murray, in press). Under uncertainty, nature may have 
included a policy to behave in a way that minimises costs, without changing 
beliefs (McKay & Dennett, 2009). In other words, the sexual over-perception bias 
might be an outcome bias, rather than a cognitive bias (Marshall et al., 2013). 
Therefore, evidence to support the notion that this bias is also found at a 
cognitive level is crucial.  
Abbey (1982) showed that male observers of a dyadic interaction between a man 
and a woman showed the bias, while female observers did not. This suggests 
that the bias is cognitive in nature, as the observers had access to the exact same 
information. Yet, men and women might have different prior beliefs about 
general levels of sexual interest, so that a bias in posterior beliefs obtains even 
when observing the same evidence (McKay & Efferson, 2010). Such a difference 
between men and women might develop due to different socialisation 
experiences. Girls are taught to show sexual restraint (Low, 1989), while boys 
are taught, or encouraged through stereotypes in the media, to show great 
interest in sex (Haselton & Buss, 2000). As this interest develops, it might 
become generalised, so that men assume everyone, including women, to have 
great sexual interest (Abbey, 1982). As such, men and women might have 
different prior beliefs about others’ sexual interest. The paradigms of previous 
studies (Abbey, 1982; Abbey & Harnish, 1995; Haselton, 2003; Haselton & Buss, 
2000) have included only one piece of evidence. Participants’ beliefs did not 
require updating based on several pieces of accumulating evidence. Hence, 
differences in posterior probabilities provided by men and women might be 
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ascribed to differences in prior beliefs. In other domains of psychology, such as 
the optimism bias (see Chapter 5), updating paradigms (Sharot et al., 2011) have 
improved upon “one-point-estimate” paradigms (with beliefs measured on the 
basis of one piece of evidence) by elucidating the process through which people 
arrive at biased estimates for future outcomes. In a similar vein, in this study we 
aimed to investigate the sexual over-perception bias by using an updating 
paradigm. 
4.1.1 The Present Study and Hypotheses 
In this study, the beads task used to study the jumping-to-conclusions bias 
(Chapters 2 and 3) was adapted to form a belief-updating paradigm to measure 
the sexual over-perception bias. We investigated whether men and women 
differ in the extent to which they incorporate relevant feedback regarding 
women’s sexual interest, and specifically whether men systematically 
overestimate women’s sexual interest. This question was approached from two 
angles in two related experiments. The first (3a) investigated whether men 
systematically overestimate the probability that women are sexually interested 
in men (i.e., are heterosexual). The second (3b) investigated whether men 
systematically overestimate the probability that women are sexually interested 
in a given man. Besides the condition hypothesised to lead to biased cognitions, 
both experiments also involved a neutral condition. The neutral condition was a 
probability-estimates version of the beads task. Here, black or white beads were 
shown in succession, and after each bead participants had to give probability 
estimates for a jar containing mostly black beads and for a jar containing mostly 
white beads. At the end of the sequence, they had to decide which jar all the 
beads were from. No gender differences were expected on this task.  
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For the conditions where a bias was hypothesised (i.e., bias conditions), men 
were expected to systematically under-weigh evidence that would count against 
women being sexually interested in men (in general or in a specific man). The 
bias condition in experiment 3a involved a male character who had gone to 
either a gay bar or a straight bar (“bars” replacing “jars”) and had flirted with 
women who may or may not have responded positively to his advances 
(“positive/negative responses” replacing “beads”). After each response, 
participants had to provide their estimates for either type of bar, based on 
whether female characters responded to his advances or not. It was predicted 
that men, compared to women, would overestimate the probability that the man 
was in the straight bar, as this provided a context where women would be 
sexually interested, while sexual interest would be low in a gay bar. The bias 
condition in experiment 3b involved a male character who was either attractive 
or unattractive to women (replacing jars) and had speed-dated several women 
who may or may not have wanted to go on a further date with him (replacing 
beads). Participants had to indicate their estimates for whether the male 
character was attractive to women or not, based on whether female characters 
wanted to go on a further date after their speed date. It was predicted that men 
would provide higher estimates than women for the male character being 
attractive to women.  
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4.2 Methods 
4.2.1 Participants 
There were 77 participants in experiment 3a and 73 participants in experiment 
3b.13 The majority of participants were students at RHUL. Participants received 
a show-up fee of £3 and received a bonus between £0 and £2 (mean (SD) reward 
= £1.83 (0.38)) based on their answers in the experiment. The Psychology 
Department Ethics Committee of RHUL approved this study. 
4.2.2 Materials and Procedure 
This study comprised two interrelated experiments. In each experiment, there 
were two within-subject conditions: a neutral condition (beads and jars) and the 
relevant bias condition (which varied across the two experiments). The two 
experiments were conducted simultaneously. Participants were not aware 
which experiment they signed up for when enrolling for the study. Of the eight 
sessions conducted in total, four investigated general sexual interest (3a: bars), 
the other four investigated sexual interest in a given man (3b: dates). The order 
in which within-subject conditions were presented was counterbalanced across 
sessions for each experiment.  
In all sessions participants first read written instructions and had to answer 
comprehension questions correctly before proceeding to the tasks (see Appendix 
D).  
In the neutral condition (3a and 3b: jars), participants were shown computerised 
jars filled with beads of two colours in opposite ratios (70% black: 30% white 
                                                          
13 Due to time constraints imposed by testing in groups, the data of eight additional 
participants in experiment 3a and four additional participants in 3b was incomplete. These 
participants were excluded from all analyses.  
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and vice versa). They were informed that there would be four rounds where 
series of beads would be drawn from one of the two jars. They had to determine 
from which jar the beads were coming in each round. For the first nine beads, 
participants had to indicate the probabilities that the beads were coming from 
Jar A or Jar B. After ten beads, participants had to decide from which jar all the 
beads came. 
Participants also completed essentially the same task in a bias condition, either 
before or after the neutral condition, depending on the order of conditions in 
their session. This bias condition was framed so as to evoke the biased cognition 
hypothesised by EMT. In the bias condition in experiment 3a, participants were 
told that a heterosexual man had either gone to a gay bar or to a straight bar 
(i.e., a non-gay bar). Here, he had flirted with women. Women at a gay bar may 
not have been interested in flirting with him and so his success rate here was 
low (30% of flirtations reciprocated, 70% of flirtations ignored). At a “straight” 
bar, his success rate was higher (70% of flirtations reciprocated, 30% of 
flirtations ignored). The two bars replaced the two jars and the beads were 
replaced by successes (i.e., reciprocated flirtations, visualised by green happy 
faces) and failures (i.e., ignored flirtations, visualised by red sad faces). 
Participants had to use these pieces of information to determine if the man went 
to the gay bar or the straight bar. The other three rounds repeated this same 
scenario with a different order of information and differently named men.  
In the bias condition of experiment 3b, participants were told that a man had 
gone speed-dating and they would see how many women had been willing to 
go on a subsequent date with him. If women found him attractive, he would 
have been more successful (on average 70% success and 30% failure); while he 
would have been less successful if he were not attractive (on average 30% 
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success and 70% failure). Based on pieces of information that indicated success 
(i.e., she would go on a subsequent date, visualised by a green check) or a 
failure (i.e., she would not go on a subsequent date, visualised by a red cross), 
participants had to decide if the man from the story was attractive or not. Here, 
the beads from the neutral condition were replaced by information indicating 
success or failure. The jars were replaced by the question of whether the man 
was attractive or not. The other three rounds repeated this same scenario with a 
different order of information with differently named men. 
In each of the conditions, participants could win a reward of £1 for a correct 
decision in one of these rounds. As in Chapter 2, the information in one of the 
rounds (the first round) was drawn at random, but with probabilities matching 
the ratio of different types of information (i.e., 70:30) in the randomly selected 
state of the world. Since this first round, used for pay-out, was randomly 
determined per session, this round was excluded from analyses. In the other 
three rounds, the order of information was fixed across participants to facilitate 
analyses. Table 4.1 shows the sequences of information in these three rounds 
and the state of the world suggested by the sequence as a whole. The rounds 
were presented in a fixed order across conditions, to prevent the same rounds 
appearing sequentially in two different conditions. The sequences were 
generated with a random number generator: three sets of 10 non-unique 
numbers ranging from 1 to 100 were generated. All numbers above 30 would 
represent the suggested source (i.e., that with which the sequence as a whole 
was most consistent), while the numbers 1 to 30 would represent the opposite 
source.  
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Table 4.1 The sequences of information per condition and per round. In the jars task, 
w refers to a white bead and b refers to a black bead. In the bars condition, 
yes refers to a reciprocated flirtation and no refers to an ignored flirtation. In 
the dates condition, yes refers to a woman wanting to go on a next date after 
the speed-date and no refers to a woman not wanting to go on a next date. 
The correctness of a sequence is based on which state of the world was 
randomly selected, which was the same state suggested by the majority of 
the information within the sequence. 
Round Condition Correct #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 #8 #9 #10 
1 All n/a Randomly determined per session 
2 Jars White w w b w w w w b w b 
 Bars Gay bar no no yes no no no no yes no yes 
 Dates Attractive yes yes no yes yes yes yes no yes no 
3 Jars White w b b w w w w w w w 
 Bars Gay bar no yes yes no no no no no no no 
 Dates Attractive yes no no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
4 Jars Black b b w b b b w w b w 
 Bars Straight bar yes yes no yes yes yes no no yes no 
 Dates Unattractive no no yes no no no yes yes no yes 
 
After the two conditions, participants answered demographic questions 
(gender, age, sexuality) and were paid for their participation. Sexuality was 
assessed through the Kinsey sexuality scale (Kinsey, Pomeroy, & Martin, 
1948/1998), which measures sexuality on a continuum.  
All sessions were conducted on a local computer network using z-Tree software 
(Fischbacher, 2007) in the EconLab at RHUL. The experiment lasted 
approximately 30 minutes. Before the experiment began, participants provided 
written informed consent.  
4.2.3 Data Preparation, Data Screening, and Statistical Analyses 
The analyses used scores for the state of the world hypothesised to be 
systematically overestimated by men: the straight bar and being attractive in 
experiments 3a and 3b, respectively; the jar presented on the same side as the 
straight bar or attractive label was used for the neutral condition. Note that this 
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may not always have been the state suggested by the evidence across the 
sequence of information.  
Initially, we had intended to investigate probability estimates in a 9 (draw; 
within-subjects) × 3 (round; within-subjects) × 2 (condition; within-subjects) × 2 
(gender; between-subjects) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA). However, 
screening of the data, after it had been collected, indicated varying types of 
extreme deviations from normality per variable at the level of each individual 
draw (e.g., bimodal distributions, positive skew, negative skew). No straight-
forward data transformations would aid in normalising all variables, as, for 
example, a transformation would improve the distribution of one variable, but 
deteriorate those of other variables. Therefore, analyses could not look at effects 
of single pieces of information (i.e., each draw). Instead, the average deviation 
from Bayesian estimates was calculated across the nine draws for each non-
random round. This deviation was calculated as the participants’ provided 
probability estimate minus the Bayesian probability. Positive values, therefore, 
indicate overestimation of the relevant state of the world; whereas negative 
values indicate underestimation.  
However, this did not eliminate non-normality. As a result, the average 
deviation across the three non-random rounds in each condition was calculated. 
This also accounted for the fact that the rounds were presented in a fixed order, 
which may have led to order effects. Hence, deviations from the Bayesian 
probability averaged across nine draws of a sequence (i.e., one round) were 
calculated first. Then, these average deviations per sequence were averaged 
across the three rounds in each condition. In experiment 3a, the average 
Bayesian probabilities that the character was in a straight bar were .12 in round 
2, .38 in round 3, and .76 in round 4; averaged across the rounds this amounted 
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to a probability of .42 for the straight-bar state of the world (i.e., slightly in 
favour of the opposite gay-bar state of the world). The mostly-black jar within 
experiment 3a had the same probabilities and was thus the jar-equivalent of the 
straight bar. In experiment 3b, the Bayesian probabilities for the state of the 
world where the character was attractive in each round were .88, .71, and .15, 
with an average Bayesian probability across the rounds amounting to .58. In 
experiment 3b, the mostly-white jar was the jar-equivalent of the attractive state 
of the world, based on Bayesian probabilities.  
Data screening of these average deviations across the nine draws, averaged 
across the three rounds, still indicated severe non-normality as indicated by 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests (p<.001 for the majority of the dependent variables) 
and visual inspection of data plots (e.g., extreme kurtosis). Removing outliers 
(based on standardised scores larger than an absolute 3.29, as no scores in a 
standardised normal distribution should be larger than this; Field, 2013) or data 
transformations did not correct for non-normality (e.g., p=.039 for remaining 
groups).  
Finally, therefore, robust analyses for mixed designs using M-estimators and 
bootstrapping with 2000 bootstrapped samples were conducted on the full 
sample (Field, Miles, & Field, 2012; Wilcox, 2005), in a 2 (condition; within-
subjects) × 2 (gender; between-subjects) design. In order to investigate whether 
men systematically overestimated the Bayesian probabilities compared to 
women, in the bias conditions, but not in the neutral condition, analyses focused 
on interactions between gender and condition. Furthermore, one-sample 
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests were conducted to investigate whether men’s and 
women’s deviations were significantly different from zero in either the neutral 
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or the bias condition (with an α-level of .05/4=.0125 to correct for multiple 
comparisons). 
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.2 shows the descriptive statistics for the order in which the conditions 
were presented, gender, and sexuality, for experiments 3a and 3b. The samples 
of the two experiments did not differ in terms of age (t(148)=.969, p=.334, 
d=0.159, 95%-CI [-0.400, 1.170]; mean (SD) years = 20.03 (2.406) for experiment 3a 
and 20.41 (2.460) for experiment 3b), gender (χ²(1)=.279, p=.625, φC=.043; see 
Table 4.2), or sexuality (Fisher’s exact test: 5.349, p=.671; χ²(7)=5.417, p=.670, 
φC=.190; see Table 4.2). 
Table 4.2 Sample characteristics with regards to the order in which conditions were 
presented, gender, and sexuality. 
  Exp. 3a (n=77) Exp. 3b (n=73) 
Order Neutral (jars) –-Bias (bars/dates) 35 35 
 Bias (bars/dates) – Neutral (jars) 42 38 
Gender Male 36 31 
 Female 41 42 
Sexuality Exclusively heterosexual 58 50 
 Predominantly heterosexual, only 
incidentally homosexual 
9 13 
 Predominantly heterosexual, but more 
than incidentally homosexual 
4 2 
 Bisexual 2 3 
 Predominantly homosexual, but more 
than incidentally heterosexual 
0 0 
 Predominantly homosexual, only 
incidentally heterosexual 
1 0 
 Exclusively homosexual 1 2 
 Asexual, non-sexual 1 0 
 Don’t want to answer 1 3 
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4.3.2 Inferential Statistics – Experiment 3a 
The robust ANOVA indicated that the main effect of gender was not significant 
(  =-1.468, p=.053), with men (mean (bootstrapped SE) = 2.443 (.854); 
bootstrapped 95%-CIMEAN [0.918, 4.275]) deviating as much as women (2.733 
(.540); bootstrapped 95%-CIMEAN [1.724, 3.813]). The main effect of condition was 
significant (  =1.049, p=.018), with lower deviations for the bias condition (2.306 
(.578); bootstrapped 95%-CIMEAN [1.249, 3.532]) than for the neutral condition 
(2.889 (.549); bootstrapped 95%-CIMEAN [1.846, 4.012]). The interaction was not 
significant (  =1.417, p=.144). Figure 4.1 shows the means and bootstrapped 95%-
CIs.  
 
Figure 4.1 The mean (±bootstrapped 95%-CI) deviations from Bayesian probabilities 
(i.e., 42%) for the black jar or straight bar in each condition (neutral versus 
bias) by men and women. Note that at this Bayesian probability, over-
estimation indicates conservatism towards the prior probability of 50% (a 
deviation of 8% from the Bayesian posterior probability).  
Women deviated significantly from the Bayesian probability (i.e., 42%) in both 
the neutral (T=684.0, p=.001, r=.513) and the bias condition (T=746.0, p<.001, 
r=.638). Men deviated significantly in the neutral condition (T=555.0, p<.001, 
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r=.581), but not in the bias condition (T=435.0, p=.109, r=.267). Note that in 
experiment 3a, the estimates were compared to a Bayesian probability of 42%. 
As such, these over-estimations actually reflect conservatism, as the provided 
estimates are closer to the prior probability of 50% than Bayes’ theorem 
prescribes (Phillips & Edwards, 1966).  
4.3.3 Inferential Statistics – Experiment 3b  
The robust ANOVA indicated that the main effect of gender was not significant 
(  =0.198, p=.790), with men (-1.935 (.532); bootstrapped 95%-CIMEAN [-2.986,  
-0.924]) deviating as much as women (-2.025 (.441); bootstrapped 95%-CIMEAN  
[-2.905, -1.187]). The main effect of condition was not significant (  =-0.730, 
p=.209), where deviations in the neutral condition (-2.501 (.357); bootstrapped 
95%-CIMEAN [-3.221, -1.799]) were not different from deviations in the bias 
condition (-1.472 (.554); bootstrapped 95%-CIMEAN [-2.634, -0.455]). The 
interaction was significant (  =2.235, p=.040). Without the availability of robust 
post-hoc tests, interpretation of this interaction is based on means and one-
sample tests (described below), which suggest that men are equally (in)accurate 
in both conditions, but women become more accurate in the bias condition (see 
Figure 4.2).  
Women deviated significantly from the Bayesian probability (i.e., 58%) in the 
neutral condition (T=91.0, p<.001, r=-.696), but not in the bias condition (T=330.0, 
p=.129, r=-.234). Men deviated significantly in both the neutral (T=82.0, p=.001, 
r=-.584) and the bias condition (T=118.0, p=.011, r=-.457). Note that in experiment 
3b, the estimates were compared to a Bayesian probability of 58%. As such, 
these under-estimations reflect conservatism, as the provided estimates are 
closer to the prior probability of 50% than Bayes’ theorem prescribes (Phillips & 
Edwards, 1966). 
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Figure 4.2 The mean (±bootstrapped 95%-CI) deviations from Bayesian probabilities 
(i.e., 58%) for the white jar or for the man being attractive in each condition 
(neutral versus bias) by men and women. Note that at this Bayesian 
probability, under-estimation indicates conservatism towards the prior 
probability of 50% (which would be a deviation of -8% from the Bayesian 
posterior probability). 
4.3.4 Sensitivity Analyses  
4.3.4.1 Analyses with Only Heterosexual Participants  
As the evolutionary theory in this study is focused on mating prospects, it could 
be argued that it would only hold for heterosexual participants, whose 
reasoning about mating prospects could be more driven by the possibility to 
produce offspring. Furthermore, the scenarios in the study assumed 
heterosexual coupling of the characters. Therefore, follow-up analyses (2 
(gender) × 2 (condition: within-subjects) were conducted including only 
participants who indicated they were exclusively heterosexual (n=58 in 
experiment 3a; n=50 in experiment 3b). 
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4.3.4.1.1 Analyses with Only Heterosexual Participants – Experiment 3a 
The robust ANOVA indicated that the main effect of gender was not significant 
(  =-1.220, p=.111), so men (2.929 (.949); bootstrapped 95%-CIMEAN [1.344, 5.098]) 
did not deviate more or less than women (2.393 (.568); bootstrapped 95%-CIMEAN 
[1.246, 3.480]). The main effect of condition was not significant (  =0.907, p=.053), 
with equal deviations in the neutral condition (2.839 (.570); bootstrapped 95%-
CIMEAN [1.747, 3.999]) as in the bias condition (2.483 (.672); 95%-CIMEAN [1.248, 
3.943]). The interaction was not significant (  =1.355, p=.183), so that men’s 
deviations in the neutral condition (3.635 (.867); bootstrapped 95%-CIMEAN [2.030, 
5.408]) and in the bias condition (2.222 (1.188); bootstrapped 95%-CIMEAN [0.321, 
4.924]) were not different from women’s deviations in the neutral condition 
(2.0435 (.748); 95%-CIMEAN [0.614, 3.530]) and in the bias condition (2.743 (.679); 
bootstrapped 95%-CIMEAN [1.490, 4.103]).  
4.3.4.1.2 Analyses with Only Heterosexual Participants – Experiment 3b 
The robust ANOVA indicated that the main effect of gender was not significant 
(  =0.604, p=.484); men (-1.989 (.596); bootstrapped 95%-CIMEAN [-3.197, -0.899]) 
and women (-2.228 (.649); bootstrapped 95%-CIMEAN [-3.559, -1.062]) deviated 
equally. The main effect of condition was not significant (  =-0.405, p=.495), with 
equal deviations in the neutral condition (-2.380 (.451); bootstrapped 95%-CIMEAN 
[-3.302, -1.532]) and in the bias condition (-1.837 (.718); bootstrapped 95%-CIMEAN 
[-3.326, -0.520]). The interaction was not significant (  =1.787, p=.157), so that 
men’s deviations in the neutral condition (-2.117 (.684); bootstrapped 95%-
CIMEAN [-3.484, -0.826]) and in the bias condition (-1.860 (.730); bootstrapped 
95%-CIMEAN [-3.426, 0.517]) were not different from women’s deviations in the 
neutral condition (-2.642 (.594); 95%-CIMEAN [-3.834, -1.504]) and in the bias 
condition (-1.814 (.1.194); bootstrapped 95%-CIMEAN [-4.377, 0.320]).  
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4.3.4.2 Condition as a Between-Subjects Factor 
Feedback from a pilot study suggested that the within-subject condition 
manipulation was quite evident, which may have obscured a difference between 
conditions on a within-subject level. This manipulation was kept within subjects 
for financial considerations. However, it is possible to analyse the difference 
between the neutral and bias conditions differently. For this alternate approach, 
analyses only considered the first condition participants encountered, and 
conditions are compared on a between-subjects level. Robust factorial ANOVAs 
could not be conducted as the sample sizes in subgroups were not equal and no 
appropriate non-parametric test was available. Instead, 2 (condition: between-
subjects) × 2 (gender) ANOVAs, with 2000 bootstrapped samples, were 
conducted.  
4.3.4.2.1 Condition as a Between-Subjects Factor – Experiment 3a 
There was no significant main effect of gender (F(1,73)=.190, p=.664, ηp²=.003; 
mean (SE) for men: 2.345 (.782) vs. women: 2.812 (.731); bootstrapped 95%-CI  
[-1.631, 2.530]). There also was no significant main effect of condition 
(F(1,73)=1.374, p=.245, ηp²=.018; neutral: 3.206 (.792) vs. bias: 1.951 (.721); 
bootstrapped 95%-CI [-0.828, 3.366]). Lastly, the interaction was not significant 
(F(1,73)=3.220, p=.077, ηp²=.042; men (3.933 (1.166)) vs. women (2.479 (1.070)) in 
the neutral condition, bootstrapped 95%-CI [-2.058, 5.088]; men (.757 (1.043)) vs. 
women (3.145 (.995)) in the bias condition, bootstrapped 95%-CI [-0.045, 4.861]).  
4.3.4.2.2 Condition as a Between-Subjects Factor – Experiment 3b 
There was no significant main effect of gender (F(1,69)=.176, p=.676, ηp²=.003; 
men: -1.221 (.865) vs. women: -1.697 (.734); bootstrapped 95%-CI [-1.538, 2.553]). 
There also was no significant main effect of condition (F(1,69)=1.659, p=.202, 
ηp²=.023; neutral: -2.189 (.831) vs. bias: -.729 (.772); bootstrapped 95%-CI [-0.741, 
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3.486]). Lastly, the interaction was not significant (F(1,69)=.874, p=.353, ηp²=.013; 
men (-1.421 (1.318)) vs. women (-2.958 (1.013)) in the neutral condition, 
bootstrapped 95%-CI [-0.323, 3.423]; men (-1.021 (1.120)) vs. women (-.437 
(1.062)) in the bias condition, bootstrapped 95%-CI [-3.182, 4.007]).  
4.4 Discussion 
The experiments described in this chapter sought evidence for the hypothesised 
sexual over-perception bias using a belief-updating paradigm. One experiment 
(3a) examined whether men overestimate female sexual interest in men in 
general, by providing higher-than-warranted ratings for the male character 
being in a straight bar. The other experiment (3b) examined whether men 
overestimate how sexually interested women are in a given man, by providing 
higher-than-warranted ratings for the male character being attractive to women. 
However, across the experiments no evidence of gender differences was found. 
Although the interaction between neutral and bias conditions and gender was 
found to be significant in experiment 3b, this was not a robust effect as it was 
not found in sensitivity analyses (e.g., analyses involving only heterosexual 
participants). Moreover, this effect was not in the predicted direction: men gave 
lower ratings for the male character being attractive than did women. Another 
non-robust finding was a difference between neutral and bias conditions in 
experiment 3a, so that the full sample deviated less when estimating the 
probability that the male character was in a straight bar than when estimating 
whether beads came from the black jar, but again this result was not found in 
sensitivity analyses. Overall, we found no evidence of the sexual over-
perception bias using this belief-updating paradigm. We did replicate the 
overall conservatism previously found in this paradigm (Phillips & Edwards, 
1966), as the difference between participants’ estimates of posterior probabilities 
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and the objective prior probabilities (50% for each state of the world) was 
generally less than that prescribed by Bayes’ theorem. 
There are a few aspects of the design that might have contributed to these null 
findings. In the present design, participants judged the situation of a male 
character, rather than their own situation or their own interaction. Indeed, 
ethical constraints precluded asking participants to rate their own attractiveness 
based on, albeit pre-determined, feedback pertaining to this. Therefore, the 
study investigated how attractive men thought women would find men in 
general. It is possible that if males do display a sexual over-perception bias it 
may be more specific, involving an overestimation of their own appeal (and 
perhaps underestimation of other men’s appeal to downplay the competition). 
However, Abbey and Harnish (1995) found the male sexual over-perception bias 
for vignettes describing two characters, rather than any task involving the 
participants themselves, suggesting that this distance factor should not pose a 
problem.  
Another aspect of the design possibly accounting for the null findings was the 
within-subjects manipulation of conditions. As noted earlier, piloting feedback 
suggested that the within-subjects manipulation was evident to some 
participants; but owing to financial considerations we kept this manipulation 
within subjects. However, a between-subject analysis was available, by 
comparing the conditions participants encountered first. These analyses did not 
find any differences between conditions or between genders. Admittedly, this 
might be because splitting the sample led to underpowered analyses, as Farris et 
al. (2008b) note that the gender differences should be visible with sample sizes 
of at least n=45 for each gender, which is slightly higher than the resulting 
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sample sizes when splitting the groups by order in these experiments (i.e., 
sample sizes ranging from 35 – 42).  
Nevertheless, another possible explanation of the null findings relates to the 
limitations of EMT outlined in the introduction. First, any relevant adaptive bias 
might be behavioural in nature, rather than cognitive (Marshall et al., 2013; 
McKay & Dennett, 2009). If so, this bias would not be revealed by our paradigm. 
One possibility is that the incoming information is integrated with prior 
probabilities equally by men and women (i.e., there is no cognitive bias in the 
use of logical inference rules for belief updating), but the value of the incoming 
information is perceived differently. Another, not mutually-exclusive, 
possibility (mentioned earlier in 4.1 on page 139) is that men and women have 
different prior beliefs about women’s sexual interest, which may have explained 
the bias in previous “one-point-estimate” paradigms. Such different prior beliefs 
could arise from different socialisation of men and women, where men are 
taught to show great sexual interest and might develop the notion that everyone 
else also has such great sexual interest (Abbey, 1982; Haselton & Buss, 2000). 
Within our paradigm, however, the presentation of multiple pieces of 
information with a given likelihood of occurring would eventually lead 
everyone to arrive at the same posterior beliefs, despite holding dissimilar prior 
beliefs (Matthews, 2005). A potential limitation of the present study is that we 
did not measure subjective prior beliefs, and hence we could not test this 
suggestion directly.  
It is possible that the value of incoming information is perceived differently by 
men and women, as long as the information is ambiguous. Imagine, for 
example, that a woman looks away when a man tries to make eye contact. A 
woman might do this because she is not sexually interested in him. However, it 
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is also possible that she does this in order to play “hard to get” (Jonason & Li, 
2013), a behaviour many women are encouraged to display (at least initially) to 
appear coy (Abbey, 1982). When men assume that women are adopting this 
strategy, the same behaviour (i.e., looking away) might be considered quite 
likely in both states of the world (i.e., whether she is sexually interested or not). 
Such varying interpretations of the likelihood ratio of incoming evidence are 
only possible for ambiguous cues (e.g., looking away, a smile) and indeed, the 
sexual over-perception bias is generally only found with ambiguous cues (Buss, 
2013; Lindgren et al., 2008). The likelihood ratio of the information presented in 
our experiments was explicitly stated, so there was no ambiguity regarding the 
value of the incoming information. This then would avoid arrival at different 
posterior probabilities due to different subjective likelihood ratios. Indeed, we 
did not find differences between men and women’s estimates of posterior 
probabilities.  
Furthermore, it has been suggested that the bias might not consist of men over-
perceiving sexual interest, but actually of women underreporting their sexual 
interest (Perilloux et al., 2012), to avoid being considered promiscuous and thus 
attempt to protect their reputation (Farris et al., 2008b; Haselton & Buss, 2000). 
As participants’ self-reports might be biased, our use of vignettes and distant 
characters in the present design might be a virtue. If reporting one’s own 
interest is required, accurate reporting could be incentivised, perhaps by 
increasing the stakes of accurately reporting interest, not through self-report 
measures on questionnaires, but rather by whether participants’ actual phone 
numbers would be exchanged, for example, as Perilloux et al. (2012) have 
suggested. 
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4.5 Conclusion 
This study represents the first investigation of how information pertaining to 
female sexual interest is integrated into posterior probabilities by men in a 
belief-updating paradigm. In contrast to previous “one-point-estimate” 
paradigms, no evidence of sexual over-perception was found. This suggests that 
if men overestimate their sexual prospects, this does not involve irrational belief 
updating. Furthermore, our study is consistent with the notion that 
discrepancies between men and women’s reports of sexual interest found in 
previous studies may not lie in men’s biased perception, but rather in other 
factors (e.g., women underreporting sexual interest), that we accounted for in 
the present study. In the next chapter, more general beliefs about future 
prospects, rather than sexual prospects specifically, are explored. 
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5 Self-Deceptive Optimism 
5.1 Background 
As described in Chapter 1, unrealistic optimism was initially defined as the 
phenomenon where desirable future outcomes are expected to be more likely, 
and undesirable future outcomes less likely, than indicated by an objective 
standard (Segerstrom, 2007; Shepperd et al., 2013). However, following 
important work by Sharot et al. (2011), this definition has been refined such that 
“unrealistic optimism” denotes a bias in which beliefs are updated more in 
response to desirable information than in response to undesirable information. 
This new definition is based on findings from a paradigm (described in Chapter 
1, on page 54, and summarised later in this chapter on page 160) robust to 
statistical artefacts which may have influenced findings in earlier studies (Shah, 
2012). In the present study, unrealistic optimism is investigated to shed light on 
processes underlying self-deception. 
The classic conception of self-deception, or “real” self-deception (Mijovic-Prelec 
& Prelec, 2010), is analogous to interpersonal deception: one part of the self 
actively deceives another part (Gur & Sackeim, 1979). The implication is that 
self-deceived individuals carry two conflicting representations of reality. 
Proponents of an alternative, “deflationary” account claim that this is 
paradoxical, and argue that knowledge regarding the use of a deception process 
should undermine its success (Mele, 1997). Instead, on the deflationary account, 
cases of putative “self-deception” are thought simply to reflect distortions in the 
processing of relevant information (Mele, 1997). 
To illustrate, consider a standard case of optimistic belief. On the classic 
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conception of self-deception, a heavy smoker who believes her future health 
prospects are good may also represent a more accurate, and less rosy, state of 
affairs. In contrast, proponents of the deflationary view might argue that there is 
no need to suppose that she carries two conflicting representations. She may be 
processing evidence about the health implications of smoking in a biased 
fashion (Sharot, 2011) to arrive at one false representation. 
The present study combined the optimistic belief-updating paradigm and the 
crowd-within paradigm as a potential means of testing the “real” self-deception 
account. To briefly reiterate, in the optimistic belief-updating paradigm, 
participants provide an initial estimate of their chances of experiencing a 
negative event, are presented with the base rate of that negative event 
happening to their demographic, and are then asked to provide a second 
estimate of their personal chances of experiencing the event (Sharot et al., 2011). 
Beliefs are updated more when base rates represent desirable information (i.e., 
the initial estimate was an overestimate) than when they represent undesirable 
information. Participants in crowd-within experiments provide first and second 
estimates for neutral questions (e.g., “What percentage of the world’s airports 
are in the United States of America?”), without intervening directional feedback 
(Herzog & Hertwig, 2009; Vul & Pashler, 2008). The crowd-within effect refers 
to the fact that the average of the two estimates has a smaller error than the 
errors of the individual estimates on average.  
To ensure optimism would not constitute a reporting bias (e.g., signalling to 
oneself or the experimenter that one is healthy), we incentivised accuracy of the 
answers, so that true beliefs were expected to be reported (Schotter & Trevino, 
2014; Simmons & Massey, 2012). However, such incentives introduce a problem 
for the use of neutral questions in the optimistic belief-updating paradigm. 
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Participants would provide their first estimate (e.g., the percentage of airports 
they think are in the United States of America) and then see the correct answer 
to the question (e.g., 30.3%). With incentives for accuracy, participants’ second 
estimates should not deviate from the correct answer provided. For undesirable 
events, participants might argue that their own risks are different from the base 
rate based on individuating information (e.g., no family history of cancer), and 
the incentivised accuracy might thus not pertain to the presented base rate and 
they could still deviate while expecting to maximise their payoff. As such, a bias 
for undesirable events but not neutral events could be due to people aiming to 
maximise their payoff, rather than due to a cognitive, self-deceptive bias. This 
confound is avoided in the crowd-within paradigm, where participants are only 
instructed to assume their first estimate was wrong, but are not informed 
whether it was too high or too low. Here, systematic, directional biases would 
suggest self-deception.  
The crowd-within effect is thought to occur because, rather than being best 
guesses, the different estimates are randomly sampled from the same internal 
distribution of potential estimates, with a mean centred around the true value. 
All estimates have different random errors, which cancel out when the estimates 
are averaged (Vul & Pashler, 2008). Moreover, when some estimates are from 
the lower end of the distribution, and others are from the upper end of the 
distribution, the mean true value is more likely to be bracketed, which would 
reduce error even more when averaging (Herzog & Hertwig, 2009).  
One possibility is that when asked to supply multiple estimates of their 
probability of experiencing undesirable outcomes, people sample randomly 
from an internal probability distribution. If so, the second estimate is just as 
likely to be more optimistic than the first as it is to be less optimistic than the 
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first, irrespective of the underlying distribution's shape (indeed, this is the basis 
for the distribution-free Wilcoxon signed-rank test; Howell, 2010).  
A second possibility, in line with the “real” self-deception account, imputes 
more intentionality to the optimist, who samples selectively from the optimistic 
end of an internal distribution.14 In this case, the two estimates might vary 
systematically. On the one hand, participants might sample less selectively 
second time around, providing a less optimistic estimate and producing an 
enhanced crowd-within effect through reduction in random and systematic 
error. On the other hand, they might sample even more optimistically second 
time around, perhaps as a kind of defensive manoeuvre (e.g., P. R. Harris & 
Napper, 2005; Weinstein, 1980). Gal and Rucker (2010) found that individuals 
induced to experience doubt about their beliefs became stronger advocates of 
those beliefs than did individuals induced to feel confident in their beliefs, 
especially when the beliefs were viewed as particularly important. In their 
experiments, confidence in beliefs was not shaken by presenting evidence that 
contradicted those beliefs, but via more subtle means (e.g., asking participants to 
write about their beliefs using their non-dominant hand). In our study, a non-
specific prompt for an alternate estimate to one already provided might shake 
confidence in the initial estimate provided, especially for undesirable questions 
that might be considered important. This might lead to attempts to bolster one’s 
position by selecting even more optimistic estimates. In view of Gal and 
Rucker’s (2010) research, this selective sampling option may be quite likely. 
                                                          
14 The “real” self-deception account predicts selective sampling from an internal 
distribution, but is agnostic as to whether that distribution is itself biased (e.g., an outcome 
of biased information encoding; Sharot, 2011a; Sharot et al., 2011). Selective sampling and 
biased information processing could work in tandem to produce optimistic estimates. 
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5.1.1 The Present Study and Hypotheses 
In the present study, participants provided repeated estimates for neutral and 
for undesirable questions. With this paradigm, we investigated several 
questions: 
 First, could we replicate the crowd-within effect for neutral questions? 
We hypothesised that the averaged estimate for neutral questions would 
have a lower absolute error than the first or second estimate on average.  
 Second, would the crowd-within effect obtain for undesirable questions? 
If so, would this effect be of the same size or larger than that for neutral 
questions?  
 Third, would unrealistic optimism be found in this paradigm? We 
hypothesised that errors for undesirable questions would indicate 
underestimation, while no systematic deviation from the true value 
would be found for neutral questions.  
 Fourth, and most importantly, would second estimates for undesirable 
questions be more optimistic than first estimates for these questions, 
instead of less optimistic or equivalent?  
5.2 Methods 
5.2.1 Participants 
The participants were 104 students from RHUL (mean (SD) age = 20.38 (1.90) 
years; 41 male, 63 female). Participants received a show-up fee of £3 and a 
decision-based bonus of between £0 and £2 (mean (SD) = £1.83 (£0.38)). The 
Psychology Department Ethics Committee of RHUL approved this study. 
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5.2.2 Materials 
The study included two question-type conditions: neutral and undesirable. The 
required responses to all questions were percentages. Neutral questions were 
the eight used in the original crowd-within study (Vul & Pashler, 2008), see 
Table 5.1. Although Vul and Pashler (2008) provided answers to an accuracy of 
one decimal place, in the present study participants were asked for integer 
responses; therefore, participants’ estimates were compared to the rounded 
answers from Vul and Pashler (2008).  
5.2.2.1 Selection of Undesirable Questions 
Undesirable questions were a selection of the eighty items used by Sharot et al. 
(2011; obtained through personal communication with C. Korn, 14 February, 
2013). We presented the eighty items to thirteen independent raters, who 
provided estimates of the probability of the events happening to them. The 
mean estimate was then compared to the “true” values provided by Korn, who 
derived and calculated these values from PubMed and the Office for National 
Statistics. Items for which raters provided much lower estimates than the “true” 
values were considered particularly prone to the optimism bias and, as such, 
potential candidates for our undesirable questions.  
Our final selection of eight undesirable items was made on the basis of several 
additional considerations. First, raters’ comments about the clarity of items were 
considered and unclear items were excluded (e.g., it was deemed unclear 
whether “chance of having back pain” referred to chronic or occasional back 
pain). Second, items that might not be relevant for all participants were 
removed (e.g., “theft from vehicle” implies the possession of a vehicle). Finally, 
we selected items involving events that were unlikely or impossible to have 
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happened to the participants already at their current age, so that participants 
would not give high ratings on the grounds that they were currently 
experiencing or had previously experienced the event in question. However, as 
described below, we also explicitly checked whether participants had prior or 
current experience of the events.  
Table 5.1 reports the final questions. The true answers to the undesirable 
questions (mean (SD) = 35.88 (20.55)) were not significantly different from the 
answers to the neutral questions (32.50 (23.46)), t(14)=.306, p=.764, d=.164, 95%-CI 
[-27.021, 20.271]), so this could not explain lower estimates for undesirable 
questions. 
Table 5.1 The questions used in the task. The eight neutral questions were taken from 
Vul and Pashler (2008); the eight undesirable questions are a selection from 
Sharot et al. (2011). Participants’ estimates were compared to the (rounded) 
statistic from the literature. 
Question-type Question Literature 
statistic 
Neutral The area of the United States of America is what 
percentage of the area of the Pacific Ocean? 
6.3 (6) 
What percentage of the world’s population lives in 
China, India, or the European Union? 
44.4 (44) 
What percentage of the world’s airports are in the 
United States of America? 
30.3 (30) 
What percentage of the world’s roads are in India? 10.5 (11) 
What percentage of the world’s countries have a 
higher fertility rate than the United States of America? 
58 (58) 
What percentage of the world’s telephone lines are in 
China, the United States of America, or the European 
Union? 
72.4 (72) 
Saudi Arabia consumes what percentage of the oil it 
produces? 
18.9 (19) 
What percentage of the world's countries have a 
higher life expectancy than the United States of 
America? 
20.3 (20) 
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Table 5.1 continued 
Question-type Question Literature 
statistic 
Undesirable What is the chance that you will have gallbladder 
stones? 
16 
What is the chance that you will have a limb 
amputated? 
11 
What is the chance that you will die before 90? 68 
What is the chance that you will have serious hearing 
problems? 
22 
What is the chance that you will have irritable bowel 
syndrome (disorder of the gut)? 
30 
What is the chance that you will have hepatitis A or B 
(inflammation of the liver)? 
36 
What is the chance that you will have an eye cataract 
(clouding of the lens of the eye)? 
61 
What is the chance that your arteries will harden 
(narrowing of blood vessels)? 
43 
 
5.2.3 Procedure 
The experiment was conducted over five sessions, all conducted on a local 
computer network using z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007) in the EconLab at 
RHUL. The experiment lasted approximately 40 minutes. For purposes of non-
deceptive payment (see 5.2.3.1 on page 168), in addition to asking participants to 
provide their own estimates for each of the questions, we asked them to estimate 
the average answers given by other participants in the session, in separate 
rounds.  
After the first estimates, participants were shown their initial estimate and given 
“dialectical bootstrapping instructions” (Herzog & Hertwig, 2009), where 
participants were asked to consider reasons for why their initial estimate might 
be incorrect and to take on a new perspective for their second estimate (see 
Appendix E). Second estimates could not be equal to the first estimate. 
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A fixed order of rounds was used where participants provided different 
estimates in each: in round one their own estimate (e.g., “What percentage of the 
world’s countries have a higher fertility rate than the United States of 
America?”); in round two what they thought the other participants’ average 
estimate for each question was (e.g., “What is the average estimate for the 
following question: What percentage of the world’s countries have a higher 
fertility rate than the United States of America); in round three an alternative, 
second own estimate for the exact same questions as in round one; and in round 
four an alternative, second estimate of the others’ average estimate for the exact 
same questions as in round two. This order was chosen for three reasons. First, 
to calculate others’ average estimate, everyone’s own estimates had to precede 
the average rounds. Second, if participants had been unexpectedly asked for the 
second own estimate prior to giving their first estimate of the others’ average 
estimate, they might have expected to have to do the same when then asked for 
others’ average. Instead of providing their best estimate on the first guess, they 
might therefore have chosen to give the lower and higher bounds of their best 
guess to maximise payment (e.g., if they thought the correct answer was 30, they 
might first estimate 25 and then 35, as 30 falls into the paid range for both 
estimates; see below). Therefore, we elicited both sets of first estimates before 
eliciting the unexpected second sets of estimates. Finally, we thought the 
interval between the first and second guess should be equal for own and 
average estimates. The order in which questions were presented within each 
round was randomised for each participant; this order remained the same across 
the four rounds. 
Participants first provided written informed consent, then read instructions and 
continued to the task when everyone had finished reading the instructions (see 
Chapter 5 
168 
 
Appendix E). After completing the four rounds, participants answered 
demographic questions (gender, age, nationality), check questions (i.e., whether 
they had experienced or were currently experiencing any of the possible 
undesirable events), and were paid for their participation. 
5.2.3.1 Incentives 
We incentivised accurate responding for both question types. As participants 
might have had individuating information regarding their own personal 
vulnerability to certain future misfortunes (e.g., family history of an illness), we 
paid them for their accuracy in estimating the average of others’ estimates for 
undesirable questions. These averages, computed in-session, enabled us to pay 
participants based on their accuracy in estimating objectively correct responses 
for both neutral and undesirable questions. We do not report analyses of these 
others-estimates, as they were included for logistical reasons and do not bear on 
our research questions. Although we did not deceive our participants, we did 
not make it explicit that payment was not based on their own estimates for 
undesirable questions. As far as participants were concerned, they were paid 
based on their accuracy in estimating both question types (which was true), but 
did not know upon which particular questions payment was based. 
In each round, four of the sixteen questions were rewarded for accuracy. In the 
rounds concerning own estimates, only the neutral questions were rewarded; 
half in the first round and the other half in the third round. In the rounds 
concerning others’ average estimate, the undesirable questions were rewarded; 
half in the second round and the other half in the fourth round.  
Across the experiment, all questions were rewarded as follows: 10 points for an 
estimate that was the true value; 4 points for estimates off by up to 2% in either 
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direction; 2 points for estimates off by up to 5% in either direction, 1 point for 
estimates off by up to 10% in either direction; and 0 points for estimates that 
were off by more than 10% in either direction. Each point was worth £0.20. 
For the four questions rewarded in the first estimate rounds, the first estimate 
was used for payment. In the second-estimate rounds, the four previously 
unrewarded questions were rewarded. For these four questions, the better of the 
two estimates, whether the first or the second estimate, was used for payment. 
Participants were informed of this payment scheme, although they were not 
informed at the outset about having to provide a second estimate, so as to keep 
participants from providing lower and upper bounds of their estimates.  
5.2.4 Analytic Strategy 
The crowd-within effect was investigated by comparing the absolute error of the 
first estimate (  ), the absolute error of the second estimate (  ), and the 
absolute error of the two estimates averaged (    ). Because squared errors 
penalise large errors more heavily than smaller errors, and therefore favour 
average errors over either of the errors chosen at random (Soll & Larrick, 2009), 
we did not measure accuracy through squared errors as Vul and Pashler (2008) 
did. Instead, errors were calculated as per C. M. White and Antonakis (2013), 
with the slight alteration of using the mean rather than the median to align with 
more recent work (Herzog & Hertwig, 2014; personal communication with S. 
Herzog, 21 January, 2014): 
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Here    is the mean absolute difference between participants’ first responses, 
  , and the true values,  , across the eight questions (i); and    is the mean 
absolute difference between participants’ second responses,   , and the true 
values,  , across the eight questions (i). These are compared to     , which is the 
mean absolute difference between participants’ averaged first and second 
responses,   , and the true values. Together, these values constituted the three 
within-subjects levels of estimate-type. These values were calculated separately 
for both question-type conditions: neutral and undesirable.  
To investigate whether we replicate the crowd-within effect for neutral 
questions, and if the same effect can be found, to a similar or different degree, 
for undesirable questions, a 3 (estimate-type: first estimate versus second 
estimate versus the average of the two estimates) × 2 (question-type: neutral 
versus undesirable) repeated-measures analysis of variance (RM ANOVA) was 
conducted on the means of absolute errors of own estimates.  
Furthermore, the crowd-within effect is thought to partially stem from 
bracketing of the true value, where one estimate is an underestimate of the true 
value and the other an overestimate (Herzog & Hertwig, 2009). We conducted a 
paired-samples t-test on the mean number of questions where the two estimates 
bracketed the true value for each question type to investigate whether 
bracketing rates were equal.  
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Finally, to investigate optimism, log-transformed (see under data screening) 
signed (i.e., non-absolute) errors were analysed through a 2 (estimate-type: first 
estimate versus second estimate) × 2 (question-type: neutral versus undesirable) 
RM ANOVA and through one-sample t-tests.  
An alpha level of .05 was adopted for these analyses. When the assumption of 
sphericity was violated, Greenhouse-Geisser corrections or multivariate tests (if 
ε<.7 in Mauchly’s test) were used.  
5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Data Screening 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests were used to check for normality, but as these tests 
tend to detect even trivial deviations in larger samples (Field, 2013), an α-level 
of .01 was adopted. The tests indicated that signed errors for undesirable 
questions were not normally distributed for the first estimate (p=.004) and for 
the second estimate (p=.005). To correct for positive skew, all signed errors were 
transformed by first adding a constant to make all values positive and then 
taking the logarithm (i.e., log(x+31), where x was the original score) as advised 
by Field (2013). After this transformation, all variables were normally 
distributed. Analyses included all participants (n=104). However, seventeen 
participants endorsed at least one check question. Therefore, we also conducted 
analyses with a subsample of n=87, consisting only of participants who had not 
experienced (or were not currently experiencing) any of the undesirable events. 
These analyses did not lead to different results than those obtained with n=104, 
and thus only the latter are reported. Reported means and standard errors (and 
graphical displays) are based on non-transformed data to facilitate 
interpretation. 
Chapter 5 
172 
 
5.3.2 Crowd-Within Effects 
There was a main effect of estimate type, as shown by a 3 (estimate-type) × 2 
(question-type) RM ANOVA on absolute errors (Wilks’ Lambda=.446, 
F(2,102)=63.395, p<.001, ηp²=.554). Planned comparisons with a Bonferroni 
correction indicated that the absolute errors of the two estimates averaged 
(mean (SE) = 17.143 (.346)) were lower than errors of first estimates (18.368 
(.367); p<.001, 95%-CI [0.833, 1.617]) and errors of second estimates (17.889 (.377); 
p<.001; 95%-CI [0.289, 1.203]). The errors of the first and second estimates did 
not differ (p=.334, 95%-CI [-0.247, 1.206]). There was no main effect of question-
type, with equal errors for undesirable questions (18.374 (.425)) and neutral 
questions (17.225 (.481); F(1,103)=3.636, p=.059, ηp²=.034, 95%-CI [-0.046, 2.343]). 
Estimate-type and question-type did not interact (Wilks’ lambda=.991, 
F(2,102)=.464, p=.630, ηp²=.009). In summary, we found an overall crowd-within 
effect, which was not moderated by question type. Figure 5.1 shows these 
results.  
There was no significant difference in the number of questions for which first 
and second estimates bracketed the true value between neutral questions and 
undesirable questions (t(103)=1.611, p=.110, d=.317, 95%-CI [-0.064, 0.622]). Of the 
eight neutral questions, 1.90 (.138) questions were bracketed on average. Of the 
eight undesirable questions, 1.63 (.134) questions were bracketed on average.  
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Figure 5.1 The mean absolute error (±95%-CI) of first estimates, second estimates, and 
the first and second estimates averaged, for both neutral and undesirable 
questions.  
5.3.3 Optimism Effects 
There was a main effect of estimate-type, such that second estimates (-1.952 
(.817)) were lower than first estimates (-.290 (.810)), as revealed by a 2 (estimate-
type) × 2 (question-type) RM ANOVA on the log-transformed signed errors 
(F(1,103)=11.468, p=.001, ηp²=.100, 95%-CI [0.654, 2.671]). There was also a main 
effect of question-type, such that estimates for undesirable questions (-4.770 
(.993)) were lower than estimates for neutral questions (2.528 (.953); 
F(1,103)=43.993, p<.001, ηp²=.299, 95%-CI [4.950, 9.645]). Estimate-type and 
question-type interacted as well (F(1,103)=8.604, p=.004, ηp²=.077). Planned 
contrasts with a Bonferroni correction showed that there was no difference 
between the first and second estimates for neutral questions (3.020 (1.028) and 
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2.036 (.952), respectively; p=.165; 95%-CI [-0.088, 2.056]). For undesirable 
questions, second estimates (-5.940 (1.069)) were lower than first estimates  
(-3.599 (1.033); p=.001, 95%-CI [0.972, 3.709]). Figure 5.2 shows these results.  
 
Figure 5.2 The mean biases of the first (1) and second (1) estimates (circles and left 
vertical axis in each panel) and the differences (Δ1-2) between these 
estimates (triangles and right vertical axis in each panel), with 95% 
confidence intervals, for neutral questions (panel a) and undesirable 
questions (panel b).  
As the above analysis showed they were not different, the log-transformed 
signed errors of first and second estimates for neutral questions were collapsed 
and a one-sample t-test indicated that they were not different from equivalently-
transformed zero (i.e., log(0+31); t(103)=1.183, p=.720 (Bonferroni-corrected), 
mean difference=.015, 95%-CI [-0.010, 0.041]). As the planned contrasts indicated 
that log-transformed errors of first and second estimates for undesirable 
questions were not equal, they were analysed through separate one-sample t-
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tests. In both cases the log-transformed errors were lower than transformed 
zero, i.e., optimistically biased (first estimate: t(103)=-4.965, p<.001 (Bonferroni-
corrected), mean difference=-.086, 95%-CI [-0.120, -0.052]; second estimate: 
t(103)=-6.323, p<.001 (Bonferroni-corrected), mean difference=-.140, 95%-CI  
[-0.183, -0.096]).  
In summary, one’s estimates for undesirable (but not neutral) questions were 
optimistically biased, the second estimate more so than the first (see Figure 5.2).  
5.4 Discussion 
The crowd-within effect describes the phenomenon where the average of two 
estimates from the same person has a lower error than either of the individual 
estimates from that person on average (Vul & Pashler, 2008). In the present 
study we found this crowd-within effect both for neutral questions, thereby 
replicating results from previous studies (e.g., Herzog & Hertwig, 2009; Vul & 
Pashler, 2008), and for undesirable questions, equally.  
Furthermore, consistent with the optimism bias (Sharot, 2011a; Weinstein, 1989), 
we found that participants consistently and significantly underestimated the 
answers to undesirable, but not neutral, questions. Moreover, and as the most 
important aim of the present study, we investigated self-deception. Comparing 
signed errors of first and second estimates for both types of questions suggested 
the second estimates for undesirable questions were significantly rosier than the 
first estimates, while no difference was found for first and second estimates 
regarding neutral questions.  
The significance of this latter result is that it indicates participants were 
sampling selectively from an internal probability distribution for undesirable 
questions. Whatever the shape of the underlying distribution, if they had been 
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sampling randomly (as per Vul & Pashler, 2008), participants would have been 
just as likely to provide a more optimistic second estimate as a less optimistic 
second estimate.15 As such, no systematic difference in bias would have emerged 
across estimates. Our results imply participants carried a more accurate, and 
less rosy, representation of their future prospects than their individual estimates 
(at least their second estimates) for undesirable questions conveyed. Our results 
are consistent with the “real” self-deception account (Gur & Sackeim, 1979; 
Mijovic-Prelec & Prelec, 2010). Just as someone might sample selective 
information to give another person a desirable impression of themselves (e.g., 
showcasing specific, rather than random, examples of previous employment in a 
job interview), people might mislead themselves by sampling selective examples 
which would convey desirable information regarding their future prospects. 
Likewise, just as people exaggerate their prospects when their claims are 
challenged (Gal & Rucker, 2010), and potentially “protest too much”, our 
findings suggest this same defensive strategy may operate intrapersonally 
(McKay, Mijović-Prelec, & Prelec, 2011). 
The results of the present study raise several questions. For example, one might 
wonder how the crowd-within effect could obtain for undesirable questions, 
given that second estimates were more biased, on average, than first estimates 
for such questions. Note that although the signed errors were different for the 
first and second estimates of undesirable questions, the absolute errors, upon 
                                                          
15 Note that Lench, Smallman, Darbor, and Bench (2014) have recently found that people 
perceive greater variance for given probabilities or given ranges of probabilities of desirable 
outcomes for the self, but not for others. As such, the internal probability distribution for 
the self might have a higher variance than the distribution for others, so that any estimate 
away from the (accurate) mean, including any optimistic estimate, is more likely to be given 
for the self than for others. However, this does not make it more likely for the second 
estimate to be systematically more optimistic than the first estimate.  
Chapter 5 
177 
 
which the crowd-within effect is based, were not. First estimates to some 
questions could have been overestimations, while all second estimates might 
have been underestimations. For the absolute errors, both these types of errors 
could add up to an equal value for first estimates as for second estimates when 
averaged across questions. However, for signed errors, some overestimations 
and underestimations could have cancelled out, leading to a smaller averaged 
signed error for first estimates compared to second estimates. With some 
overestimations in the first estimates, but none in the second estimates, one 
would expect some bracketing of true values, which we indeed found. As Vul 
(n.d.) noted, even low rates of bracketing can correct for higher absolute errors 
for second estimates and still lead to the crowd-within effect. 
Second, one might wonder if the optimistic estimates participants provided did 
not convey their actual beliefs, but were distorted for impression formation 
purposes (e.g., to deceive the experimenters of participants’ low chance of 
misfortune). Against this possibility, we note that our participants provided 
estimates under conditions of strict anonymity and they stood to gain 
financially by providing accurate estimates. Mijovic-Prelec and Prelec (2010) and 
Simmons and Massey (2012) have shown that participants supply optimistic 
estimates even in the face of substantial incentives to be accurate.  
One might wonder why the data pertaining to others’ estimates was not 
analysed to investigate comparative optimism (i.e., comparing the self to 
others), in addition to the absolute optimism we did investigate. Here, one 
crucial methodological aspect should be noted. In comparative optimism, 
participants are asked to estimate the likelihood that others will experience 
relevant outcomes (Garrett & Sharot, 2014; Shepperd et al., 2013). In the present 
study, however, the “other estimates” involved asking participants what they 
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thought others had estimated for themselves. This phrasing could lead to 
different results compared to estimating another’s likelihood if people are aware 
of the optimism bias. Given the coverage of the optimism bias in the media (e.g., 
Cadwalladr, 2012), a popular psychology book (Sharot, 2011b), and a TED talk 
on the topic (Sharot, 2012), some of our participants may have had a certain 
degree of awareness of the optimism bias. With this knowledge, participants 
might assume others would underestimate their risk, and they would adjust 
their others-estimate accordingly. This would then confound the interpretation 
of any analyses between own-estimates and others-estimates in this study. 
Hence, we decided not to analyse these estimates, although they maintained 
their practical purpose for non-deceptive payment.  
Finally, following previous investigations of the optimism bias (Sharot, 2011; 
Sharot et al., 2011; Weinstein, 1989), we deliberately chose to use negative items 
as they carry more relevance in terms of taking action to reduce risks (Weinstein 
& Klein, 1995). Future studies could include desirable events, or could ask 
participants to estimate their chance of not experiencing the undesirable events 
in question (Sharot et al., 2011), and investigate if second estimates are higher 
than first estimates for such items. If so, this would strongly support the notion 
of self-deceptive selective sampling we propose here.  
The negating phrasing of “not experiencing” undesirable events was avoided, 
due to concern that if the undesirable events described would be more salient 
than the negating word, the events might still lead to negative affective states. 
This, in turn, could potentially influence the optimism bias (Helweg-Larsen & 
Shepperd, 2001). Admittedly, this concern has not been empirically tested. 
Therefore, future studies could include a condition with negating questions to 
investigate if second estimates for negated undesirable questions are higher 
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than the first of such estimates, while also including measures of mood. It must 
be noted that more than the current eight items might need to be included for 
reliable measurement if the number of items is to be split across conditions.  
5.5 Conclusion 
In the present study, we combined the optimistic belief-updating and crowd-
within paradigms to investigate whether “self-deceptive” processes underlie the 
optimism bias. First, we found the crowd-within effect (i.e., lower errors for 
averaged estimates than for either estimate alone) for neutral and undesirable 
questions. Second, we found optimism as the true values for undesirable 
questions were underestimated, but neutral questions were accurately 
estimated. Finally, and most importantly, we found self-deception as the second 
estimate for undesirable questions was systematically lower than the first, 
suggesting systematic, biased sampling from an internal probability 
distribution. First and second estimates for neutral questions were not 
systematically different, suggesting random sampling from an internal 
probability distribution in those cases. This systematically biased sampling 
supports the “real” self-deception account. 
Overall, the present study’s findings are not especially optimistic about the 
possibility of correcting the optimism bias, when it would be desirable to do so, 
such as when forecasting changes in stock markets. The results indicate that 
second guessing oneself and taking the average of the two guesses may improve 
accuracy somewhat compared to taking either of the two guesses at random. 
However, this seems to only minimise random error.  
Unrealistic optimists seem less willing to have their beliefs tested when this 
could require updating of those beliefs. This might be because they have rosier 
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beliefs than warranted, but also because finding out bad news might be more 
detrimental to people with optimistic beliefs. This last possibility is investigated 
in Chapter 6, which investigates the phenomenon of betrayal aversion and so 
the thesis moves from optimism about one’s future prospects to pessimism 
about others’ trustworthiness.  
Chapter 6 
181 
 
6 Betrayal Aversion 
6.1 Background 
As discussed in Chapter 1, in the binary trust game, a sender first decides 
whether to opt in or opt out of a trust game. If the sender opts out, the sender 
and (generally) the trustee receive a small reward (e.g., 10|10 for the sender and 
trustee, respectively). If the sender opts in, the trustee can then decide to 
reciprocate trust and pick a fair outcome (e.g., 15|15) or to betray trust and 
choose an unfair outcome (e.g., 8|22; Berg et al., 1995; Camerer & Weigelt, 1988). 
According to the neo-classical economic model, trustees should maximise their 
material return and thus choose the unfair outcome, and anticipating this, 
senders should opt out. Yet, people are found to trust and to be trustworthy in 
the trust game (Camerer, 2003), which is irrational in light of the neo-classical 
economic model as it does not maximise material self-interest (Glimcher, Fehr, 
Camerer, & Poldrack, 2008; Manapat et al., 2013). Besides these behaviours, 
betrayal aversion has been observed in the trust game, which forms another 
irrational behaviour from a neo-classical economic point of view (Fehr, 2009).  
Briefly, betrayal aversion is shown when participants indicate they need more 
certainty of receiving the good outcome when another player selects that 
outcome compared to when the outcome is selected by a random process (i.e., a 
computerised lottery). For example, if a trustee determines the outcome, a 
sender might require the probability that the trustee will select the good 
outcome to be at least 70% in order to opt in. That same sender might require a 
lottery’s probability of the good outcome only to be at least 60%.  
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As described in Chapter 1, Aimone and Houser (2012) argue that betrayal 
aversion occurs because people want to avoid the emotional costs of finding out 
they have been personally betrayed after trusting someone. These authors have 
now reported support for this suggestion from an imaging study, which found 
more insula activity when opting into the trust game compared to making risky 
decisions in a computerised lottery (Aimone, Houser, & Weber, 2014), with 
insula activity suggested to signal aversive emotions.  
However, some studies have not replicated the betrayal-aversion phenomenon. 
Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) first reported this phenomenon and replicated it 
across several countries (Bohnet et al., 2008), while Fetchenhauer and Dunning 
(2012) did not find evidence for betrayal aversion in a slightly different 
paradigm (described below). As mentioned in Chapter 1, differences in 
methodologies may have accounted for the presence versus absence of betrayal 
aversion.  
Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) asked participants what the minimum 
probability of receiving the good outcome had to be in order for them to opt into 
a game, rather than opt out. Three different games were used, which varied in 
whether a computerised lottery or another person selected an outcome and in 
whether another person’s payoffs depended on the sender’s decision. 
Participants reported a higher required minimal probability of the good 
outcome if another person were to select the outcome than if a computerised 
lottery were to select the outcome.  
Fetchenhauer and Dunning (2012) took a different approach and asked senders 
if they wanted to opt out (5|0 for the sender and trustee, respectively) or opt in 
to the trust game. If opting in, the trustee would pick between the good outcome 
Chapter 6 
183 
 
(10|10) and the bad outcome (0|20). In an additional task, these authors asked 
participants whether they wanted to keep 5, or opt into a lottery where they 
could win 0 or 10. One group of participants was informed that the probability 
of the good outcome, in both the trust game and in the lottery, was 46%; another 
group was informed it was 80%. When the chance of the good outcome was 
high, senders opted into the trust game and the lottery at equal rates. However, 
when the chance of the good outcome was low, 28.6% of the senders opted into 
the lottery, while 54.3% opted into the trust game. This finding does not support 
the notion of betrayal aversion, as participants were more willing to accept the 
risk of the bad outcome through another player’s choice than through a 
computerised lottery.  
One methodological difference between Bohnet and Zeckhauser’s (2004) and 
Fetchenhauer and Dunning’s (2012) studies is inequality of payments to the 
sender and trustee if the sender decides to opt out. Social motives such as 
altruism, efficiency motives (i.e., larger total payoffs if opting in), or inequality 
aversion (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999), could have led participants in Fetchenhauer 
and Dunning’s (2012) study to opt into the trust game. However, opting in 
could have resulted in inequality for the sender, especially if the probability of 
the good outcome is low. Hence, inequality-averse senders might opt out in this 
scenario. Yet, high levels of opting in were found. Therefore, inequality aversion 
cannot fully explain the differences between the studies. Nevertheless, in the 
present study, we ensured that both players in a dyad would receive a positive 
sum of money, irrespective of which outcome was selected and how it was 
selected, and that the outcomes had equal efficiency. 
A second methodological difference between the two studies lies in how 
participants construe the trust scenario. In Bohnet and Zeckhauser’s (2004) 
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study, participants gave a conditional, minimal acceptable probability of the 
good outcome in the lottery or trust game to signal the minimal level of trust 
needed, without specifically signalling distrust to the trustee. In Fetchenhauer 
and Dunning’s (2012) study, participants could opt in or out, signalling distrust 
when doing the latter, as trustees learned that the sender opted out. Signalling 
distrust could be of great influence on behaviours in economic games. Much as 
people are willing to pay a cost to avoid displaying unfairness in the dictator 
game (see Dana, Cain, & Dawes, 2006)16, some people might be willing to forego 
larger rewards in the trust game if this allows them to avoid signalling negative 
qualities about themselves (e.g., distrust of others). We avoided this confound 
by asking participants for their minimal acceptable probabilities of the good 
outcome, so that they would not signal distrust directly if preferring the 
computerised lottery over the trust game. 
We developed a theory to explain betrayal aversion, which may also account for 
differences in the aforementioned studies with contradictory findings. We build 
on Aimone and Houser’s (2012) notion that betrayal aversion might be 
influenced by emotional costs. In the present study, we hypothesised that prior 
beliefs about others’ trustworthiness could predict betrayal aversion. Intuitively, 
one might expect that if people believe others are untrustworthy, they would 
not trust another with their payment. Thus, one might expect trustworthiness-
                                                          
16 This cost was not a fair share of the endowment, but Dana et al. (2006) asked dictators to 
split $10 between themselves and the recipient. After dictators had made their decision, 
they were presented with the option to exit the dictator game and receive $9, in which case 
the recipient would get nothing but would also not be informed about the fact that a 
dictator game had been played. This exit option is costly to the dictator as they could have 
kept $10 ($1 more than the exit option), without any change in outcome for the recipient, or 
they could have kept $9 (equal to the exit option), with a positive reward for the recipient 
($1 more than the exit option). Yet, the exit option, taken by 33% of the dictators, provides a 
way of being selfish without showing such unfairness to another player. 
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beliefs to predict more opting in. Yet, this would not explain betrayal aversion. 
Instead, we suggest that betrayal aversion might be explained by different 
utility functions, which factor in prior beliefs about others’ trustworthiness. 
When one decides to trust, and subsequently is betrayed, not only does the bad 
outcome lead to disutility, but there are emotional costs from knowing that one 
has been betrayed (Aimone & Houser, 2012) and additional disutility from 
knowing that the betrayer received extra money with their unkind action. The 
emotional costs and additional disutility from knowing the betrayer received 
more money is perhaps less for someone who initially believes they are likely to 
be betrayed than for someone who is surprised by this. When one decides to 
trust, and gets the good outcome, the good outcome leads to an increase in 
utility, and additional utility may accrue from knowing that the person was 
trustworthy (i.e., honor benefits; Bohnet et al., 2008). This additional utility 
might be higher for someone who believed he or she was likely to be betrayed 
than for someone who was expecting this to happen.  
The differences in the additional (dis)utility could be underpinned by dopamine 
prediction errors. Rewarding sensations are reflected in prediction errors coded 
through increased dopamine release for outcomes better than expected and 
decreased dopamine release for outcomes worse than expected (Schultz, 1998). 
If one’s prediction is that one will be betrayed (i.e., a pessimistic belief), and this 
consequently occurs, the outcome is as expected. Similarly, if one does not 
expect to be betrayed (i.e., an optimistic belief), and trust is reciprocated, the 
outcome is as expected. However, if one believes that one will be betrayed and 
consequently receives the good outcome, the outcome is better than predicted, a 
positive prediction error. In contrast, if one believes one’s trust will be 
rewarded, and consequently gets betrayed, this results in a negative prediction 
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error. Therefore, when one is pessimistic, yet opts into the trust game, the 
dopamine release upon seeing the outcome will be as expected or better; a 
positive, rewarding sensation. Hence, participants with a pessimistic belief 
should be relatively more willing to opt into a trust game compared to a lottery 
or should at least be indifferent about playing the trust game versus a lottery. 
On the other hand, optimistic participants receive, at best, the expected 
dopamine release, or, if betrayed, less than expected; a negative sensation. 
Hence, participants with an optimistic belief should be relatively less willing to 
opt into a trust game and have their beliefs tested compared to a lottery, or 
should be indifferent between the two methods of determining an outcome. As 
an analogy, consider someone with an optimism bias (see Chapter 5) who thinks 
they are healthy (i.e., a positive belief): they might not be particularly eager to 
have that belief tested by subjecting themselves to medical tests and potentially 
facing evidence that challenges the positive belief. Someone who thinks they are 
ill (i.e., a negative belief) might be more eager to undergo medical tests, in case 
they obtain evidence that would speak against the negative belief (or, of course, 
obtain confirmation of the illness which they could then obtain treatment for).  
This could explain why, in a different study, Fetchenhauer and Dunning (2009) 
found that participants simultaneously believed others’ trustworthiness to be 
lower than it actually was, and yet trusted others more than they should have 
based on their misguided beliefs. This seems to go against the intuitive notion of 
betrayal aversion, as one might expect those who anticipate betrayal to avoid 
this possibility by opting out. Yet, the findings are in line with the theory 
presented in the present study. 
Aimone and Houser (2012) argue that participants trust more when they can 
avoid information about betrayal. However, they overlooked the fact that the 
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computer’s selection of a bad outcome still provides information about the 
trustworthiness of people in general, as the selection procedure is based on the 
proportion of unfair trustees. Therefore, people are still exposed to information 
that might challenge their beliefs, not about their specific counterpart per se, but 
rather about the general population’s trustworthiness. This is presumably the 
belief being used in the trust game, given that the identity of the trustee is never 
revealed and the trustee thus constitutes a random member of the general 
population. Furthermore, Aimone and Houser (2012) did not measure beliefs 
and hence their study cannot shed light on the association between beliefs about 
others’ trustworthiness and betrayal aversion. The present study measured such 
beliefs and investigated whether they can predict levels of betrayal aversion.  
6.1.1 The Present Study and Hypotheses 
In the present study we wanted to test the association between beliefs about 
others’ trustworthiness and the choice between a trust game and a lottery, in 
order to illuminate the notion of betrayal aversion. Participants in the role of the 
sender provided an incentivised estimate of their belief of others’ 
trustworthiness (i.e., trustworthiness-beliefs) and indicated at what probability 
of the good outcome they would prefer playing a lottery rather than have a 
trustee decide on an outcome. They set this probability by requesting a minimal 
number of white beads (representing the good outcome) in an urn of 1000 
beads. If the urn held at least the requested number of white beads, the 
computer drew an outcome from the urn. Otherwise, the decision of the trustee 
was implemented. Figure 6.1 (on page 192) illustrates this task.  
In our design, senders determined the level at which another person’s decision 
versus the computer’s selection would determine the outcome. This avoided 
having the minimal acceptable probability represent opting in and out of the 
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risky option, and thereby avoids confounding loss aversion and betrayal 
aversion (Aimone & Houser, 2012). This also avoided any influence of efficiency 
motives, where people prefer options with the highest overall payoffs. In the 
standard binary trust game, the overall payoffs of opting out are smaller than 
the overall payoffs of opting in, which might lead people to opt in to increase 
efficiency. In the present study, trusting a trustee or a computer had the same 
overall payoffs (i.e., the good outcome in the trust game and the lottery was 
15|15, while the bad outcome in both scenarios was 8|22), and participants’ 
decisions should thus not have been influenced by efficiency motives.  
If utility depended only on the outcome obtained, a rational act would have 
been to request as many white beads as represented the believed number of fair 
trustees. If a sender believed seven out of eight trustees selected the good 
outcome (7/8=87.5%), this would suggest that with 875 white beads in the urn, 
the sender would be impartial between the two ways of implementing an 
outcome. The number of white beads that matched the trustworthiness-belief, 
and indicated the point at which participants would be indifferent between the 
two methods of implementing the outcome, represented the belief-equivalent 
number of beads. Betrayal aversion was expressed by requesting a lower 
minimal number of white beads than the belief-equivalent number suggested. 
This translated into a negative deviation of the number of requested white beads 
from the belief-equivalent number. A negative deviation indicated that 
participants accepted a higher risk of receiving the bad outcome from the 
computer than run the risk of having another player betray them. 
We predicted that participants’ trustworthiness-beliefs would influence their 
level of betrayal aversion. Specifically, we predicted that optimists would show 
more betrayal aversion and pessimists would show less betrayal aversion. In 
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this study, optimism was defined as believing others are trustworthy (i.e., 
holding high trustworthiness-beliefs). The higher one’s trustworthiness-beliefs, 
the more disutility would be obtained from being betrayed, and the more one 
might avoid exposure to potential betrayal. Therefore, we predicted a negative 
association: the higher the number of trustworthy people was believed to be, the 
more negative the deviation from the belief-equivalent number of beads.  
In order to test the robustness of the predicted association, several potentially 
influential factors were measured and accounted for in analyses. First, as 
evidence regarding the similarity between the willingness to trust and the 
willingness to take risks is mixed (Bohnet & Zeckhauser, 2004), risk-aversion 
was measured in order to account for the willingness to take risks. Second, 
beliefs about others’ trustworthiness might be influenced by paranoia. The more 
paranoid thoughts one has, the lower one’s trust in others. This paranoia might 
extend to distrust in the experimenters’ (true) claim of a random computerised 
draw from the urn. Thus, paranoia would not only affect the beliefs about the 
number of trustworthy trustees, but also potentially the beliefs about the 
fairness of the computer lottery. In order to account for possible influences of 
paranoia, a questionnaire measuring paranoia was included. Third, reciprocity, 
which “is a behavio[u]ral response to perceived kindness and unkindness” (Falk 
& Fischbacher, 2006, p. 294), might affect expectancies of others’ trustworthiness 
and levels of opting into the trust game (Naef & Schunk, 2009). Someone who 
feels strongly about reciprocity might experience more disutility from learning 
that a trustee received a higher payoff by betraying a sender. In contrast, 
someone who does not feel strongly about reciprocity would mainly be 
interested in his own payoffs, and not experience additional (dis)utility from the 
payoff a trustee receives. As such, our hypothesised mechanism might only 
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apply to participants with stronger reciprocity norms. Therefore, we measured 
reciprocity norms as well.  
6.2 Methods 
6.2.1 Participants 
Participants were 208 students from RHUL (mean (SD) age = 20.75 years (2.65 
years); 77 male, 131 female). Participants received a decision-based payment 
between £4 and £14.85 (mean (SD) = £7.85 (£2.30)), which combined the results 
from the trust game or lottery, the trustworthiness-belief question if answered 
correctly (only for senders), and the risk-aversion measure. Half of the 
participants were randomly assigned to the role of a sender, while the other half 
were assigned to the role of a trustee. The analyses reported here focused on 
senders (n=104; mean (SD) age = 21.09 years (3.25 years); 36 male, 68 female). 
The Psychology Department Ethics Committee of RHUL approved this study. 
6.2.2 Materials 
6.2.2.1 Trust Game 
Although descriptions throughout this chapter use terms such as “trust game”, 
“trustee”, and “good outcome”, neutral language was used throughout the 
experiment (i.e., “Player X” was the sender, “Player Y” was the trustee, 
“Outcome A” was the good outcome, and “Outcome B” was the bad outcome) 
to minimise demand effects (Aimone & Houser, 2012). Furthermore, in order to 
avoid demand effects with regards to directly translating trustworthiness-beliefs 
into actions, the use of the term “probability” was also avoided. The game had 
two outcomes: the good outcome with 15|15 points for the sender and the 
trustee, respectively; and the bad outcome with 8|22 points. All participants 
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were informed that one of the two outcomes would be arrived at in one of two 
possible ways: the computer would decide or Player Y (i.e., the trustee) would 
decide. 
Trustees were always asked to select an outcome, in case their decision would 
be implemented. They were informed that if the computer selected an outcome, 
their choice would not be relevant for payment and player X (i.e., the sender) 
would not learn about their choice. 
Senders were informed that they could influence how the outcome would be 
determined. An urn was filled with 1000 neutral (grey) beads, which would be 
replaced by x white beads and 1000 – x black beads. Note that white represents 
the colour for the good outcome in this chapter, but whether white or black 
beads represented the good outcome was counterbalanced across participants in 
the experiment. Senders were shown the urn with 1000 neutral (grey) beads and 
had to indicate how many white beads, at minimum, they wanted to be in the 
urn for the computer to draw a bead from the urn in the lottery (y). If there were 
fewer white beads (x) than the requested number of white beads (y), the 
outcome would be decided by the trustee’s decision. If there were more white 
beads than (or as many as) requested (i.e., x ≥ y), the computer randomly 
selected an outcome from the urn with the ratio of x white beads and 1000 – x 
black beads. If the bead was white, the good outcome was selected; if it was 
black, the bad outcome was selected. Figure 6.1 shows how the outcome was 
determined, based on the sender’s requested minimal number of white beads 
(y). 
Several examples and comprehension checks were included before senders 
indicated how many white beads they wanted at minimum for the computer to 
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draw an outcome (y). The minimal number of white beads requested (y) is the 
equivalent of Bohnet and Zeckhauser’s (2004) minimal acceptable probability of 
the good outcome in the lottery or trust game.  
 
Figure 6.1 The task procedure, depicting how the outcome was determined. 
Participants set their minimal level of probability of a good outcome at 
which they would prefer a lottery over the trust game. Random draws from 
the computer determined if this level was met; and, if so, which outcome 
was selected in the lottery. Grey beads are neutral and are replaced by white 
beads (representing the good outcome) and black beads (representing the 
bad outcome) when the computer randomly draws the number of white 
beads (x). 
Senders also indicated how many of the trustees they thought would choose the 
good outcome and how many would choose the bad outcome. This question 
was incentivised to encourage truthful reporting of participants’ 
trustworthiness-belief (Schotter & Trevino, 2014). If the answer was exactly 
correct, senders gained an additional 10 points at the end of the experiment; if it 
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was incorrect, they did not receive any points and were not informed about the 
correct answer.  
Senders were also asked to indicate their confidence that their belief was close to 
the correct answer (off by one trustee at most), on a four-point Likert scale: 0 = 
not at all confident; 1 = somewhat confident; 2 = quite confident; and 3 = very 
confident. Furthermore, senders were asked which option they thought was 
more likely if their belief was incorrect: that there were more trustees who chose 
the good outcome, that there were fewer trustees who chose the good outcome, 
or that these two possibilities were equally likely. All these questions were 
asked before senders learned which outcome was received and how it was 
selected.  
6.2.2.2 Risk Aversion 
For a description of the computerised risk-aversion measure (Holt & Laury, 
2002), see Chapter 2 (2.2.2.2 on page 88). As an improvement to previous studies 
in this thesis, the risk-aversion measure in this study was genuinely paid for one 
randomly-selected participant in the session, regardless of their role. For this 
participant, a decision from this measure was randomly selected and their 
selected lottery was played and the bonus added to their payment.  
6.2.2.3 Questionnaires 
6.2.2.3.1 Paranoia 
The Paranoia/Suspiciousness Questionnaire (PSQ; Rawlings & Freeman, 1996) 
consists of 47 questions, such as “When people are especially nice, do you 
wonder what they want?” or “Do you feel at times that you’ve got a raw deal 
out of life?”, with yes/no responses. This questionnaire is designed to measure 
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paranoia and suspiciousness in the general population. The summed total score 
can range from 0 to 47. 
6.2.2.3.2 Reciprocity 
A selection of six questions from the personal norm of reciprocity questionnaire 
(PNR; Perugini, Gallucci, Presaghi, & Ercolani, 2003) was used. The original 
PNR measures three aspects of reciprocity (beliefs in reciprocity; positive 
reciprocity, which is the behaviour in response to kind actions; and negative 
reciprocity, which is the behaviour in response to unkind actions), all measured 
with nine items each. We used a selection of six items that has been used before 
(Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, & Sunde, 2009) and consists of items with the highest 
factor loadings (all factor loadings >.70; Perugini et al., 2003): three for positive 
reciprocity (e.g., “If someone does a favour for me, I am ready to return it”) and 
three for negative reciprocity (e.g., “If somebody puts me in a difficult position, I 
will do the same to him/her”), and none for beliefs in reciprocity. Each item was 
scored on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to 
strongly agree (7). The positive and negative reciprocity items were then 
combined, so that the summed total score can range from 6 to 42. 
6.2.3 Procedure 
The experiment comprised 13 sessions, all conducted on a local computer 
network using z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007) in the EconLab at RHUL. The 
experiment lasted approximately 40 minutes. All sessions had sixteen 
participants (i.e., eight senders and eight trustees), so that the belief question for 
trustees was equally sensitive across all sessions (i.e., nine options ranging from 
0 to all 8 trustees choosing the good outcome).  
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Before being assigned their roles, all participants read general instructions 
regarding the possible outcomes and the possible ways of arriving at one of the 
outcomes (i.e., computer’s or trustee’s selection). After correctly answering 
comprehension questions about these general instructions, participants were 
assigned their roles and their one specific partner, whose identity they would 
never learn. 
Trustees were asked to select one of the two outcomes, in case the outcome 
would be determined through their decision. They completed the risk-aversion 
measure after this. Next, they completed tasks for an unrelated, non-
incentivised, pilot experiment.  
Senders were provided with instructions about how to influence how the 
outcome would be determined (i.e., setting a threshold for the number of white 
beads). After correctly answering the comprehension question about this aspect 
of the task, they indicated the minimal number of white beads they wanted to be 
in the container. Senders also provided their belief regarding the number of 
trustees who would pick the good and the bad outcomes, and indicated their 
confidence in this belief. Whether the belief question or the task of setting the 
minimal number of white beads was presented first was counterbalanced across 
participants. Next, senders also completed the risk-aversion measure, the PSQ, 
and the reciprocity questionnaire.  
Finally, all participants answered demographic questions (gender, age, 
nationality). Then, they were informed about the outcome and how it was 
selected, and were paid for their participation, with experimental points being 
converted to British currency using the exchange rate of 1 point = £0.50. At this 
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feedback stage, senders were also informed if their beliefs were correct or not 
(and thus if they received an additional 10 points or not).  
6.2.4 Analytic Strategy 
If utility were to depend only on the outcome, a sender would place the number 
of white beads at the percentage representing the number of trustees the sender 
believed would choose fairly (i.e., the belief-equivalent number of beads). The 
deviation from this belief-equivalent number was calculated by subtracting the 
belief-equivalent number of beads from the requested minimal number of white 
beads. Betrayal aversion was then defined as negative deviations from the 
belief-equivalent number of white beads. To test if people were betrayal averse, 
we used a one-sample t-test assessing whether the deviations from the belief-
equivalent number of beads were significantly below zero. 
Furthermore, we investigated whether beliefs about how many trustees would 
choose fairly (i.e., trustworthiness-beliefs) could predict the number of white 
beads requested, and more importantly, whether beliefs could predict 
deviations from belief-equivalent numbers. To this end, linear regressions with 
trustworthiness-beliefs predicting the minimal number of white beads requested 
and with trustworthiness-beliefs predicting the deviation from the belief-
equivalent number of white beads requested were conducted. The robustness of 
any such associations was checked through hierarchical linear regressions. In 
the first model, risk-aversion, reciprocity norms, and paranoia were accounted 
for; in the second model, trustworthiness-beliefs were added as an additional 
predictor to see if they could explain unique variance not already accounted for 
by the factors included in the first model. 
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One potential limitation with the analyses listed above is that we might find a 
negative relationship between trustworthiness-beliefs and deviations from 
belief-equivalent numbers of beads even if these two are not related. This is 
because people with low trustworthiness-beliefs, and thus a low belief-
equivalent number of beads, will have more space to deviate in the positive 
direction than in the negative direction. Conversely, people with high 
trustworthiness-beliefs have more space to deviate in the negative direction than 
in the positive direction. This, then, could lead to a negative association between 
beliefs and deviations.  
Therefore, as a test for robustness, we also conducted regressions on only those 
data points that could deviate from the belief-equivalent number of beads 
equally in both directions. This means that these follow-up analyses included 
only those participants with trustworthiness-beliefs between one and seven 
trustworthy trustees. Senders who believed no one or everyone (i.e., 0 or 8 
trustees) was trustworthy could only deviate from their belief-equivalent 
number (i.e., 0 or 1000, respectively) in one direction: the hypothesised one. 
Therefore, senders with these extreme trustworthiness-beliefs were excluded in 
this robustness check. Furthermore, of the included trustworthiness-belief 
levels, only data points of requested numbers of beads which fell within an 
equidistant range of the belief-equivalent number were included so that 
deviations in both directions were equally possible. For example, for senders 
who believed 3 trustees were trustworthy, the belief-equivalent number of 
beads would be 375 (3/8=.375), and as long as their requested number of white 
beads was between 0 and 750, their data were included. All other data points 
were excluded. As such, this robustness test was conducted on a subgroup of 
participants who could deviate in both directions of their belief-equivalent 
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number of beads equally. This group will simply be referred to as “subgroup” in 
the results.  
With this more stringent selection of data points, the regression analyses might 
be underpowered to detect an effect. Therefore, group comparisons based on a 
median split of beliefs were also conducted as a robustness check. Any 
participants falling at the median of the beliefs of number of trustworthy players 
were excluded from these analyses. Pessimists, those with trustworthiness-
beliefs lower than the median, were compared to optimists, those with 
trustworthiness-beliefs higher than the median, in analyses of variance 
(ANOVAs) and analyses of covariance (ANCOVAs), accounting for risk-
aversion, reciprocity norms, and paranoia.  
6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Data Screening 
Figure 6.2 gives an overview of the data, the belief-equivalent numbers of beads 
at each level of trustworthiness-beliefs, and the range of data included in the 
subgroup analyses (n=35). 
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Figure 6.2 The minimal number of white beads requested graphed against the 
trustworthiness-beliefs (i.e., the number of trustees expected to pick the 
good outcome). The dashed line indicates the belief-equivalent numbers of 
white beads. The deviations analysed are the distances from each number of 
beads requested (diamonds) to the dashed line. The dotted line indicates the 
range of data included in the subgroup analyses (n=35).  
Assumptions of linearity, of absence of multicollinearity, of normality of the 
residuals, and of homoscedasticity were checked, both for total beads requested 
and for the deviations from belief-equivalent numbers of beads. There was no 
clear non-linear trend between trustworthiness-beliefs and either the total beads 
requested or the deviations from belief-equivalent numbers of beads; hence the 
assumption of linearity was not violated. Absence of multicollinearity was 
confirmed by the facts that none of the predictors (beliefs, risk-aversion, 
paranoia, and reciprocity norms) were very strongly correlated, the tolerance 
values were >.866, and the VIF values were all <1.155. The standardised 
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residuals were normally distributed. Homoscedasticity was confirmed as the 
plots of standardised residuals and predicted scores showed that the variance 
was equal across the range of the predicted scores. Less than 5% of the 
participants had standardised residuals >|2|, which is an acceptable level for 
regression analyses (Field, 2013). As none of the assumptions were violated, 
regression analyses were conducted using the data from the full sample (n=104) 
and the subgroup (n=35).  
The median trustworthiness-belief of the full sample was 2 trustworthy players; 
the median belief of the subgroup was 3 trustworthy players. Participants with 
the median belief in the respective analysis-group were excluded, leaving n=87 
(43 pessimists, 44 optimists) for the full sample and n=24 (11 pessimists, 13 
optimists) for the subgroup.  
For the group comparisons, normality of the dependent variables was checked 
for pessimists and optimists, separately. All distributions were normal in the 
subgroup (ps>.115). The distributions of deviations in the full sample were 
normal (ps>.106), but the distributions of the total beads requested showed a 
slight positive skew and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests indicated that they were 
non-normal (both ps=.006). Transformations (e.g. square-root transformations) 
did not correct this (Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests: ps<.001). Given the robustness 
of ANOVAs and ANCOVAs to non-extreme deviations from normality (Field, 
2013), analyses were continued with untransformed variables. Non-parametric 
Mann-Whitney tests were also conducted, with results reported in footnotes. 
However, there is no non-parametric equivalent of an ANCOVA and hence it 
was not possible to check for robustness after accounting for potentially 
influential factors in non-parametric analyses.  
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6.3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 present the descriptive statistics for the study. Overall, 
senders were quite accurate in their trustworthiness-beliefs, as the median 
sender expectation was that 2 trustees (25% of the trustees in a session) would 
pick the good outcome, when 27.9% of the trustees picked the good outcome in 
reality. However, due to variation in the number of trustees who picked the 
good outcome across the different sessions (ranging from 1 to 8), only 9 senders 
were rewarded for their trustworthiness-belief, which was accurate within their 
specific session.  
Table 6.1 Descriptive statistics for the continuous variables. 
 Mean Median SD Range 
Trustworthiness-belief 2.68 2 2.57 0-8 
Risk-aversion 7.22 7 2.08 0-11 
Reciprocity norms 26.47 26 5.09 6-39 
Paranoia 18.12 18 6.56 4-39 
 
Table 6.2 Descriptive statistics for the categorical variables.  
  N (%) 
Trustees who picked the good outcome 29 (27.9%) 
Senders who had the exactly correct trustworthiness-belief 9 (8.7%) 
Confidence that trustworthiness-belief was close to correct answer  
 Not at all confident 10 (9.6%) 
 Somewhat confident 39 (37.5%) 
 Quite confident 37 (35.6%) 
 Very confident 18 (17.3%) 
Guess what would be more likely if belief was wrong  
 More trustworthy players than thought 43 (41.3%) 
 Fewer trustworthy players than thought 47 (45.2%) 
 Equally likely for there to be more or fewer trustworthy players than 
thought 
14 (13.5%) 
 
6.3.3 Betrayal Aversion 
In the overall sample, a higher minimal number of white beads was requested 
than prescribed by beliefs (mean (SE) deviation from belief-equivalent numbers 
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of beads = 129.06 (38.454); t(103)=3.356, p=.001, d=.661, 95%-CI [52.794, 205.321]). 
This means that participants, on average, were more willing to play against 
another player than against the computer compared to what would be expected 
on the basis of their trustworthiness-beliefs. In the subgroup, the requested 
minimal number of white beads was not significantly different from that 
prescribed by beliefs (8.25 (29.541); t(103)=.279, p=.782, d=.055, 95%-CI [-51.721, 
68.221]). As such, betrayal aversion was not found at a general level. 
6.3.4 Regression Analyses 
The results of a linear regression using the whole sample showed that 
trustworthiness-beliefs could not significantly predict the minimal number of 
white beads requested (F(1,102)=.375, p=.542, R²ADJUSTED=-.006; see Table 6.3, 
model 1). 
However, a linear regression using the subgroup showed that trustworthiness-
beliefs significantly predicted the total number of white beads requested 
(F(1,34)=18.215, p<.001, R²ADJUSTED=.330; see Table 6.3, model 2). This was a robust 
association as a hierarchical linear regression indicated that adding beliefs as a 
fourth predictor significantly improved a model with risk-aversion, reciprocity 
norms and paranoia (ΔF(1,31)=12.085, p=.002, ΔR²=.241; F(4,31)=4.796, p=.004, 
R²ADJUSTED=.303; see Table 6.3, model 3). This robust association within the 
subgroup is not surprising, as only participants whose number of requested 
white beads fell (widely) along the diagonal imposed by the belief-equivalent 
numbers of beads were included.  
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Table 6.3 B-values, 95%-confidence intervals (95%-CI) of the b-values, standard errors 
(SE), β-values, and p-values for each of the predictors in the linear 
regression models for the minimal number of white beads requested. Model 
1 for the full sample; models 2 and 3, for the subgroup.  
Model Predictor b 95%-CI of b SE β p 
1 Trustworthiness-beliefs 5.795 [-12.975, 24.565] 9.463 .061 .542 
2 Trustworthiness-beliefs 86.876 [45.509, 128.244] 20.355 .591 <.001 
3.1 Risk-aversion 26.408 [-14.271, 67.087] 19.971 .224 .195 
 Reciprocity -10.538 [-24.367, 3.292] 6.789 -.263 .130 
 Paranoia 0.394 [-10.589, 11.376] 5.392 .012 .942 
3.2 Risk-aversion 20.866 [-14.385, 56.118] 17.284 .177 .236 
 Reciprocity 1.326 [-12.489, 15.141] 6.774 .033 .846 
 Paranoia -1.217 [-10.741, 8.307] 4.670 -.038 .796 
 Trustworthiness-beliefs 84.795 [35.048, 134.543] 24.392 .576 .002 
 
Another set of linear regressions investigated whether beliefs could (robustly) 
predict how much the requested number of white beads deviated from belief-
equivalent numbers.  
Results for the full sample indicated that trustworthiness-beliefs could 
significantly predict deviations from the belief-equivalent number of white 
beads (F(1,102)=158.679, p<.001, R²ADJUSTED=.605; see Table 6.4, model 1). The 
association between beliefs and deviations was robust, because adding beliefs as 
a predictor in addition to risk-aversion, reciprocity norms, and paranoia 
significantly improved the model (ΔF(1,99)=154.246, p<.001, ΔR²=.600; 
F(4,99)=39.470, p<.001, R²ADJUSTED=.615; see Table 6.4, model 2). Note that the b-
values of beliefs are close to -125, and their 95%-CIs include -125. This is the 
expected value of deviations based on their calculation, if trustworthiness-
beliefs and the number of white beads requested were statistically 
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independent17. Statistical independence between the number of white beads 
requested and trustworthiness-beliefs was also suggested in the analyses above.  
Table 6.4 B-values, 95%-confidence intervals (95%-CI) of the b-values, standard errors 
(SE), β-values, and p-values for each of the predictors in the linear 
regression models for the deviation from the belief-equivalent number of 
white beads. Models 1 and 2 for the full sample; models 3 and 4 for the 
subgroup. 
Model Predictor b 95%-CI of b SE β p 
1 Trustworthiness-
beliefs 
-119.205 [-137.975, -100.435] 9.463 -.780 <.001 
2.1 Risk-aversion 6.054 [-31.642, 43.749] 19.000 .032 .751 
 Reciprocity 5.403 [-10.885, 21.691] 8.210 .070 .512 
 Paranoia -7.073 [-19.542, 5.395] 6.285 -.118 .263 
2.2 Risk-aversion 4.917 [-28.673, 18.838] 11.972 -.026 .682 
 Reciprocity 3.310 [-6.932, 13.552] 5.162 .043 .523 
 Paranoia -4.333 [-12.181, 3.516] 3.955 -.072 .276 
 Trustworthiness-
beliefs 
-118.903 [-137.899, -99.906] 9.574 -.778 <.001 
3 Trustworthiness-
beliefs 
-38.124 [-79.491, 3.244] 20.355 -.306 .070 
4.1 Risk-aversion 18.239 [-17.746, 54.224] 17.666 .183 .310 
 Reciprocity 6.951 [-5.283, 19.185] 6.006 .205 .256 
 Paranoia -1.981 [-11.697, 7.734] 4.770 -.073 .681 
4.2 Risk-aversion 20.866 [-14.385, 56.118] 17.284 .209 .236 
 Reciprocity 1.326 [-12.489, 15.141] 6.774 .039 .846 
 Paranoia -1.217 [-10.741, 8.307] 4.670 -.045 .796 
 Trustworthiness-
beliefs 
-40.205 [-89.952, 9.543] 24.392 -.323 .109 
 
For the subgroup, trustworthiness-beliefs showed a trend towards significantly 
predicting deviations from belief-equivalent numbers of beads (F(1,34)=3.508, 
                                                          
17 If trustworthiness-beliefs and the number of white beads requested are statistically 
independent, the number of white beads requested is a random draw between 0 and 1000, 
with an expected average of 500. If trustworthiness-beliefs are 0/8, the belief-equivalent 
number of white beads is 0 and so deviations are between 0 and 1000 (expected average 
500); if trustworthiness-beliefs are 1/8, the belief-equivalent number of white beads is 125, 
and deviations are between -125 and 875 (expected average of 375); and so on. Hence, with 
a randomly selected number of white beads requested, the deviations should decrease in 
steps of -125 with each increasing step of trustworthiness-beliefs.  
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p=.070, R²ADJUSTED=.067; see Table 6.4, model 3). In this subgroup, however, this 
association was not robust, as it did not significantly improve a predictive 
model accounting for risk-aversion, reciprocity norms, and paranoia 
(ΔF(1,31)=2.717, p=.109, ΔR²=.075; F(4,31)=1.262, p=.306, R²ADJUSTED=.029; see Table 
6.4, model 4). Note that this may be due to a lack of power with analyses based 
on a sample of n=35. 
6.3.5 Factorial Analyses 
In the full sample, there were no significant differences between pessimists 
(mean (SE) = 411.953 (37.705)) and optimists (486.955 (37.274)) in the minimal 
number of white beads they requested (F(1,85)=2.001, p=.161, ηp²=.023, 95%-CI  
[-30.414, 180.416]). They also did not differ when risk-aversion, reciprocity 
norms, and paranoia were accounted for in an ANCOVA (F(1,85)=1.970, p=.164, 
ηp²=.023, 95%-CI [-31.548, 182.685]). However, within the subgroup, there was a 
significant difference (F(1,22)=11.382, p=.003, ηp²=.341, 95%-CI [97.174, 407.259]). 
As expected, participants with pessimistic beliefs (230.091 (55.022)) requested 
fewer white beads than participants with optimistic beliefs (482.308 (50.613)). 
This difference was reduced to marginally significant when accounting for risk-
aversion, reciprocity norms, and paranoia (F(1,19)=3.922, p=.062, ηp²=.171, 95%-
CI [-10.049, 363.433]).  
When assessing deviations from belief-equivalent numbers of beads, there was a 
difference between pessimists and optimists, both in the full sample and in the 
subgroup. 
In the full sample (F(1,85)=61.267, p<.001, ηp²=.419, 95%-CI [-663.444, -394.667]), 
pessimists requested significantly more white beads than their belief-equivalent 
numbers would suggest (365.422 (46.086); t(42)=8.906, p<.001, d=2.748, 95%-CI 
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[282.629, 448.255]). Optimists requested significantly fewer white beads than 
they should based on their trustworthiness-beliefs (-163.614 (47.518); t(43)= 
-3.061, p=.004, d=.934, 95%-CI [-271.391, -55.836]). This difference was robust as it 
was also found after accounting for risk-aversion, reciprocity norms, and 
paranoia (F(1,82)=58.777, p<.001, ηp²=.418, 95%-CI [-663.097, -389.875]).  
This effect of trustworthiness-beliefs on deviations from belief-equivalent 
numbers of beads was also robustly found in the subgroup, where pessimists 
and optimists differed significantly (F(1,22)=6.879, p=.016, ηp²=.238, 95%-CI  
[-266.830, -31.184]). Pessimists requested slightly more beads than their belief-
equivalent number of beads would suggest (25.545 (41.813)), although a one-
sample t-test indicated this was not significantly different from the belief-
equivalent number (t(10)=.784, p=.451, d=.496, 95%-CI [-47.077, 98.168). In 
contrast, optimists requested significantly fewer white beads than they should 
based on their trustworthiness-beliefs (-123.462 (38.463); t(12)=-2.787, p=.016, 
d=1.609, 95%-CI [-219.998, -26.925]). This difference was also found after 
accounting for risk-aversion, reciprocity norms, and paranoia (F(1,19)=6.769, 
p=.018, ηp²=.263, 95%-CI [-331.973, -35.970]).18 
6.4 Discussion 
The first aim of the study presented here was to seek evidence of betrayal 
aversion in a paradigm designed to be free of methodological confounds. Our 
general sample was not found to be more willing to take the risk of a bad 
                                                          
18 Non-parametric Mann-Whitney tests converged on the same conclusions: optimists and 
pessimists did not differ in their total number of beads requested in the total sample 
(U=827.0, p=.315, r=-.108), but they did in the subgroup (U=21.0, p=.002, r=-.597). Moreover, 
optimists and pessimists differed in their deviations from belief-equivalent numbers of 
beads in the total sample (U=222.5, p<.001, r=-.688) and in the subgroup (U=31.5, p=.019, r=-
.473).  
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outcome when determined by a computer than when determined by another 
player, which would be a classic indication of betrayal aversion. However, these 
results changed drastically, as discussed below, when using beliefs regarding 
others’ trustworthiness to predict the levels of betrayal aversion. Including 
trustworthiness-beliefs in the analysis, to test a novel theoretical explanation of 
betrayal aversion, was the second aim of this study. 
Our hypothesis was that beliefs about others’ trustworthiness would predict 
how betrayal averse participants would be. This hypothesis was tested in two 
steps. As a first step, the hypothesis would entail a positive correlation between 
trustworthiness-beliefs and number of white beads requested. More optimistic 
participants (i.e., those who believe more trustees are trustworthy) would 
require a higher probability of a good outcome from the computer’s draw to 
prefer having the computer draw an outcome compared to having another, 
believed-to-be-trustworthy trustee draw an outcome.  
6.4.1 Trustworthiness-Beliefs and Numbers of White Beads 
Requested 
For the whole sample, the beliefs about others’ trustworthiness did not predict 
the minimal number of white beads senders requested. For the subgroup, the 
trustworthiness-beliefs did predict the number of white beads requested, but 
this might be related to inclusion criteria for this subgroup: data points had to 
be (widely) along the line imposed by belief-equivalent numbers (see Figure 
6.2). A lack of a correlation between the trustworthiness-beliefs and the total 
white beads requested in the total sample could be explained by a number of 
factors.  
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First, our assumption that behaviour in economic games should be in line with 
beliefs might have been wrong. Fetchenhauer and Dunning (2009) had already 
hinted at this when they found that participants were sceptical about others’ 
trustworthiness in the trust game, yet opted into the trust game. Furthermore, a 
disconnect between beliefs and behaviour was recently shown in a signal-
sender-receiver game (Sheremeta & Shields, 2013). In this game, there are two 
states of the world: A or B. One player, the signal-receiver, is endowed an initial 
10 points that can be invested, which leads to 18 points in state A, but to 0 points 
in state B. The other player, the signal-sender, receives 13 points if the signal-
receiver invests, but 0 points if the signal-receiver does not invest. The signal-
sender, who knows the true state of the world, sends the signal-receiver a signal 
regarding the state of the world; this can be honest or deceptive. It would be in 
the signal-sender’s interest to signal state A, regardless of the true state of the 
world, as this would lead signal-receivers to invest, which, in turn, leads to a 
reward for the signal-sender. Therefore, in this game, a signal A could represent 
either a true state A (honest signal) or a true state B (deceptive signal). Signal-
receivers are aware of this, as Sheremeta and Shields (2013) found that a 
majority of signal-receivers believed that signal-senders might send a deceptive 
signal A. This belief was incentivised for correctness and so was expected to 
reflect a true belief. From a rational point of view, if signal-receivers distrust the 
authenticity of signal A, they should ignore this signal. Instead, they should use 
the probabilities of the states of the world (here: p(A)=p(B)=.5) to calculate their 
expected payoff to make the rational decision not to invest. Yet, 67% of the 
participants receiving signal A decided to invest (Sheremeta & Shields, 2013). 
This suggests that participants often do not act in accordance with their 
incentivised, stated beliefs in economic games. As such, this could be a reason 
for the lack of a correlation between beliefs and (rational) behaviour. However, 
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in Fetchenhauer and Dunning’s (2009) and Sheremeta and Schields’s (2013) 
studies, participants may have opted in or invested out of altruism. If they had 
not invested, which is what their beliefs dictated they should do in order to 
maximise their own expected payoff, the other player would not have received 
any payoff. Anticipating this, we did not include an option to opt out, so 
trustees would always receive a reward. In fact, in our study, outcomes would 
be equal for the senders and trustees, or unequal in the trustees’ favour, which 
would have led to reduced willingness to trust the trustee, if anything.  
Second, although a pilot study gave no indication of miscomprehension and any 
clarification questions participants asked during the experiment proper 
pertained to the risk-aversion measure, rather than to the betrayal-aversion task, 
it is possible that participants did not fully comprehend the task. In particular, 
participants may not have understood that if their minimal number of white 
beads requested was not met, the other player’s decision would be 
implemented. Such miscomprehension could account for the participants who, 
despite having pessimistic beliefs about the trustworthiness of others, still 
required that the urn contained at least 900 white beads, which would occur 
with a probability of only 10%. Therefore, they took a 90% chance that their 
outcome would be determined by another player, who they believed was more 
likely to be untrustworthy than to be trustworthy. Against this notion of 
miscomprehension, we did include detailed instructions and comprehension 
checks, which presumably would have avoided miscomprehension. It is, 
however, still possible that participants kept selecting answers for the multiple-
choice questions until they selected the correct answer (as they could not 
continue to the task otherwise). The correct answer would then not be based on 
full understanding of the instructions. We did not include open-ended 
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questions, such as “If there were 3 players (out of 8) in role Y choosing outcome 
A (15/15), how many white beads would the container (with 1000 beads) have to 
hold so that the probability of receiving outcome A is the same in both 
situations?” or “If I wanted 1000 beads representing outcome A in the container, 
what is the probability that the player in role Y determines the outcome?”. We 
avoided such questions because the use of the term “probability” may have led 
to a suggestive mechanism to match trustworthiness-beliefs and numbers of 
white beads requested, potentially creating demand effects. Future research 
could incentivise (additional) comprehension questions so that each incorrect 
answer leads to a penalty taken from the show-up fee.  
If miscomprehension did occur, this may have been due to the abstract language 
used in the experiment. As noted above, in order to avoid demand effects, 
suggestive terms such as “trustee”, “good outcome”, and “probability” were 
avoided. Instead, abstract terms (e.g., “Player Y” and “Outcome A”) were used. 
A suggestion that people struggle arriving at logical decisions when dealing 
with abstract problems, but not when dealing with more contextualised 
problems, comes from Wason’s Selection Task (Wason, 1968). In the abstract 
form of this task, participants are presented with four cards, all of which have a 
letter on one side and a number on the other side. Participants see the letters (P 
and Q) of two cards, and the numbers (1 and 2) of the other cards. Participants 
are then asked which card or which cards they would need to turn over to see if 
the rule “If P, then 1” is true, without checking unnecessary cards. Many 
participants do not make the correct selection (i.e., the card that says P, to check 
if it has 1 on the other side, and the card that says 2, to check that it does not have 
P on the other side). Yet, when framed in more concrete, social contexts (in 
particular, a context of cheater detection), participants perform well on this task 
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(Cosmides, 1989). For example, if the cards show the age of people (minor or 
not) on one side, and the type of beverage (alcoholic or not) on the other, 
participants check both the card of the minor and the card with an alcoholic 
beverage when asked to check if there is no underage drinking (Dudley & Over, 
2003). Perhaps the abstract terms used in the present study led to illogical 
responses from participants.  
Notwithstanding the above considerations, we doubt that miscomprehension 
was responsible for the lack of an association between trustworthiness-beliefs 
and numbers of white beads requested. Instead, our hypothesised mechanism 
explaining betrayal aversion may well have masked the correlation between 
beads requested and beliefs. This relates to the second step of our hypothesis, 
which focused on deviations from belief-equivalent numbers of white beads.  
6.4.2 Trustworthiness-Beliefs and Deviations from Belief-
Equivalent Numbers of White Beads Requested 
Our hypothesis suggests that, besides the lower monetary payoff from receiving 
the bad outcome (and disadvantageous inequality of payoffs), being betrayed 
would lead to additional disutility. This additional disutility would stem from 
knowing the untrustworthy trustee received more money from their unfair 
selection than if the trustee had selected the good outcome (i.e., the trustee was 
rewarded for being unkind), and its level would depend on trustworthiness-
beliefs. In particular, the additional disutility would be higher for optimists than 
for pessimists, because the betrayal is unexpected, leading to a negative 
prediction error, for the former. As such, participants were expected to deviate 
from the number of white beads that their trustworthiness-beliefs would 
prescribe, so that the higher the beliefs about trustworthiness, the more negative 
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this deviation would be. This would attenuate the assumed underlying positive 
correlation between beliefs and number of beads requested in the first step of 
the test of our hypothesis.  
We found evidence for this negative association between trustworthiness-beliefs 
and deviations from the belief-equivalent number of white beads. Through 
regression analyses, we found a strong negative correlation for the whole 
sample and a trend-level negative association for the subgroup. The subgroup 
provided a more robust test of hypotheses regarding deviations, as only 
participants who could deviate from their belief-equivalent number of beads 
equally in both directions were included. This avoided a potential correlation 
being driven by statistical independence between trustworthiness-beliefs and 
number of white beads requested, which were suggested to be independent, as 
described earlier for the first step of our hypothesis testing. However, the 
inclusion criteria for the subgroup led to a small sample size, which may have 
made regression analyses underpowered. In group comparisons, which might 
be more appropriate than the regression given the small sample size (Field, 
2013), a robust effect of trustworthiness-beliefs was found. Pessimists requested 
slightly more beads than their beliefs dictated, while optimists requested fewer 
beads than their beliefs dictated. In other words, optimists showed betrayal 
aversion and were willing to accept a higher risk of the bad outcome in the 
lottery than what their trustworthiness-beliefs indicated they thought the risk 
would have been in the trust game. Pessimists, on the other hand, were more 
willing to play the trust game than their trustworthiness-beliefs suggested. 
This provides tentative support for the notion that betrayal aversion might be 
associated with the disutility stemming from the untrustworthy person being 
rewarded. Furthermore, this additional disutility factors into the sender’s utility 
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function above and beyond the disutility from the actual outcome received and 
depends on a sender’s expectations about the trustee’s behaviour. As such, our 
hypothesised mechanism of trustworthiness-beliefs affecting betrayal aversion 
might cloud the association between trustworthiness-beliefs and the number of 
white beads requested.  
The association between levels of betrayal aversion and trustworthiness-beliefs 
may influence whether betrayal aversion is found or not. Fetchenhauer and 
Dunning’s (2012) sample may have included many participants with relatively 
pessimistic trustworthiness-beliefs. These participants may have considered the 
trust game an opportunity for a pleasant surprise by other’s kind actions, and 
therefore would have been willing to opt into the trust game. Furthermore, at 
the low probability of receiving the bad outcome (i.e., a manipulated low 
trustworthiness-belief), receiving the bad outcome after having opted into the 
trust game would be as expected, but receiving the good outcome would lead to 
additional utility as this outcome would be better than expected.  
In closing, it must be noted that this study can only point to an association 
between betrayal aversion and beliefs. In order to investigate whether our found 
association is causal, beliefs would have to be manipulated. This could be done in 
a future study where senders are informed they will be placed in a group with 
four other players, one of whom will be their assigned trustee, and they are 
informed about how many of the four players are trustworthy. Senders then 
have to provide their minimal acceptable probability of the good outcome at 
which they would switch from the trust game to a computerised lottery. This 
could be done using a strategy method (N. D. Johnson & Mislin, 2011), where 
senders provide answers for several possible group compositions, ranging from 
all four trustees being trustworthy to all four being untrustworthy. By informing 
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senders how many trustees are trustworthy, one can manipulate the beliefs. 
Then, participants’ minimal acceptable probabilities of a good outcome in the 
lottery might show differences within the uncertain groups (i.e., 1, 2, or 3 out of 
4 trustees are trustworthy) that are above the trust game’s equivalent probability 
of a good outcome in the relatively untrustworthy group, but below it in the 
relatively trustworthy group. For example, in groups with one trustworthy 
trustee the probability of a good outcome in the trust game is .25. The minimal 
acceptable probability of the good outcome in the lottery in untrustworthy 
groups might be higher than .25 (e.g., .33). In contrast, in groups with three 
trustworthy trustees, the probability of a good outcome in the trust game is .75. 
The minimal acceptable probability of the good outcome in the lottery in 
trustworthy groups might be lower than .75 (e.g., 64). Such results, if found, 
would provide further support for the theory presented in this chapter.  
6.5 Conclusion 
The present study shows that beliefs about others’ trustworthiness are 
associated with the level of betrayal aversion people display. People with 
pessimistic beliefs about the trustworthiness of others show a slightly stronger 
preference for the trust game than their beliefs would dictate. We suggest this is 
because they stand nothing to lose by trusting another: they either find out that 
others are indeed not trustworthy or get pleasantly surprised that others are 
more trustworthy than expected. As such, they may as well play the trust game 
or request a high probability to win the good outcome in a computerised lottery. 
People with optimistic beliefs about others’ trustworthiness, however, show a 
stronger preference for the computerised lottery than their beliefs would dictate. 
They can either have their beliefs confirmed or be unpleasantly surprised by 
others’ lack of trustworthiness, and might thus prefer not to have their beliefs 
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tested. Instead they prefer to play a computerised lottery, even when it has a 
lower probability of the good outcome than their beliefs would indicate the 
probability of that outcome to be in the trust game. 
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7 Discussion and Conclusion 
In this thesis I have investigated a range of “irrational beliefs”, defining 
irrational beliefs as deviations from the probability that one should assign to 
given propositions. Irrationality is critically important on a personal and on a 
social scale as it can carry large costs. Biased beliefs about the self and about the 
future might lead to smoking, unsafe sex, financial recessions, or even wars (D. 
D. P. Johnson & Fowler, 2011; Sharot, 2011a). Men’s biased beliefs about 
women’s sexual interest may lead to unwanted sexual advances or even sexual 
assault (Farris et al., 2008b). Less common, but extreme irrational beliefs, such as 
delusions, affect society due to loss of functioning and high mental health care 
costs (Coltheart et al., 2011). 
The vast number of findings where people systematically provide answers that 
do not follow formal logic rules, has led some to argue that humans are simply 
not rational (Kahneman, 2003; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983, 1986). Defenders of 
bounded rationality consider this notion too harsh and emphasise that 
ecological influence can lead to decisions deemed irrational when compared to 
normative rules, which assume unlimited time and cognitive resources and the 
application of the correct logic rules (Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Gigerenzer & 
Goldstein, 1996; Gigerenzer & Sturm, 2012; Stanovich & West, 2000). 
Furthermore, often biased beliefs are inferred from biased behaviour (e.g., 
Haselton & Buss, 2000), an inference some (e.g., Bortolotti, 2009) might consider 
valid as they claim that rational beliefs should have matching behaviour. 
However, others (e.g., Marshall et al., 2013; McKay & Dennett, 2009) argue that 
biased behaviours can occur without biased beliefs and vice versa. Therefore, 
the inference of a biased belief from a biased behaviour might not be valid. 
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In this thesis, I mainly focused on biased beliefs, rather than on biased 
behaviours. In each case I introduced novel elements to the investigation of the 
respective biases, so as to clarify or resolve a series of compelling theoretical 
issues. In addition, I took great care to minimise or eliminate relevant 
confounds, as imperfect methodologies have been at the heart of the 
irrationality debate (Stanovich & West, 2000). The studies reported in Chapters 2 
and 3 investigated the data-gathering and probability-reasoning components of 
the jumping-to-conclusions (JTC) bias associated with delusion-proneness, 
using newly incentivised versions of the beads-task paradigm. The study 
reported in Chapter 4 investigated the sexual over-perception bias in a belief-
updating paradigm, so as to assess whether this phenomenon reflects a bias in 
the integration of relevant information and is not fully attributable to different 
socialisation of men and women. The study reported in Chapter 5 investigated 
the “real” self-deception account in the domain of the optimism bias, to assess 
whether people hold both a realistic and a more desirable representation of their 
future prospects simultaneously. The study reported in Chapter 6 investigated 
whether beliefs about others’ trustworthiness could influence the level of 
betrayal aversion participants displayed in the trust game.  
In this final chapter, I first summarise the findings of these empirical studies and 
consider the theoretical implications of these findings for each specific 
psychological phenomenon. Then, I discuss overall limitations of the research, 
as limitations specific to the researched biases have already been discussed in 
the empirical Chapters 2 to 6. Next, I consider the implications of the findings at 
a more general level of rationality research. Throughout, I provide future 
suggestions. Finally, I conclude the thesis. 
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7.1 Summary and Theoretical Implications of the Specific 
Biases 
7.1.1 Jumping-to-Conclusions Bias 
That delusional and delusion-prone individuals “jump to conclusions” (JTC) on 
probabilistic reasoning tasks is perhaps the most important and influential claim 
in the entire literature on cognitive theories of delusions. However, previous 
investigations of this bias have suffered from conceptual and methodological 
limitations. First, although the notion of “jumping to conclusions” implies that 
delusion-prone individuals gather insufficient evidence and reach premature 
decisions, no previous study has actually investigated whether the evidence 
gathering of such individuals is, in fact, suboptimal. The standard “jumping to 
conclusions” effect is a relative effect, but using relative comparisons to 
substantiate absolute claims is problematic, as non-delusion-prone individuals 
could potentially gather objectively too much data and decide too late. Second, 
although some studies have varied the likelihood ratios of relevant evidence, no 
previous investigation has examined the effect of varying the prior distribution 
over relevant states. Third, many previous investigations have been vulnerable 
to a range of confounds, including effects of miscomprehension, working-
memory and motivation. 
The studies reported in Chapters 2 and 3 were designed to minimise the 
influence of these factors to assess whether the JTC bias is a genuine cognitive 
bias, rather than a methodological artefact. In both studies, we used an adapted 
version of the beads-task paradigm, in which a fisherman presented fish from 
either a mostly-white lake or a mostly-black lake. In Chapter 2, financial 
incentives were utilised to generate optimal decision points in two data-
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gathering versions of this paradigm and thus move beyond the standard, 
relative finding. In Chapter 3, we systematically investigated the effects of 
incentives and relevant information parameters (i.e., prior distribution, 
likelihood ratios) in a probability-estimates version of this paradigm. 
In the two tasks in Chapter 2, participants’ data gathering was compared to the 
optimal amount of data to gather, as determined by a maximisation of expected 
payoff, combining a reward for accuracy and a small cost for additional data 
gathering. In the first, dynamic decision-making task, participants indicated 
whether they wanted to see more information or decide on a lake, after each 
fish. In the second, one-shot decision-making task, participants indicated how 
many fish they wanted to see to base their decision on, before seeing any fish. 
Across both these tasks, more delusion-prone participants based their decisions 
on less data than less delusion-prone participants (i.e., a relative JTC bias). 
Evidence for an absolute JTC bias was found for high-delusion-prone 
participants in both tasks, who requested less than the optimal amount of data 
before deciding. Low-delusion-prone participants requested less data than 
optimal in the dynamic task, but performed optimally in the static task. No 
association between delusion-proneness and confidence levels at the moment of 
deciding was found in either of the two tasks.  
In Chapter 3, the presence of incentives was directly investigated between 
subjects and the effect of varying prior probabilities was investigated within 
subjects in a probability-estimates version of the fish task. In a condition where 
the likelihoods of the fish being from either lake were equal, but the prior 
probability of each lake was different, no effects of incentives or of delusion-
proneness were found. In a condition where both prior probabilities and 
likelihoods of the two lakes were different, again, no effects of incentives or of 
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delusion-proneness were found. Interestingly, in the condition where the prior 
probabilities of each lake were equal, but only the likelihoods were different, as 
is the case in the standard beads task, an interaction between incentives and 
delusion-proneness was found. High-delusion-prone participants 
underestimated the posterior probabilities in this condition, whether 
incentivised or not. Non-incentivised low-delusion-prone participants 
underestimated the posterior probabilities as well, but incentivised low-
delusion-prone participants provided higher posterior probabilities close to the 
Bayesian posterior.  
The effects of delusion-proneness were more robust in the evidence-gathering 
versions of the task used in Chapter 2 than in the probability-estimates version 
used in Chapter 3. This accords with the conclusions of several reviews, which 
have noted that the JTC bias is more robust on the former measure compared to 
the latter (Fine et al., 2007; Garety & Freeman, 1999).  
The fact that some differences in probability reasoning were found between 
low-delusion-prone and high-delusion-prone participants is inconsistent with 
the liberal acceptance account of the JTC bias. This account states that earlier 
decisions are based on a lower decision-threshold for delusional or delusion-
prone participants, while they hold the same subjective probabilities for the 
hypotheses as controls (e.g., Moritz et al., 2007). Furthermore, the findings from 
Chapter 2 only partially fit with this account: although we did find earlier 
decisions for high-delusion-prone participants, which this account predicts, 
these decisions were not made at lower decision thresholds, as we found similar 
confidence levels for high-delusion-prone and low-delusion-prone participants.  
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As described in Chapter 2, the results of our data-gathering JTC study could fit 
the information-integration account (Menon et al., 2006), where evidence is 
assigned extra weight due to dysregulated dopamine mechanisms (Kapur, 
2003). As a result, decisions would be made early and hypotheses would be held 
with more confidence. The data-gathering results of the study reported in 
Chapter 2 were consistent with this account, but the results regarding 
confidence levels were somewhat ambiguous. As discussed earlier, we analysed 
confidence levels at deciding and found no difference between low-delusion-
prone and high-delusion-prone groups, but perhaps both groups make their 
decision at the same confidence level and high-delusion-prone groups arrive at 
this level faster. Due to power constraints, this could not be analysed. Also 
ambiguous were the probability-estimates results from the study reported in 
Chapter 3. In contrast to the information-integration account’s predictions, we 
found probability estimates provided by high-delusion-prone participants to be 
either similar to or lower than those provided by low-delusion-prone 
participants. One reason why the predicted direction (i.e., higher probability 
estimates from high-delusion-prone participants) was not found could be that 
we presented only one fish, and as such, subsequent information did not need to 
be integrated with beliefs based on previously-acquired information. 
Alternatively, as the JTC bias is less robust in probability-estimates versions of 
the reasoning paradigm (Fine et al., 2007; Garety & Freeman, 1999), a significant 
difference might only be found when comparing clinical and non-clinical 
groups, as the probability reasoning of our high-delusion-prone participants 
may not be affected to the extent that it is consistently different from that of low-
delusion-prone participants. 
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An alternative account might explain our findings better. Dudley and Over 
(2003) argue that the JTC bias might result from delusional or delusion-prone 
participants having a confirmation bias combined with an overactive threat-
detection system which extends to neutral material. With such a combination, 
instances that confirm a (perceived-to-be-threatening) hypothesis are sought 
out. For example, if someone is laughing in the vicinity of a delusional person, 
he might hypothesise the laughter is an indication of a plot against him. To 
maximise survival, it might be wise to focus on instances that confirm the 
hypothesis of a developing plot, and to take appropriate actions, rather than to 
search for instances which disconfirm this (e.g., evidence that someone was 
merely laughing at a joke). Doing the latter would result in an inefficient use of 
time in case people are plotting against him. Green, Freeman, and Kuipers 
(2011) provide support for this type of confirmatory biased reasoning in a non-
clinical sample as they found that individuals higher in paranoid ideation 
tended to give more paranoid explanations of laughter they overheard between 
the experimenter and a confederate. Balzan, Delfabbro, Galletly, and Woodward 
(2013) also found that schizophrenia participants, and delusion-prone 
participants to a lesser degree, have a preference for a positive-test strategy (i.e., 
a test that will provide evidence that matches the hypothesis), even if the 
positive test is non-diagnostic (i.e., that the evidence also matches other 
hypotheses) and diagnostic negative tests (i.e., tests that disprove the 
hypothesis) are available. In the (adapted) beads task, such a confirmation bias 
might lead delusional or delusion-prone participants to accept hypotheses early 
“to be on the safe side”, without necessarily believing that the hypothesis is 
more probable than controls believe it to be. 
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It might be difficult to see how confirmation of threat would apply in a neutral 
beads (or fish) task. However, as Dudley and Over (2003) state, threat might be 
detected even in neutral material due to an overactive threat-detection system, 
which, in turn, might result from high levels of arousal and anxiety (Salvatore et 
al., 2012). Evidence for an association between psychotic symptoms and 
attentional biases to threat has been mixed (Tone & Davis, 2012), where some 
(e.g., Colbert, Peters, & Garety, 2010) find a bias away from threat, and others 
finds a bias towards threat detection (e.g., Dudley et al., 2014).  
Perhaps rather than constituting a threat in itself, a fish of a different colour than 
that seen so far might induce anxiety concerning the difficulty of integrating 
disconfirming evidence into a belief (and, as a result, arriving at the wrong 
conclusion and missing out on a reward). Potentially due to poorer working-
memory functioning, delusional or delusion-prone participants might have 
difficulty accounting for disconfirming evidence, and either discard it, leading 
to a bias against disconfirmatory evidence (e.g., Speechley et al., 2012; 
Woodward, Buchy, Moritz, & Liotti, 2007), or overvalue it, leading to over-
adjustment in probability estimates (e.g., Garety et al., 1991; Speechley et al., 
2010), provided the latter is not due to miscomprehension (Balzan, Delfabbro, 
Galletly, et al., 2012). To avoid the mental complexity of potentially having to 
integrate disconfirming evidence, delusion-prone individuals might simply stop 
considering evidence after a few pieces, as the probability of encountering a 
sequence of solely confirming evidence drops dramatically as more evidence is 
gathered. This would then result in a low number of draws to decision.  
The use of a confirmatory reasoning style in neutral tasks, such as the beads 
task, might also stem from hyper-salience of evidence-hypothesis matches 
(Balzan et al., 2013; Speechley et al., 2010). Besides displaying a strategic search 
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for evidence that would confirm the hypothesis, such evidence itself would be 
more salient and be considered in more detail than evidence that would not 
match the hypothesis. Speechley et al. (2010) found that schizophrenic 
participants increased their probability estimates for the lake that matched the 
evidence more than the clinical and non-clinical control groups. Their 
probability estimates for the lake that did not match the evidence were the same 
as those provided by the other groups. Balzan et al. (2013) found that 
schizophrenic and delusion-prone participants valued and recalled 
confirmatory evidence better than disconfirmatory evidence. Furthermore, the 
salience of the initial confirmatory evidence led to reduced adjustment of beliefs 
in the face of disconfirmatory evidence in these groups compared to the non-
delusion-prone group (Balzan et al., 2013). These findings suggest that hyper-
salience of evidence-hypothesis matches might underlie the confirmation bias. 
Hyper-salience of evidence is at the heart of the information-integration account 
of the JTC bias. As such, the results in this thesis might support a combination of 
both the confirmation-bias account and the information-integration account of 
the JTC bias.  
Overall, the notion of a confirmatory reasoning style, perhaps combined with 
hyper-salience of hypothesis-evidence matches affecting information 
integration, could explain the results of the JTC studies in this thesis. This 
reasoning style might be the result of an imbalance in the weighting of the costs 
of errors, with a preference given to detection of a threat that is not there, rather 
than missing a threat that is there (Dudley & Over, 2003). Such differential 
weighting of errors is at the heart of error-management theory, which has been 
applied to the sexual over-perception bias, studied in Chapter 4. 
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7.1.2 Sexual Over-Perception 
The study reported in Chapter 4 focused on men’s alleged over-perception of 
women’s sexual interest. There are theoretical and methodological limitations to 
the claim that men over-perceive women’s sexual interest. The theoretical 
limitation stems from the fact that sexual over-perception might be a biased 
(and potentially adaptive) behaviour, without necessarily requiring biased 
beliefs. As such, the theoretical underpinning of the sexual over-perception bias 
as a cognitive bias is questionable. The methodological limitation pertains to 
previous literature’s focus on point-estimate paradigms, which do not exclude 
the possibility of differential socialisation explaining gender differences. In our 
study, we investigated sexual over-perception as a cognitive bias, and as a novel 
element, we presented repeated information to avoid potential differences 
between men and women being due to different prior estimations resulting 
from different socialisation.  
We used a belief-updating paradigm with the beads task as a neutral condition 
and two adapted bias conditions assessing whether men would overestimate 
women’s sexual interest. Both when estimating how likely women are to be 
sexually interested in men in general and in a given man, male and female 
participants provided similar estimates. We found no evidence of a sexual over-
perception bias in our belief-updating paradigm as both men and women 
integrated information similarly into their beliefs. Compared to the rational 
Bayesian belief-updating norm, both men and women were conservative in their 
belief-updating, as Phillips and Edwards (1966) have found in the neutral beads 
task. 
One addition to the existing literature (e.g., Abbey, 1982; Haselton & Buss, 2000) 
is that our stimuli were non-ambiguous (i.e., each piece of information was 
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unambiguously indicative either of sexual interest or disinterest), while 
previous studies have generally used stimuli which are ambiguous with respect 
to whether they signal sexual interest or not. Our lack of support for this bias 
may be due to our use of non-ambiguous stimuli. Buss (2013) and Lindgren et 
al. (2008) have suggested that the sexual over-perception bias is only found 
when women display ambiguous behaviours that occur in friendly as well as 
sexual interactions (e.g., making eye contact), and not when the behaviours are 
unambiguous (e.g., touching a person’s genitals). This then raises the question 
why a woman would display ambiguous behaviours. One reason might be that 
she is not yet sure if she is sexually interested, so sends mixed, ambiguous 
signals, to maintain the possibility to act on potential future sexual interest. 
Another reason is that she might play “hard to get” (Jonason & Li, 2013), and as 
such wants to downplay her interest, perhaps to avoid a reputation of being 
promiscuous. If this playing “hard to get” would be the underlying reason for 
sending ambiguous signals, it is not unlikely that women would underreport 
their own sexual interest (Haselton & Buss, 2000). Men may have learned to 
read “between the lines” of such games over time, and interpret the supposed 
low sexual interest from ambiguous signals as a concealed genuine sexual 
interest. These hypothesised processes might underlie the difference between 
men’s perception of women’s true intentions and women’s biased self-reported 
intentions. This might lead to a new interpretation of the sexual “over-
perception” bias: the difference might not be due to men over-perceiving sexual 
interest, but rather due to women underreporting such interest.  
This thesis moved from biased beliefs in men about their future sexual prospects 
to a more general biased belief about future prospects. In the optimism bias, 
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investigated in Chapter 5, future prospects are thought to be better than an 
objective standard indicates.  
7.1.3 Self-Deceptive Optimism 
The study reported in Chapter 5 investigated possible self-deception underlying 
the optimism bias. This was accomplished by combining the optimistic belief-
updating paradigm (e.g., Sharot et al., 2011) and the crowd-within paradigm 
(Herzog & Hertwig, 2009; Vul & Pashler, 2008). Participants provided multiple 
estimated answers to neutral and undesirable questions, with the latter 
pertaining to participants’ chances of experiencing negative events. The crowd-
within effect, where the averaged estimate has a lower absolute error than either 
of the two estimates alone, was found for both neutral and undesirable 
questions. Signed errors, however, indicated that second estimates for 
undesirable questions were systematically lower than first estimates for these 
questions; whereas first and second estimates for neutral questions were equal. 
These results imply that when providing estimates of their probability of 
experiencing undesirable future outcomes, participants sampled selectively from 
an internal distribution, producing estimates that were optimistic initially and 
even more so on a second sampling. Optimism was also found in the absolute 
sense, where the estimates for undesirable questions underestimated the true 
value, while the answers to neutral questions were accurate.  
These results indicate that people mislead themselves by selecting specific 
estimates of their future prospects, just as they might seek to mislead another 
person by cherry picking relevant data (e.g., in a job interview, they might 
showcase select examples of their previous employment performance rather 
than choosing examples at random). Hence, just as people potentially “protest 
too much” by exaggerating their prospects or beliefs when they are made to 
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doubt them (Gal & Rucker, 2010; McKay et al., 2011), people might bolster their 
own beliefs about their prospects through a similar defensive strategy applied 
intrapersonally.  
This might also apply to other putative cases of self-deception, such as the oft-
cited better-than-average effect (Alicke, 1985). Perhaps people selectively think 
of certain examples (e.g., those tests on which they received a particularly good 
result) to arrive at the conclusion that they are more intelligent than average. 
This conclusion might then be wrong compared to the true value (e.g., their true 
IQ score might actually be average). However, with a single estimate, it is not 
possible to determine if someone samples selectively from a desirable end of an 
internal distribution, or whether they sample randomly from a distribution with 
a biased mean. Selective sampling, found for unrealistic optimism in this thesis, 
would support the “real” self-deception account (Gur & Sackeim, 1979; Mijovic-
Prelec & Prelec, 2010), as one actively avoids a particular, less rosy, conclusion 
that they also hold besides their more rosy representation of reality. But besides 
selective sampling, the mean of the distribution could be biased, perhaps due to 
biased information processing (Mele, 1997). These two possibilities could even 
act in tandem (i.e., sampling selectively from a biased distribution). In order to 
investigate whether people sample selectively, repeated sampling is necessary; 
single estimates cannot distinguish between the different possibilities. 
Overall, people become even more optimistic in response to tests of their 
optimistic beliefs. An unwillingness to have one’s optimistic beliefs about future 
outcomes tested could extend to an unwillingness to have other optimistic 
beliefs tested. In Chapter 6, I explored whether people with more optimistic 
beliefs about others’ trustworthiness were more betrayal averse, and as such less 
willing to have their beliefs tested in a trust game.  
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7.1.4 Betrayal Aversion 
The study reported in Chapter 6 explored betrayal aversion in the trust game. 
Participants indicated their minimal acceptable probability of a computerised 
lottery selecting the better of two outcomes, at which level they would prefer to 
play that lottery than have another person select the outcome. This study 
avoided the choice between opting in or out, so as to avoid confounds of 
signalling distrust or efficiency maximisation. Furthermore, strongly 
incentivised beliefs about others’ trustworthiness were elicited to determine the 
point at which participants should be indifferent between having the computer 
or another player select the outcome, in the absence of betrayal aversion. 
Importantly, these beliefs were then used to test a novel theory that a person’s 
trustworthiness-belief could predict their level of betrayal aversion. Deviations 
from belief-equivalent points indicated that betrayal aversion was present and 
its strength related to trustworthiness-beliefs. People who believed that only a 
few others would be trustworthy (i.e., pessimistic trustworthiness-beliefs) set 
the minimal probability of the good outcome in the lottery at a higher level than 
their beliefs would suggest. Conversely, people who believed many others were 
trustworthy (i.e., optimistic trustworthiness-beliefs) set the minimal probability 
of the good outcome in the lottery at a lower level than their beliefs would 
suggest.  
The explanation advanced in this thesis concerns the emotional costs of betrayal. 
People with pessimistic beliefs about others’ trustworthiness have nothing to 
lose by having another player determine their payoffs: either they will have 
their pessimistic beliefs confirmed or be pleasantly surprised by others’ 
trustworthiness. As such, they may as well play the trust game or request a high 
probability to win the good outcome in a computerised lottery. People with 
Chapter 7 
230 
 
optimistic trustworthiness-beliefs, however, can either have their beliefs 
confirmed or be unpleasantly surprised by others’ lack of trustworthiness, and 
might thus prefer not to have their beliefs tested. Instead they prefer to play a 
computerised lottery, even when it has a lower probability of the good outcome 
than the probability they would expect in the trust game.  
Assuming our findings are not due to alternative explanations (outlined in 
Chapter 6 and to be confirmed through future research), the association between 
beliefs about others’ trustworthiness and betrayal aversion may explain the 
mixed evidence for betrayal aversion in previous work. Previous work which 
did not find betrayal aversion may have had many participants with relatively 
pessimistic trustworthiness-beliefs; indeed, Fetchenhauer and Dunning (2012) 
effectively created low trustworthiness-beliefs by informing participants that the 
chance of a good outcome was only 46%. Participants with pessimistic 
trustworthiness-beliefs may have felt that the trust game offered an opportunity 
to be pleasantly surprised by others’ kind actions, and so may have opted into 
the trust game at rates equal to or even higher than those of opting into a lottery.  
7.2 Strengths and Potential Limitations of the Overall 
Research 
The strength of the studies presented in this thesis arises from our unusual 
methodological rigour. First, we based our sample sizes (all ns>103) on those 
found in the literature and aimed for sufficient power to avoid Type II errors 
due to small sample sizes. Second, although not completely representative of the 
general population, the gender balance across our studies (59% female, 41% 
male) was more representative than that in most psychology studies. For 
example, across the samples of studies published in the Journal of Personality and 
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Social Psychology in 2002, 71% of the participants were female (Gosling, Vazire, 
Srivastasa, & John, 2004). Finally, in our designs, we aimed to minimise 
confounds which may have been underlying the psychological phenomena 
studied in this thesis in previous research (e.g., miscomprehension in the beads 
task, equality concerns in the trust game). In addition, when a confound could 
not be minimised within the study design, we collected self-report measures to 
account for potential influences in the analyses (e.g., risk-aversion).  
The adoption of experimental economics methods also forms a strength of this 
thesis. First, I included detailed written instructions and required participants to 
answer comprehension questions correctly before starting the experimental task. 
This reduced the chance of miscomprehension and thus reduced noise, which, 
in turn, increased power (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001). Similarly, by incentivising 
the paradigms, I motivated participants to stay attentive which generally 
improves performance (e.g., Nicholls et al., 2014). Such improved performance, 
again, may have reduced noise and increased power. Furthermore, I avoided 
the use of deception, even when this meant I had to implement complex, 
convoluted solutions (e.g., estimating others’ estimates for undesirable 
questions to provide an objectively correct answer for such questions). A major 
concern for many experimental economists is that participants who have 
experienced deception in one study experience spill-over effects of such deceit 
into other studies (Barrera & Simpson, 2012). As such, participants would not 
trust claims made in other experiments. Although circumventing deception may 
have complicated the studies presented in this thesis, I avoided adding distrust 
to the subject pool. 
However, there are a few potential limitations to the research presented here. 
Limitations specific to each study have been discussed in Chapters 2 to 6. 
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Therefore, the focus here is on limitations that apply to the collection of studies 
reported in this thesis. 
7.2.1 Sample Considerations 
All studies used samples from a healthy student population, which leads to a 
few considerations regarding the extent to which the findings can be generalised 
to other populations.  
For the JTC bias, our results were found in non-clinical populations. This means 
that our conclusions concerning clinical populations are tentative. However, 
many researchers consider delusional ideation to form a continuum with 
normal experiences (e.g., Peters et al., 1999; van Os et al., 2009), where psychosis 
would be at the extreme end of the spectrum (e.g., Freeman et al., 2008; Green et 
al., 2011). People with non-clinical symptoms tend to be at a higher risk of 
developing clinical, psychotic disorders than those without such symptoms 
(e.g., Heriot-Maitland et al., 2012; Kelleher et al., 2012; Van Os, Hanssen, Bijl, & 
Ravelli, 2000). Furthermore, we measured delusion-proneness with the Peters et 
al. Delusions Inventory (PDI), which has good validity, as, for example, 
delusional patients score higher than healthy participants (Peters et al., 2004). In 
addition, Lincoln, Ziegler, Lüllmann, Müller, and Rief (2010) found that 
patients’ self-reported delusional ideation on the PDI corresponded with 
observer-rated symptom severity. As such, we believe the insights from our 
study using a non-clinical population are relevant to clinical populations. 
Research on non-clinical populations might even offer advantages, as confounds 
arising from medication or hospitalisation are avoided. Nevertheless, 
replications of our findings using clinical populations in future research would 
strengthen our conclusions. 
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Another consideration is that all participants were students or staff members at 
RHUL, a university in the United Kingdom. They thus formed a sample of a 
western, educated, industrialised, rich and democratic (WEIRD) society 
(Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010), potentially limiting the generalisability 
of the findings to other societies. Yet, with regards to the western, industrialised, 
and democratic characteristics, several of the phenomena investigated in this 
thesis have previously been investigated in other cultures. For example, Chang, 
Asakawa, and Sanna (2001) found that European Americans and Japanese 
participants both showed optimistic biases for negative future events, which 
formed the stimuli in our self-deceptive optimism study. As another example, 
Bohnet et al. (2008) found evidence for betrayal aversion across diverse 
countries (e.g., Oman, Switzerland, and the United States). Therefore, it is 
unlikely that our findings are due to the specific cultural background of our 
participants. Nevertheless, as with all findings, replication of the current 
findings in diverse populations is important to ascertain their robustness and 
generalisability. 
With regards to the characteristic of being educated, one might assume that our 
participants, being at university, were more intelligent than the average 
population. This might affect the extent to which they deviate from rationality 
as defined by formal logic rules. Indeed, in the study reported in Chapter 2, we 
did find intelligence to significantly predict variation in deviations from the 
optimal amount of data to gather. Nevertheless, the variable of interest (i.e., 
delusion-proneness) predicted additional, unique variation in these deviations. 
Therefore, intelligence was not the only predictor of rationality. Furthermore, 
Stanovich and West (2008) found that cognitive ability (i.e., intelligence) and 
rationality are only related when the task clearly outlines the presence of a 
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conflict between a normative and a biased response, in which case more 
intelligent participants show less biased responding. However, when the more 
intelligent participants are not aware of the need of a normative response, they 
are as biased as less intelligent participants. As the studies in this thesis did not 
present a clear conflict between different types of responses (in the way the 
Linda problem presents a conflict between a probabilistically-correct and an 
intuitive, conversational-exchange-correct response), intelligence may not have 
influenced our findings to a large extent. Ideally, future studies on rationality 
would include measures of intelligence, but this may not always be possible due 
to financial or time constraints (as discussed later under 7.2.2 on page 236).  
Finally, with regards to the wealth characteristic, the incentives may have 
influenced our samples less than they would have influenced participants from 
less affluent backgrounds. The magnitude of our rewards (i.e., ranging from a 
few pence to a few pounds) may not have motivated our participants enough to 
report accurate answers. However, for the optimism bias, for example, Simmons 
and Massey (2012) found equal levels of optimism if accuracy was rewarded 
with $5 as when it was rewarded with $50. In addition, Woodward et al. (2009) 
did not find a difference for the JTC bias between a condition with rewards of 
$0.25 and a condition with rewards of $5. Finally, in a meta-analysis, N. D. 
Johnson and Mislin (2011) did not find an effect of the amount at stake on either 
trusting or trustworthy behaviours. They did find that students are less 
trustworthy (i.e., as the trustee, they return less or choose the unfair outcome 
more frequently) than non-student populations. Students and non-students 
were not different in their trusting behaviour, which constitutes the behaviour 
we considered. Overall, this suggests that the magnitude of the reward might 
not influence deviations from rationality. Future research would benefit from 
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including a measure of socioeconomic status (SES), so as to account for 
differences in utility obtained from the experimental rewards, as the small 
rewards might lead to less utility for participants with a higher SES than for 
participants with a lower SES. Participants could be asked to report their 
parents’ education level and occupation, from which SES can be estimated 
(Hollingshead, 1975). It must be noted that several of our manipulations were 
within-subject. Therefore, influences of the sample population (e.g., sensitivity 
to reward magnitude), for example, should not have been responsible for 
differences between conditions.  
7.2.2 Financial Constraints Imposed by Use of Incentives 
In order to encourage arriving at the rational response, defined as the response 
with the highest expected value, incentives were included for all studies. The 
importance of this practice was highlighted by the findings in Chapter 3: in the 
presence of incentives, low-delusion-prone participants provided estimates that 
were not significantly different from Bayesian probabilities, while these 
probabilities were underestimated without incentives. However, incorporation 
of incentives necessarily posed certain financial constraints on the amount of 
data that could be collected (Baron, 2001). As described in Chapter 1 (on page 
76), sample size was prioritised to ensure that individual differences (e.g., 
delusion-proneness, trustworthiness-beliefs) would be varied enough to 
investigate their association with other measures. Given the financial 
constraints, this meant that study duration needed to be kept to a necessary 
minimum, as studies conducted in the EconLab at RHUL must pay participants 
£8 to £10 per hour, on average. As a consequence, certain pertinent measures 
may have been excluded. 
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In Chapter 3, for example, intelligence was not measured. Including an 
intelligence measure would have increased the cost of the experiment by at least 
£300 (at least 100 participants to be paid £3 more for the additional 20 minutes 
they would need). Given the mixed evidence for the role of intelligence on the 
JTC bias (Ziegler et al., 2008), this was deemed too expensive for its potential 
worth. As a result, we cannot establish to what extent intelligence may have 
affected our findings in this study. However, intelligence was measured in 
Chapter 2, where delusion-proneness could explain unique variance not 
accounted for by intelligence, and so we feel confident that results in Chapter 3 
are not (fully) attributable to differences in intelligence. Ideally, however, future 
studies using probability-estimate variants of the beads task would include a 
measure of intelligence, to further elucidate its role in the JTC bias. 
In Chapter 4, feedback from a pilot study indicated that the within-subject 
manipulation of a neutral versus a bias condition was quite evident. However, 
given the sample sizes required to detect gender differences for sexual over-
perception (at least n=45 for each gender; Farris et al., 2008b), use of a between-
subjects manipulation would have required at least 90 additional participants. 
This was expected to have cost at least an additional £360. For this reason, the 
manipulation was kept within-subject but counterbalanced across sessions. To 
account for potential effects due to the salience of the manipulation, an analysis 
of only the first condition participants encountered was conducted. This 
analysis also did not provide support for men’s sexual over-perception bias. 
Hence, we feel that the within-subject nature of the design cannot explain the 
lack of a difference between the two conditions. Nevertheless, future research 
might benefit from comparing neutral and bias conditions using a between-
subjects design. 
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In Chapter 5, it was noted that including items that negated the chance of a 
negative event could shed further light on the self-deceptive sampling we 
hypothesised. Including additional items, which were to be repeated in four 
rounds, would have made the experiment longer and thus more expensive by 
approximately £250 (at least 100 participants to be paid £2.50 for the estimated 
additional 15 minutes they would need). Anecdotally, several participants 
indicated that the experiment was already quite repetitive. Hence, making the 
experiment longer by including more items could have led to a drop in 
attention. Yet, without such items, we cannot establish whether second 
estimates for desirable (or more accurately: not-undesirable) items would be 
higher than first estimates. Future research could incentivise the items at a 
higher rate and decrease the show-up fee to compensate, in order to maintain 
attention throughout the experiment. This may also reduce the additional costs 
of including extra items, as participants only need to be paid for estimates close 
to the correct answer; an increased show-up fee would be paid independently 
from performance and thus increase study costs more than increasing the 
rewards for accuracy.  
7.2.3 Defining a Normative Standard 
The incentives were used to create optimal decisions from the homo economicus 
perspective, where people are considered rational and self-interested to the 
extent that they aim to maximise their expected monetary value (Glimcher et al., 
2008). This view has been challenged, the charge being that putatively 
“irrational” behaviour may simply stem from responses being compared against 
the wrong norm (Gigerenzer, 1996; Stanovich & West, 2000). Measured against 
alternative norms (i.e., norms that participants may have assumed they were 
expected to invoke and employ), responses might not be biased (De Neys & 
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Bonnefon, 2013). Consider the Linda problem, outlined in Chapter 1 (on page 
21): if people realise the normative standard is to use probability theory, they 
might correctly decide that it is more likely that Linda is a bank teller than that 
she is a bank teller and a feminist. However, some might apply the norm of 
conversational exchange (i.e., that conversation does not generally include 
irrelevant details) and assume the descriptive details are important for their 
answer (Stanovich & West, 2000). Measured against the appropriate norm (i.e., 
that which people applied, such as the norm of conversational exchange), 
people’s judgement that Linda is more likely to be a bank teller and a feminist 
than just a bank teller might not constitute biased or incorrect responses (De 
Neys & Bonnefon, 2013). 
If people consider a different or an additional norm than the one the 
experimenters used as their standard, participants might experience conflict 
between different norms when providing their judgment. Although people’s 
verbal descriptions of their thought processes while making a decision on tasks 
like the Linda problem generally do not indicate that they are considering 
different norms or experiencing conflict between different norms, implicit 
measures do tend to suggest a detection of conflict (De Neys, Cromheeke, & 
Osman, 2011). De Neys et al. (2011) showed that people were less confident in 
their decisions when there was conflict between norms, as in the standard Linda 
problem, compared to when there was no conflict between norms. The conflict 
was removed by including the likely, rather than the unlikely, characteristic in 
both answer options: a) “Linda is a feminist”, or b) “Linda is feminist and a 
bank teller” (cf. the standard answers: a) “Linda is a bank teller”, or b) “Linda is 
a bank teller and a feminist”). For the no-conflict condition, the intuitive, 
stereotypical response is the same as the normative response according to the 
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conjunction rule. As participants were more confident about their responses to 
no-conflict questions than to conflict questions, this suggests they detected 
conflict between different norms in the latter case (De Neys et al., 2011). 
Given De Neys et al.’s (2011) findings, it would have been interesting to 
measure confidence about the estimates provided in Chapter 5. If confidence 
levels for estimated answers to undesirable questions were lower than those for 
neutral questions, this might point to people’s awareness of conflict between 
their desirable “self-deceptive” and more objective estimates for such 
undesirable questions. In addition, such data could provide further support for 
Lench et al.’s (2014) finding that the probability of desirable information is 
perceived to have a higher variance than the probability of non-desirable 
information. However, including a measure of confidence would have made the 
study longer and thus more expensive, which was a strong determinant for 
excluding this measure given financial constraints (see 7.2.2 on page 237).  
In this thesis, optimal decisions were determined with the utmost care, and 
generally from the homo economicus perspective. Deciding what other norm 
would be correct is a difficult and contentious issue (De Neys & Bonnefon, 
2013). In this thesis, responses were generally not significantly different from the 
norm we selected, at least in neutral conditions, for low-delusion-prone 
participants, or for tasks that minimised methodological confounds. This 
suggests that our chosen norm was often also the norm selected by participants. 
However, individual differences in the selection of a norm exist. For example, in 
Chapter 6 we found that maximising expected value is not the ultimate goal for 
everyone, as some people were willing to face a larger risk of obtaining only a 
small reward if that meant they could avoid the emotional costs of betrayal. This 
suggests that normative answers should focus on expected utility, taking into 
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account relevant preferences and prior beliefs and attitudes, rather than just 
expected value. Although the optimal decisions in Chapter 2 were based on 
expected value from a risk-neutral perspective, risk-aversion was measured, so 
that it would be possible to investigate whether deviations from the optimal 
decision could be explained by risk attitudes. This did not seem to be the case, 
however. First, risk-aversion was not associated with draws-to-decision. Second, 
our sample was generally slightly risk-averse, which would suggest they would 
want more certainty of obtaining the reward, and thus decide later than the 
calculated optimal points; yet decisions were made before these optimal points. 
As such, our results of deviations from rationality cannot be ascribed to having 
assumed a risk-neutral attitude in determining the norm.  
7.3 General Implications for Rationality Research 
As discussed in Chapter 1, psychologists have long debated about human 
irrationality, with one side arguing that the human mind is simply not rational 
(Kahneman, 2003; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983, 1986), while the other side 
suggests that the environment of the tasks used to measure rationality might 
contribute to putative “irrationality” (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Gigerenzer 
& Sturm, 2012). The results in this thesis lend support to aspects of both 
arguments, though they seem to be slightly in favour of the bounded rationality 
view. By adapting the task environments, some deviations from rationality were 
still found (e.g., optimism bias), suggesting the human mind is limited in its 
rationality, while other deviations were not replicated (e.g., sexual over-
perception), suggesting that previous biases may have been influenced by the 
task environment. Furthermore, deviations from rationality have been rather 
small and some of them seem to be associated with signs of psychopathology. 
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As such, it appears that the healthy human mind may be more rational than has 
been assumed.  
One possibility is that behaviours are more biased than beliefs. As such, 
previous research, which has used predominantly decision-making tasks, may 
have rightly found biases, but specifically biased behaviour. The results from the 
predominantly judgment-related tasks in this thesis suggest that biased beliefs 
are less common.  
The human mind may not reflect the ideal of homo economicus, as natural 
selection has shaped it for its adaptive abilities in ancestral environments, rather 
than for theoretically rational abilities or perfect representations of reality. The 
biological limitations of the human mind may lead to imperfect, noisy (i.e., 
distorted) cognitive processes, which could lead to systematic biases. Hilbert 
(2012) has suggested that noise in memory processes underlies at least eight 
common cognitive biases, including conservatism. Conservatism, where people 
underestimate high probabilities, but overestimate low probabilities, has been 
found in probability reasoning tasks (Phillips & Edwards, 1966) and this finding 
was replicated in Chapters 3 and 4. In binary decisions, the conservatism bias 
consists of insufficient use of conditional Bayesian likelihoods (Hilbert, 2012), 
where posterior probabilities are not updated from the prior probability 
sufficiently (Phillips & Edwards, 1966). Individually different assessments of 
likelihoods (i.e., noise), such as when a man might think that a woman looking 
away is quite likely even if she is interested in him, could ultimately lead to 
different beliefs and decisions, including ones that are conservative compared to 
the normative standard. In support of the notion that noise could underlie 
deviations from rationality, Moutoussis et al. (2011) found that computational 
models of beads-task performance could distinguish between data from patients 
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and data from controls through a noise parameter. Note that noise could make 
evidence more or less ambiguous than intended in the experimental set-up. As 
mentioned before, ambiguity regarding the subjective likelihood of observing a 
smile from a non-sexually-interested woman (i.e., P(behaviour|not-interested)) 
or of observing a sexually-interested woman breaking eye contact (i.e., 
P(behaviour|interested)), could contribute to differences between men and 
women in research on the sexual over-perception bias. As such, noise in 
reasoning processes might increase the ambiguity of stimuli, which, in turn, 
could increase noise in empirically measured cognitions and behaviours.  
We undertook stringent procedures to minimise noise in the task environments 
in the studies reported in this thesis and biases were still found in the majority 
of the studies. For example, likelihood information was explicitly stated in the 
relevant studies in this thesis. Furthermore, memory load was minimised by 
displaying previous draws of the sequence in Chapter 2, or by displaying 
participants’ previously entered answers in Chapter 4. As biases were still found 
despite these adjustments to the tasks, it would seem unjustified to ascribe all 
irrationality to noise in cognitive processes.  
Finally, people may have different goals within reasoning tasks, leading to 
different responses. This was alluded to above with the suggested confirmatory 
reasoning style of delusion-prone individuals (Dudley & Over, 2003). These 
individuals might not have the goal of arriving at the theoretically correct, and 
maximally paying, decision; instead, they might prefer to find supportive, 
confirming evidence for the hypothesis they expect to be correct. With such 
goals in mind, by considering a minimal amount of (supporting) evidence, 
people are showing “personal rationality”, which is “reasoning or acting in such 
a way as to achieve one’s goals”, even if they are not showing “impersonal 
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rationality”, which is “reasoning or acting in conformity with a relevant 
normative system such as formal logic or probability theory” (Evans & Over, 
1996, p. 357). Hence, normatively irrational responses might not solely be due to 
participants applying a different normative standard to the experimenter, as 
suggested earlier when lower confidence levels indicate a detection of conflict 
between which norms to apply (De Neys et al., 2011). Participants might also 
have (personal) goals different from applying any normative standard, such as 
wanting to confirm their hypothesis. Mixed methods, which use qualitative 
methods in addition to the quantitative methods used in this thesis, could shed 
light on the goals people have within various reasoning tasks. Balzan, 
Delfabbro, and Galletly (2012) used such mixed methods to assess the 
underlying reasons for irrational over-adjustment of probability estimates in 
light of a single piece of disconfirming evidence. From the verbal reports 
provided by participants while they chose their responses it appeared that the 
extreme over-adjustment (i.e., choosing the non-favoured jar) was mostly due to 
participants thinking that jars were swapped throughout the sequence. Without 
these verbal reports of the reasons behind decisions made (i.e., qualitative 
measures), the extreme over-adjustment would only suggest that participants 
misunderstood the task, but not why or how they interpreted it differently.  
Hence, rationality research might benefit from shifting the focus from 
quantitative methods to mixed methods, including qualitative methods that 
focus on asking participants to verbally reflect on their reasoning processes. 
However, such verbal descriptions might not reflect sub-conscious goals, so the 
inclusion of implicit measures of conflict detection, such as confidence levels, 
could be beneficial as well (De Neys et al., 2011). 
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In fact, people might very well be unaware of their goals. Although we did not 
collect such information, we could speculate that people’s background might 
have influenced how they behaved in the studies in this thesis. A theory 
regarding differential susceptibility to the environment suggests that some 
people are neurobiologically more susceptible to both negative and positive 
environmental conditions (Ellis, Boyce, Belsky, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & Van 
IJzendoorn, 2011). Such susceptible individuals show larger responses to 
stressors in unfavourable environmental conditions with low support levels and 
a lack of resources, such as showing more physical illnesses (Boyce et al., 1995). 
Yet, they also flourish in favourable and supportive environments, for example 
by showing fewer illnesses than less susceptible children in favourable 
environments (Boyce et al., 1995). The susceptibility to environmental conditions 
is thought to have been maintained throughout evolution because it could lead 
to behaviours that support evolutionary fitness, in the environment in which the 
individual is raised as well as potential other environmental conditions which 
could be encountered over the course of a lifetime (Ellis et al., 2011).  
Different reproductive strategies are one particular example of the effects of 
such susceptibility to the environment on behaviour as well as on biology. In 
line with life history theory, Belsky, Steinberg, and Draper (1991) suggest that 
children growing up in an environment with scarce resources and with an 
insecure attachment arising from insensitive, inconsistent, or rejecting parenting 
adopt a reproductive strategy that would be most beneficial in this 
environment. This reproductive strategy would entail earlier maturation (e.g., 
earlier menarche) and earlier sexual activity, as well as forming short-term, 
unstable bonds and showing limited parental investment. In contrast, children 
growing up in an environment with sufficient resources and with a secure 
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attachment stemming from sensitive, supportive, and responsive parenting, 
might develop a reproductive strategy with delayed maturation and later 
engagement in sexual activity. Furthermore, they are more likely to form bonds 
that are long-term and enduring, with greater parental investment. This 
reproductive strategy would be most beneficial in terms of evolutionary fitness 
in this favourable environment (Belsky et al., 1991).  
This theory could be applied to the sexual over-perception bias. Perhaps this 
bias is mainly shown by people who have been reared in unfavourable 
environments, as it might contribute to an aim to pair with as many potential 
mates as possible and limit parental investment. It is possible that the 
participants in our sexual over-perception study were more likely to have been 
reared in a favourable environment, being WEIRD participants (see page 233). 
This, then, could explain why the sexual over-perception bias was not found.  
Potentially, this life-history-theory perspective could be extended to the other 
biases in this thesis. If people who grew up in an unfavourable environment 
would be more likely to form short-term bonds, perhaps they also consider 
others malevolent, which could contribute to the paranoid characteristics of 
delusions and to hasty decisions based on little evidence. Furthermore, they 
might be more likely to distrust others and suspect others to betray them, an 
expectation which, in line with our theory, would lead to ambivalence or a 
slight preference for a trust game when deciding whether to let a computerised 
lottery or another person decide on an outcome, as there is little room for 
unexpected betrayal and thus no reason to avoid finding out this information 
(as per betrayal aversion). Finally, perhaps developing an optimism bias would 
be harmful in an unfavourable environment, as one would be constantly 
disappointed (e.g., if one is more susceptible to the unfavourable environment, 
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they might experience more illnesses than average; Ellis et al., 2011). This, in 
turn, might harm self-esteem, which might already be low after being reared in 
an unfavourable environment without having developed a secure attachment.  
Considering these possibilities, the opposite outcomes would be expected for 
people who have grown up in favourable environments, and perhaps for people 
with lower susceptibility levels to environmental conditions as well. Our 
WEIRD participants might be more likely to have fallen into these categories of 
low susceptibility or high susceptibility to a favourable environment, rather 
than high susceptibility to an unfavourable environment. This, then, would lead 
the majority of our participants to have an absence of the JTC bias, an absence of 
the sexual over-perception bias, but show an optimism bias as well as betrayal 
aversion, as betrayal might not be expected as much as by those reared in 
unfavourable conditions. The general trends of our findings are in line with 
these suggested effects of having a favourable life history. However, in our 
dynamic task, most of our participants decided in advance of the point at which 
they would have maximised their monetary payoff (i.e., our operationalisation of 
showing the JTC bias). It could be that extraneous costs influenced decision 
making. For example, participants may have been fatigued as the task 
progressed, in which case it may have been rational to decide before the point 
that maximised expected value, to shorten the duration of the task. If this is the 
case, it should not have been found in the static task; indeed, the JTC bias was 
absent for the low-delusion-prone participants.  
The fact that our participants were risk-averse across studies would also be 
expected if they had such backgrounds. If the environment is safe and resources 
are plentiful, it would be wise to exploit these favourable conditions, rather than 
take a risk and explore other, potentially more rewarding other environments. 
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This decision to explore could be a costly error (as discussed on page 43), if 
energy is spent on new environments while one’s current environment has 
plentiful resources and one might be exposed to dangers in new environments.  
In total, life history theory could provide a potential comprehensive framework 
for the findings reported in this thesis. Having been raised in favourable 
environments and having developed secure attachments, the majority of our 
WEIRD participants might be risk-averse, consider enough evidence before 
making decisions and thus not show the JTC bias, be more interested in forming 
long-term bonds and thus not show the sexual over-perception bias, have had 
their optimistic bias reinforced over time and thus maintained it, and show 
betrayal aversion as people might be trusted more than warranted.  
7.4 Conclusion 
I have investigated irrational beliefs in a variety of domains. As irrationality in 
several reasoning problems has been ascribed to methodological artefacts 
(Gigerenzer, 1996; Stanovich & West, 2000; Sturm, 2012), I aimed to 
(re)investigate a series of psychological phenomena through the use of rigorous 
methods from experimental economics, including detailed instructions and 
comprehension questions. I also introduced incentives so that rational decision-
making would involve maximisation of payoffs (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001); this 
was hypothesised to minimise the chance of low motivation confounding the 
results or the chance of biased reporting without biased believing (Schotter & 
Trevino, 2014). Yet, despite these attempts to encourage the use of the normative 
standard (e.g., Bayesian posterior probability), I still found considerable 
evidence of departures from this standard. 
Chapter 7 
248 
 
I found that if someone is delusion-prone, their probability reasoning might be 
unaffected or even more conservative than that of non-delusion-prone people. 
Despite relatively intact probability reasoning under most circumstances, 
delusion-prone people gather less data than would be optimal, and, as such, do 
not maximise their payoff. I even found these suboptimal decisions when 
gathering additional data did not require additional time or effort. 
If a man tends to over-perceive sexual interest from women, this might be due 
to different prior beliefs about women’s sexual interest, which, in turn, could be 
due to different socialisation. I did not find evidence that such sexual over-
perception constitutes a cognitive, belief-updating bias.  
If someone provides an optimistic estimate of their future outcomes, asking 
them to second-guess themselves may improve accuracy if the average of the 
two estimates is taken. However, this second guess increases bias, as 
participants seem to sample selectively to support even more optimistic 
estimates the second time around. 
Finally, if someone is optimistic about others’ trustworthiness, he might prefer 
to escape testing this belief by accepting a higher risk of a bad outcome as long 
as this avoids emotional costs of potential betrayal.  
The fact that some results were only found for a subset of people (e.g., only 
high-delusion-prone participants were suboptimal in an incentivised, one-shot 
data-gathering task) highlights the extent of individual differences in 
conformity to relevant rational norms. Many departures from relevant norms 
stem from distortions in information processing, as per the accounts reviewed 
above. The fact that we documented such deviations even after major 
procedural improvements might seem to give a bleak image of human 
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rationality. However, individual differences in choosing which norm to select, 
arising from differences in goals and desires (Dudley & Over, 2003), may also 
account for some of these differences. To the extent that people achieve their 
own idiosyncratic goals, they may be “personally rational” (Evans & Over, 
1996). For example, if people desire to remain optimistic about their own future 
more than they desire to obtain financial rewards, they may better achieve their 
goals through self-deceptive optimism than through adherence to normative 
standards. As such, apparent deviations from impersonal rational norms might 
be personally optimal. 
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Appendices 
Images were presented in colour in the experiments, but have been rendered to 
greyscale for the appendices.  
Appendix A: Calculation of Optimal Decision Points 
(Chapter 2) 19 
First, let us introduce some notation: 
Symbol Description 
w   The event that the next fish caught is white 
b   The event that the next fish caught is black 
W   The event that the true lake is White 
B   The event that the true lake is Black 
wn   The number of white fish caught so far 
bn   The number of black fish caught so far 
   = bw nn   
   = The value of   after catching one more fish 
l   
The event that the next fish is of the currently leading fish colour 
( wl =  if bw nn >  and bl =  if bw nn < ) 
L   
The event that the true lake is the currently leading lake 
( WL =  if bw nn >  and BL =  if bw nn < ) 
p   = 0.5>)|Pr(=)|Pr( BbWw  
   = 1>)/(1 pp   
   The probability of making a correct guess if guessing now 
c   The cost of seeing one more fish 
R   The reward for a correct guess 
 
                                                          
19 This material has been created by Dr. Maris Goldmanis (Department of Economics, 
RHUL).  
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Dynamic Task 
Suppose that n  fish have been caught so far, of which wn  are white and bn  are 
black. We are interested in the probability that the true lake is White, 
conditional on having caught wn  white fish: )),(|Pr( bw nnW  (note that
)),(|Pr(1=)),(|Pr( bwbw nnWnnB  ). We will find this by Bayes’ Rule:  
.
)(Pr)|),(Pr()(Pr)|),(Pr(
)(Pr)|),(Pr(
=)),(|Pr(
BBnnWWnn
WWnn
nnW
bwbw
bw
bw

 
Because we have assumed a diffuse prior (i.e., both lakes are a priori equally 
likely, 0.5=)(Pr=)(Pr BW ), the formula simplifies to: 
.
)|),((Pr)|),(Pr(
)|),(Pr(
=)),(|Pr(
BnnWnn
Wnn
nnW
bwbw
bw
bw

 
The conditional probabilities that wn  of the n  fish are white given the type of 
lake are: 
;)(1=)|),(Pr( 







bw
wb
n
w
n
bw
nn
n
ppWnn  and .)()(1=)|),(Pr( 







bw
wb
n
w
n
bw
nn
n
ppBnn  
Inserting these expressions into the formula for ),(Pr bw nnW  and dividing 
through by b
n
w
n
pp )(1 , we finally obtain: 
1.>
1
= where,
1
1
=)),(|Pr(
p
p
nnW
w
n
b
nbw 



 (1) 
Note that  bnwnbwbw nnWnnB  11/=)),(|Pr(1=)),(|Pr( . Because 0.5>p , 
1> , so that )),(|Pr(>)),(|Pr( bwbw nnBnnW  if and only if bw nn > . Therefore, if 
the decision maker decides to make a guess, she should always guess the lake 
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corresponding to the most fish caught so far, and the probability of a correct 
guess is: 













.n=n if
2
1
=)),(|Pr(=)),(|Pr(
;n>n if
1
1
=)),(|Pr(
;n>n if
1
1
=)),(|Pr(
=
bw
wb
bw
bwbw
b
n
w
nbw
w
n
b
nbw
nnBnnW
nnB
nnW


  
Note that this simplifies to the following extremely simple rule, where the 
probability of a correct guess depends only on the absolute value of the difference 
of the numbers of white and black fish caught so far:  
 .= where,
1
1
=)( bw nn 



  (2) 
It follows that the only relevant state variable for our problem is  , and we can 
write the value function as )(V . Here )(V  is the expected value to the 
decision maker of having observed   more fish of one color than of the other. 
As in any stopping-time problem, this value is the maximum of (1) the expected 
value of guessing immediately and (2) the expected option value of seeing one 
more fish. 
The only missing element remaining in the formulation of this problem is the 
state transition matrix. This, however, is easy to find. Clearly, if one more fish is 
caught,   will change to either 1  or 1 . Furthermore, if 0= , the change 
will be to 1=1=   with probability one. If 1> , the probability of it 
changing to 1  is simply the probability of getting one more fish of the 
currently leading color:  
  )).()(1(1)(=)|Pr()|Pr(=1=Pr   ppLlLl  
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To summarise:  
 






otherwise.))()(1(1)(
0;= if1
=1)=(Pr
 pp
 (3) 
Now, we are ready to formulate the Bellman equation for the optimal stopping 
time problem. The expected value of guessing now is R)( . The expected 
value of drawing one more fish is: 
cVV  1)(1))=(Pr(11)(1)=(Pr . 
The value function is therefore defined recursively by: 
}.1)(1))=(Pr(11)(1)=(Pr;)({max=)( cVVRV   (4) 
This equation is easy to solve by value function iteration. It can also be proven 
analytically that the stopping rule will always take the form “Stop if and only if 
0>  ” for some 0 . 
Static Task 
Let the observer have a uniform prior over lakes: 
            
 
 
  
Now, suppose we have sampled   fish and found that      of them are white 
(so that         are black). What is our best guess of a lake? Given that the 
prior probabilities of both lakes are the same, it is clear that we should guess 
“Lake White” if we have sampled more white than black fish (        
  ) and “Lake Black” if we have sampled more black than white fish (      
    ). If we have observed            the sample gives us no 
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information, so we can make either guess, and it will be correct with probability 
1/2. 
Given this decision rule, what is our probability of making a correct guess based 
on a sample of   fish? Clearly, for an odd   this is simply the probability that we 
get more fish of the “correct” than of the “incorrect” colour (where the “correct” 
colour is white if the true lake is Lake White and black if the true lake is Lake 
Black). For an even  , we need to add to this one half of the probability that we 
draw equal numbers of fish of both colours. To calculate these quantities, we 
simply note that we can get    of the   fish in the correct color in  
 
  
  ways, and 
each of these occurs with probability             , so that the total probability 
of getting    of the   fish in the “correct” color is 
                              correct         
 
  
               
Thus the probability of a correct decision for any odd  , i.e., for any       , 
where   is a natural number, is 
                                              
 
  
              
 
      
 
The probability of a correct decision for any even n, i.e., for any     , where   
is a natural number, is 
                                         
   
 
  
             
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
           
Suppose that the cost is c per fish, while the reward for a correct guess is R. 
Then the total expected payoff after sampling n fish is: 
                                                      
The optimal sample size maximises this expression: 
                    
 279 
 
An even   is never optimal: Intuitively, increasing the sample size by one from 
any odd number        can never be optimal, since adding the     
     fish can never meaningfully change the optimal decision. Mathematically, 
we can show that for any  : 
                                           
                                               
so that                           . The problem thus reduces to 
                     
 
  
                  
 
      
   
To illustrate, Figure 1 shows the expected payoff      as a function of sample 
size   for parameter values                 . In this example, the optimal 
sample size is       Figure 2 shows the optimal sample size as function of the 
parameter   when the other two parameters are fixed at      and      . 
 
Figure 1  Expected payoff as a function of sample size when p=0.8, R=25, and c=0.5 
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Figure 2 Optimal sample size as a function of p when R=10 and c=0.1  
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Appendix B: Instructions and Comprehension Questions 
(Chapter 2) 
Instructions 
First Task 
In each round you will see a fisherman and two lakes: Lake A on the left and 
Lake B on the right (which lake is which is indicated on the screen; see an 
example of a screen shot below). Both lakes contain black and white fish. The 
proportion of black to white fish in each lake is always either 75:25 or 25:75 and 
is always indicated below the lake. The relative proportion of black and white 
fish in one lake is always exactly opposite to that in the other lake. The lakes 
have so many fish in them, that the fishing of several fish does not affect the 
overall proportions.  
 
Each time he goes fishing, the fisherman flips a coin. If the coin shows heads, he 
goes to Lake A, if it shows tails, he goes to Lake B. In other words, he is equally 
likely to go to each lake. However, when he visits a lake, he always stays there 
until he has caught at least twelve fish, although he might stay and catch more. 
He never visits both lakes on the same trip. 
In this task, you will get the opportunity to see the fisherman’s collection of 
caught fish for seven different fishing trips (rounds). He will wear a shirt with a 
different colour on each trip, just to make it clear it is a different trip. The ratios 
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in the two lakes may alternate on different trips. Your task is to guess which 
lake the fisherman went to on each trip. To do that, you will be shown one fish 
at a time. After seeing a fish you will be given the choice to decide on either 
Lake A or B or to see more fish before deciding on a lake. The fisherman always 
catches at least twelve fish, but often catches more. You can see as many fish as 
you want before making your decision about which lake the fisherman has been 
fishing from, up to the last fish, after which you will have to make a decision 
between the lakes. 
If you choose the correct lake, you receive 100 points, but 2 points are deducted 
for each additional fish after the first one that you ask to see. If you are wrong 
when you decide which lake the fisherman has been fishing from, you will 
receive zero points, regardless of the number of fish you have seen (i.e. you will 
not lose points).  
IMPORTANT: At the end of the experiment, we will pay you for one round in 
which the lake and the fish are randomly drawn. All points you receive in this 
round will be converted into pounds at a rate of 1 point = £0.05. These earnings 
will be paid to you in addition to your show-up fee of £6 at the end of the 
experiment. You will not know in advance for which round you will be paid, so 
it is in your interest to treat each round as if it would determine your earnings.  
Each time you see a fish, we will also ask you to rate your confidence that the 
fish are coming from either lake. You will be asked to do this regardless of 
whether you chose to see another fish or decided on a lake. After you have 
provided your confidence ratings, you will move on to the next fish if you chose 
to see another fish or to the next round if you decided on a lake. Even though it 
does not influence your earnings, we ask you to state your confidence 
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deliberately and truthfully (you could consider your show-up fee a payment for 
this). 
You have now finished reading the instructions for the first task; please 
complete the questions on the computer to ensure that you have fully 
understood the instructions. 
Second Task 
In this second task, you will again see the fisherman in new fishing trips. The 
proportion of black and white fish in each lake is still 75:25 or vice versa, and the 
proportions are still opposite in the two lakes. As before, the fisherman only 
goes to one lake each time.  
As before, you will be able to earn points for choosing the correct lake and 
points will be deducted the more fish you see. The number of points you can 
receive for a correct decision differs each time, but is indicated on the screen. 
In this task, you will need to indicate in advance how many fish you would like 
to see in total. You will then be shown the number of fish you requested all at 
once. You will not be able to request to see additional fish afterwards. After 
seeing your requested number of fish, you again decide on a lake. Finally, you 
will again indicate your confidence level in each lake.  
As in the first task, you will be paid for one of the five rounds in which the lake 
and fish are chosen randomly. This amount will be paid in addition to your 
show-up fee and to what you earned in the first task, again at a rate of 1 point = 
£0.05. You will not know in advance for which round you will be paid, so it still 
is in your interest to treat each round as if it would determine your earnings. 
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Comprehension Questions 
[Correct answers are given in square brackets for clarity; these were not shown 
on the actual paper sheets.] 
First task 
1) If Lake A contains 25% white fish, what percentage  
of the fish in Lake A will be black?   1)__[75%]__ 
2) If Lake B contains 75% white fish, what percentage  
of the fish in Lake A will be white?    2)__[25%]__ 
3) Which of the following is not possible:   3)__[B]____ 
 a) Lake A (75% black: 25% white); Lake B (25% black: 75% white) 
 b) Lake A (25% black: 75% white); Lake B (25% black: 75% white) 
 c) Lake A (25% black: 75% white); Lake B (75% black: 25% white) 
4) Which of the following is not possible:   4)__[A]____ 
 a) Lake A (20% black: 80% white); Lake B (80% black: 20% white) 
 b) Lake A (25% black: 75% white); Lake B (75% black: 25% white) 
 c) Lake A (75% black: 25% white); Lake B (25% black: 75% white) 
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5) Which of the following is not possible in the scenario  
 below:        5)__[C]____ 
 
 a) All the fish are from Lake A 
 b) All the fish are from Lake B 
 c) The black fish are from Lake A, the white fish are from Lake B 
6) If the second fish caught on a certain trip is from  
Lake A, the last fish caught on that trip must also  
be from Lake A.      6)_[A: True]_ 
 a) True 
 b) False 
7) The fisherman visits Lake A more often than Lake B. 7)_[B: False]_ 
 a) True 
 b) False 
8) On any given trip the fisherman can catch a maximum  
of 20 fish, 10 from Lake A and 10 from Lake B.  8)_[B: False]_ 
 a) True 
 b) False 
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9) The fewer fish you choose to see, the fewer points you  
will earn if you choose the correct lake.    9)_[B: False]_ 
 a) True 
 b) False 
Second task 
10) Which of the following is possible in this scenario:  10)__[B]____ 
 
 a) Some of the fish are from Lake A, some from Lake B 
 b) All the fish are from Lake A 
 c) The black fish are from Lake B, the white fish are from Lake A 
11) If you choose to see seven fish, these fish will be shown to  
you once at a time and after each fish you will have the option  
of deciding on a lake or waiting for the next fish. 11)_[B: False]_ 
 a) True 
 b) False 
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Appendix C: Instructions and Comprehension Questions 
(Chapter 3) 
Below are the instructions and comprehension questions for the lakes-and-fish 
task. Differences in instructions and in questions for the betting and control 
groups are noted in square brackets. Correct answers are also given in italics in 
square brackets for clarity; these were not shown on the actual paper sheets. 
Instructions 
For this study, you will be required to first read these instructions and complete 
some comprehension questions, and then complete some practice trials, 
followed by 26 experimental trials. At the end we will ask you to fill out some 
questionnaires. Please do not access any other programmes, such as internet 
browsers, or you will not be paid for the session. In each of the trials you will 
see two lakes: Lake A (always on the left) and Lake B (always on the right).  
 
Figure 1 
Figure 2 
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Figure 3 
Both lakes contain black and white fish, in opposite proportions. The 
proportions in each lake differ with the seasons. Sometimes, as in Figure 1 
above, equal numbers of black and white fish are found in each of the lakes (50 
black: 50 white). At other times, as in Figure 2 above, one of the lakes has 
slightly more black than white fish (60 black: 40 white), and the other lake has 
slightly more white than black fish (40 black: 60 white). At yet other times, as in 
Figure 3 above, one of the lakes has many more black than white fish (85 black: 
15 white), and the other lake has many more white than black fish (15 black: 85 
white). The relative proportions of black and white fish in Lake A are always 
exactly opposite to those in Lake B. 
In the background you see the houses of five fishermen. All these fishermen like 
to fish for a hobby and they always return any fish they catch back to the lake. 
They all fish six days a week, but stay at home on Sunday. As they all value 
convenience but also like a change of scenery every now and then, the number 
of times each fisherman visits a given lake is directly proportional to how close 
he lives to it. Hence, the closer a fisherman lives to a lake, the more often he 
visits that lake.  
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Here you see John, who lives closest to Lake A. He visits Lake A on 5 out of 6 
fishing days and he visits Lake B on 1 out of 6 fishing days. 
  
Here you see Paul, who lives closer to Lake A than to Lake B. He visits Lake A 
on 4 out of 6 fishing days and he visits Lake B on 2 out of 6 fishing days. 
 
Here you see Bob, who lives halfway between Lake A and Lake B. He visits 
Lake A on 3 out of 6 fishing days and he visits Lake B on 3 out of 6 fishing days.  
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Here you see Luke, who lives closer to Lake B than to Lake A. He visits Lake A 
on 2 out of 6 fishing days and he visits Lake B on 4 out of 6 fishing days.  
 
Here you see Mark, who lives closest to Lake B. He visits Lake A on 1 out of 6 
fishing days and he visits Lake B on 5 out of 6 fishing days.  
In each trial you will be shown a picture from a randomly picked day of the 
year (not Sundays). In each picture a fisherman will show you what he caught 
that day: a black fish or a white fish. Your task is to [betting group: bet on/ control 
group: indicate] which lake he was actually fishing from that day. [betting group: 
For each trial, you get £4 to distribute over the two lakes (see the example on the 
next page). One of the trials will be picked at random and you will be paid the 
amount you bet on the correct lake for that trial as a bonus (i.e. you will receive 
this money on top of your show-up fee)./ This information was omitted for the 
control group].  
It might be difficult to judge which lake the fisherman has been fishing from, 
but just make the best decision you can based on the information you have, 
within the time allocated. Each picture is shown for 20 seconds, and once time is 
up the next trial will begin automatically. If you have not made a decision by the 
end of the time limit, [betting group: you will not win anything if that trial gets 
chosen/ control group: no response will be recorded for that trial]. 
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To enter your response, you first click anywhere along the grey area, so that a 
black line appears (see example below). This black line can then be placed 
anywhere along the grey area, to indicate how likely you think either lake is. 
Press the “OK” button that appears after placing your response to confirm your 
decision. 
An example  
A trial starts with the presentation of a fisherman, the fish he happens to have 
caught that day (whether black or white), and the two lakes. The picture makes 
clear how close the fisherman lives to each of the lakes, and also shows the 
proportions of black and white fish in each lake on that day. Below this image is 
the response bar (grey rectangle area), which represents how [betting group: your 
£4.00 will be distributed across the two lakes/ control group: likely you think 
either lake is]. Again, your task is to [betting group: bet on which lake/ control 
group: indicate which lake you think] the fisherman was actually fishing from 
that day. You can make your response by clicking anywhere along this grey 
rectangle. Darker grey stripes indicate one quarter, half, and three quarters of 
the grey rectangle.  
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[on-screen text for the control group: How likely do you think either lake is? You 
indicate that a lake is more likely by moving the black stripe closer to that lake. 
First click in the grey area for the black line to appear. You can then move this 
line, and confirm by clicking “OK”.] 
After you’ve taken all information into consideration, you can click somewhere 
in the grey area to have the black stripe appear there. In case you want to adjust 
the position of the black stripe, you can do this by dragging it to the correct 
place. After placing the black stripe, an OK button appears which needs to be 
clicked to confirm your response.  
In the example below, you [betting group: have bet £0.40 on Lake A and £3.60 on 
Lake B (these amounts are not shown, but the fraction of your £4.00 that you bet 
on each lake is directly proportional to the position of the black stripe inside the 
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grey rectangle). Assuming this trial is chosen for payment, you would win £0.40 
if Lake A was the correct answer and £3.60 if Lake B was the correct answer./ 
control group: think Lake B is more likely than Lake A (here you are 
approximately 90% sure that Lake B is the lake being fished from). These 
percentages are not shown, but the closer the black stripe is to either end of the 
grey rectangle, the more likely you think that the relevant lake is.] 
 
Comprehension Questions 
1) If Lake A contains 40 black fish, how many white  
fish will Lake A contain?      1)__[60]___ 
2) If Lake A contains 85 black fish, how many white  
fish will Lake B contain?      2)__[85]___ 
3) Which of the following is not possible:   3)__[C]____ 
 a) Lake A (50 black: 50 white); Lake B (50 black: 50 white) 
 b) Lake A (15 black: 85 white); Lake B (85 black: 15 white) 
 c) Lake A (60 black: 40 white); Lake B (60 black: 40 white) 
4) Which of the following is not possible:   4)__[B]____ 
 a) Lake A (85 black: 15 white); Lake B (15 black: 85 white) 
 b) Lake A (15 black: 85 white); Lake B (60 black: 40 white) 
 c) Lake A (40 black: 60 white); Lake B (60 black: 40 white) 
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5) Which of the following is not possible:    5)__[B]____ 
 a) Lake A (60 black: 40 white); Lake B (40 black: 60 white) 
 b) Lake A (90 black: 10 white); Lake B (10 black: 90 white) 
 c) Lake A (50 black: 50 white); Lake B (50 black: 50 white) 
(hint: the answer is in the second paragraph of the instructions) 
6) How many white fish are in Lake B below?   6)__[85]___ 
 
7) Below you see John. How likely is he to visit Lake B?  7)__[1/6]__ 
 
8) Below you see Luke. How likely is he to visit Lake B?  8)__[4/6]__ 
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9) True or false: The person below [betting group: has bet  
most of their money on Lake A/ control group: thinks  
Lake A is more likely than Lake B].   9)__[False]_ 
 
  
 296 
 
Appendix D: Instructions and Comprehension Questions 
(Chapter 4) 
Instructions and comprehension questions were computerised for the two 
experiments in Chapter 4. Here, instructions and comprehension questions are 
presented for the order in which the neutral condition preceded the bias 
condition. The same type of questions, but for different sources and pieces of 
information were used in the opposite order. Screenshots of each condition 
accompany the unformatted instructions and comprehension questions for 
completeness. Correct answers to questions are underlined in this appendix. 
Experiments 3a and 3b – Neutral (Jars) Condition  
Instructions 
In this task, the computer draws beads from one of two jars. Jar A contains 70% 
white beads and 30% black beads, while Jar B contains 30% white beads and 
70% black beads. These ratios will be displayed on the screen throughout the 
task. The computer randomly selects one jar; both jars are equally likely to be 
selected (i.e., the probability for each jar is 50%). After the jar is selected, the 
computer draws 10 beads from this jar. The computer puts back each drawn 
bead, but a record of drawn beads is shown. 
The computer will show you a series of ten beads drawn from the selected jar. 
After seeing each bead, you must indicate how likely you think it is that the 
beads are drawn from Jar A or Jar B. After seeing the tenth bead, you will have 
to decide which jar the beads were being drawn from. If you are correct, you 
will win £1; if you pick the wrong jar, you do not get any extra money (i.e., you 
do not lose money). 
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You will do this task for four rounds. In three of those four rounds, the 
computer will show you predetermined sequences. In one of the four rounds, 
the computer will actually select a jar and draw beads from it as described 
above. Important: You will only be paid for this round. Since you do not know 
in advance which of the four rounds you will be paid for, you should treat each 
round as if you would be paid for it.  
You have finished reading the instructions for this task. You will now have to 
complete a few questions to ensure that you have fully understood the 
instructions. If you select the wrong answer, a pop-up with the explanation will 
appear. 
Comprehension Questions 
1)  Which of the following is not possible in a given round? 
a) All the beads are drawn from Jar A. 
b) All the beads are drawn from Jar B. 
c) The black beads are drawn from Jar A, the white beads are  
drawn from Jar B. 
2)  True or false? 
a) If the second bead is from Jar A, the last bead in the  
same sequence is also from Jar A.     True 
b) It is more likely that Jar B, rather than Jar A, is initially  
selected by the computer.      False 
c) In the paid round, if you pick the correct jar, you win £1;  
if you pick the wrong jar, you do not get any extra money. True 
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Screenshot 
 
Experiments 3a – Bias (Bars) Condition 
Instructions 
John, Mark, Tom, and Luke each went to a separate bar on Saturday night. John, 
Mark, Tom, and Luke are all heterosexual, but they each have homosexual 
friends so on any weekend they are just as likely to visit a gay bar as a straight 
bar. At the bar on this occasion, all four men flirted with ten women each. All 
men are equally charming and attractive, but on average they are less successful 
with the opposite sex in a gay bar compared to a straight bar. This might be 
because the women are lesbians and not interested in men or perhaps because 
they were hoping for a girls' night out without being chatted up by men.  
Your task is to judge whether each man (i.e., John, Mark, Tom, and Luke) went 
to a gay bar or to a straight bar, based on women's reactions. On average, men's 
flirtations with women are reciprocated 70% of the time in a straight bar and are 
ignored 30% of the time, whereas in a gay bar men's flirtations with women are 
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reciprocated 30% of the time and ignored 70% of the time. These ratios will be 
displayed on the screen throughout the task. Each man will show you the 
reactions of the ten women he flirted with: a green check when his flirting is 
reciprocated,  a red cross when it is ignored. After seeing each reaction you must 
indicate how likely it is that he went to a gay bar or a straight bar. After seeing 
the reactions of all ten women, you have to indicate which type of bar he was in. 
If you are correct, you will win £1; if you are wrong, you do not get any extra 
money (i.e., you do not lose any money).  
You will do this task for four rounds. In three of those four rounds, the 
computer will show you predetermined sequences of responses. In one of the 
four rounds, the computer will actually select a bar (each with 50% probability 
of being selected) and show reactions from women at that bar as described 
above. Important: You will only be paid for this round. Since you do not know 
in advance which of the four rounds you will be paid for, you should treat each 
round as if you would be paid for it.  
You have finished reading the instructions for this task. You will now have to 
complete a few questions to ensure that you have fully understood the 
instructions. If you select the wrong answer, a pop-up with the explanation will 
appear.  
 300 
 
Comprehension Questions 
1)  True or false? 
a) It is more likely that the man is in a straight bar than in a  
gay bar, as he is heterosexual.      False 
b) The man went to only one of the two bars.    True 
c) In the paid round, if you make a correct decision about which  
type of bar a man visited, you will get £1; if you make an  
incorrect decision, you do not get any extra money.   True 
Screenshot 
 
Experiments 3a and 3b – Bias (Dates) Condition 
Instructions 
John, Mark, Tom, and Luke went speed-dating on Saturday night. Each of them 
spoke to a series of ten women, and each woman indicated whether or not she 
wanted to see each of them again for a further date. In the general population 
men are equally likely to be attractive or unattractive. On average, attractive 
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males score dates 70% of the time and are rejected 30% of the time, whereas 
unattractive males are successful 30% of the time and rejected 70% of the time. 
These ratios will be displayed on the screen throughout the task.  
Your task is to judge whether each man (i.e., John, Mark, Tom, and Luke) is 
generally attractive or unattractive to the opposite sex, based on the number of 
dates he scored. Each man will show you the reactions of the ten women he 
speed-dated: a green check if they would say “yes” to another date, a red cross if 
they would say “no” to another date. After seeing each reaction you must 
indicate how likely it is that he is generally attractive or unattractive. After 
seeing the reactions of all ten women, you have to indicate whether he is 
generally attractive or unattractive. If you are correct, you will win £1; if you are 
wrong, you do not get any extra money (i.e., you do not lose any money).  
You will do this task for four rounds. In three of those four rounds, the 
computer will show you predetermined sequences. In one of the four rounds, 
the computer will actually select either attractive or unattractive (each with 50% 
probability of being selected) and show reactions from the women as described 
above. Important: You will only be paid for this round. Since you do not know 
in advance which of the four rounds you will be paid for, you should treat each 
round as if you would be paid for it.  
You have finished reading the instructions for this task. You will now have to 
complete a few questions to ensure that you have fully understood the 
instructions. If you select the wrong answer, a pop-up with the explanation will 
appear.  
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Comprehension questions 
1)  True or false? 
a) It is more likely that any man is attractive  
than that he is unattractive.      False 
b) In the paid round, if you make a correct decision about  
whether a man is attractive or unattractive, you will  
get £1; if you are wrong, you do not get any extra money.  True 
Screenshot 
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Appendix E: Instructions (Chapter 5) 
Instructions were computerised for the study in Chapter 5; here they are shown 
in appendix format.  
Round 1 – First own estimates 
In this experiment, we will ask you to estimate answers to various questions. 
The answers to which your estimates will be compared were taken from official, 
peer-reviewed or governmental sources (e.g., Office for National Statistics). The 
answers to some of the questions concern averages for people of your age range 
and socio-cultural background. However, try to give estimates that would apply 
to you personally, in your life overall.  
You will be paid for your performance on a preselected set of questions in this 
round (i.e., which questions are paid has been determined beforehand and this 
does not depend on your performance). You do not know which questions these 
are, and it is in your best interest to treat all questions as though you are paid 
for each. The payment scheme is as follows: 
 If you estimate the correct answer, you will get 10 points. 
 If you are within 2% of the correct answer (on either side), you will get 4 points. 
 If you are within 5% of the correct answer (on either side), you will get 2 points.  
 If you are within 10% of the correct answer (on either side), you will get 1 point. 
 You will not get any points for answers that are further from the correct answer.  
It might be difficult to provide the exact answer, but please rest assured that 
your payment is based on how close your estimate is to the correct answer. 
Click OK to start the task. 
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Round 2 – First others’ estimates 
We have compiled the answers of all participants in this session to get average 
estimates to the same questions. 
Your task now is to give an estimate of these average estimates of the other 
participants to the questions shown.  
The payment scheme is the same as before. The closer you are to the true 
average estimate, the more points you will earn. The points from this round will 
be added to the points from the previous round. Again, a preselected set of 
questions is paid for. 
 If you estimate the correct answer, you will get 10 points. 
 If you are within 2% of the correct answer (on either side), you will get 4 points. 
 If you are within 5% of the correct answer (on either side), you will get 2 points.  
 If you are within 10% of the correct answer (on either side), you will get 1 point. 
 You will not get any points for answers that are further from the correct answer.  
Click OK to start the task. 
Round 3 – Second own estimates 
Now, assume your previous personal answers were incorrect. We will ask you 
to answer the questions again. Your previous estimate will be shown. 
For each question, please think about why your previous answers may have 
been incorrect. Which assumptions and considerations could have been wrong? 
What do new considerations imply? Was your first estimate too high or too low?  
The payment scheme is the same as before. The closer you are to the true 
estimate, the more points you will earn. The points from this round will be 
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added to the points from the previous rounds. Again, a preselected set of 
questions is paid for. 
 If you estimate the correct answer, you will get 10 points. 
 If you are within 2% of the correct answer (on either side), you will get 4 points. 
 If you are within 5% of the correct answer (on either side), you will get 2 points.  
 If you are within 10% of the correct answer (on either side), you will get 1 point. 
 You will not get any points for answers that are further from the correct answer.  
If your answers are better in this round, you will be rewarded the points for this 
round; if your first guess was better, you will be rewarded the points for the first 
round.  
Click OK to start the task. 
Round 4 – Second others’ estimates 
Now, assume your estimates of the average estimates provided in the first 
round were incorrect. 
For each question, please think about why your previous answers may have 
been incorrect. Which assumptions and considerations could have been wrong? 
What do new considerations imply? Was your first estimate too high or too low? 
The payment scheme is the same as before. The closer you are to the true 
average estimate, the more points you will earn. The points from this round will 
be added to the points from the previous rounds. Again, a preselected set of 
questions is paid for. 
 If you estimate the correct answer, you will get 10 points. 
 If you are within 2% of the correct answer (on either side), you will get 4 points. 
 If you are within 5% of the correct answer (on either side), you will get 2 points.  
 If you are within 10% of the correct answer (on either side), you will get 1 point. 
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 You will not get any points for answers that are further from the correct answer.  
If your answers are better in this round, you will be rewarded the points for this 
round; if your first guess was better, you will be rewarded the points for the first 
round.  
Click OK to start the task. 
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Appendix F: Instructions and Comprehension Questions 
(Chapter 6) 
Instructions were computerised for the study in Chapter 6. Instructions from 
several screens have been formatted for the appendix; screenshots are shown 
where relevant. The order depicted here is one where investors first indicated 
their minimal number of white beads and then their trustworthiness-beliefs.  
General instructions presented to all participants on a paper sheet 
General overview of the game 
You will be either a player in role X or a player in role Y. 
More instructions will follow on the computer screen. 
Numbers given are in experimental currency units, where 1 point = £ 0.50. 
 
Computerised instructions to all participants 
During the study, we do not speak of pounds (£). Instead, all earnings are given 
in points. At the end of the study, all points are transferred into pounds with the 
following exchange rate: 1 point = 50 pence. 
There are general instructions on the paper by the computer. More instructions 
will be shown on the screen.  
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Today's study consists of a single round. In the study, all participants will be 
either in role X or role Y. Roles are not switched at any point. The computer will 
randomly assign you either role X or role Y later. Then, the computer will 
randomly match each participant in role X with a different participant in role Y 
into a pair. On the next pages, we will explain the decision situation of today's 
study in more detail. 
Each pair of two players will end up with either outcome A or outcome B (see 
below). If a pair ends up with outcome A, the player in role X receives 15 points 
and the player in role Y receives 15 points. If a pair ends up with outcome B, the 
player in role X receives 8 points and the player in role Y receives 22. 
Outcome A 
Player in role X receives 15 points 
Player in role Y receives 15 points 
 
Outcome B 
Player in role X receives 8 points 
Player in role Y receives 22 points 
 
There are two possible methods how the final outcome is determined. Which of 
these two methods is actually used to determine the final outcome depends on 
the decisions of the player in role X and other factors. We will explain this later 
when it becomes relevant. 
Method 1: The computer randomly chooses one of the two outcomes. The 
randomly chosen outcome is then paid out at the end of the study. 
Method 2: The player in role Y chooses one of the two outcomes. The chosen 
outcome is then paid out at the end of the study. 
Computerised comprehension questions for all participants 
1: Every participant will play both in role X and in role Y.  True/False 
  
 309 
 
2: Each player in role X is matched with how many other players? 
 With one player in role Y 
 With one other player in role X 
 With two players in role Y 
 With several players in role Y 
3: How can the final outcome (potentially) be determined? 
 By the player in role X 
 By the player in role Y 
 Randomly by the computer 
4a: If outcome A is implemented,  
how many points does the player in role X receive?   15 
4b: If outcome A is implemented,  
how many points does the player in role Y receive?   15 
5a: If outcome B is implemented,  
how many points does the player in role X receive?   8 
5b: If outcome B is implemented,  
how many points does the player in role Y receive?   22 
Computerised instructions for trustees 
The computer has randomly determined that you are in role Y and it has 
matched you with one participant in role X.  
As mentioned before, there are two methods how a pair's outcome is 
determined:  
Method 1: The computer randomly selects one of the two outcomes. 
Method 2: The player in role Y (i.e. you) selects one of the two outcomes. 
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At this point, it is not known which of these two methods is used for your pair. 
That depends on the decision of your matched player in role X and random 
factors. However, on the next page, we ask you to assume that your choice will 
determine your pair's outcome and to select one of the two outcomes. If method 
1 is used to determine the outcome (i.e. the computer randomly selects an 
outcome), your choice will not be relevant for payment and player X will not be 
informed about your decision. If method 2 is used to determine the outcome (i.e. 
you as the player in role Y determine the outcome), the choice you make on the 
next screen determines your payoff and the payoff of your matched player in 
role X. That means if you choose outcome A, the player in role X will receive 15 
points and you will receive 15 points. If you choose outcome B, the player in 
role X will receive 8 points and you will receive 22 points. If you are ready to 
make your decision, please click ok.  
Please select the outcome you want to implement below. Please confirm your 
decision when you are done. 
Computerised instructions for investors to set their number of 
white beads 
The computer has randomly determined that you are in role X and it has 
matched you with one participant in role Y.  
As you know, your final outcome will either be determined randomly by the 
computer or chosen by the player in role Y that you are matched with. Now, it is 
your task to decide which of the two methods will be used, i.e. you decide if the 
decision of your matched player in role Y determines your final outcome or if 
the computer makes a random draw instead. The player in role Y will be 
informed about which method was used to determine the outcome at the end of 
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the study, but only after he or she has already chosen one of the outcomes. The 
player will not be informed about how exactly you made the decision between 
both methods. Before you have to make your decision whether to let the player 
in role Y choose or to let the computer make a random draw, we will explain 
what happens depending on your choice on the next pages.  
If you decide to let the player in role Y select the outcome 
All players in role Y are asked to make a decision between outcome A and 
outcome B in case this is how their pair's final outcome is determined. If you 
decide to let the player in role Y select the final outcome, the program simply 
looks at the decision that your matched player in role Y has made. The outcome 
that the player has selected will then be implemented and later paid out. That 
means that if the player has selected outcome A, you receive 15 points and the 
player in role Y receives 15 points. If the player has selected outcome B, you 
receive 8 points and the player in role Y receives 22 points. It does not matter for 
your outcome what other players in role X or in role Y have chosen. Only the 
decision of your matched player in role Y is relevant for your outcome. 
If you decide to let the computer randomly select the outcome 
If you decide to let the computer randomly select an outcome, the decision of 
your matched player in role Y is NOT relevant for your outcome. Instead, the 
computer draws a bead (a small ball) from a container with 1000 white and 
black beads. If a white bead is drawn, outcome A will be implemented, 
meaning that you receive 15 points and your matched player in role Y receives 
15 points. If a black bead is drawn, outcome B will be implemented, meaning 
you receive 8 points and your matched player in role Y receives 22 points. 
Again, it does not matter for your outcome what other players in role X or in 
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role Y have decided. Only the colour of the bead that the computer draws for 
you is relevant for your outcome. If you let the computer decide, you will not be 
informed about the outcome your matched player in role Y has chosen.  
We will further explain how to make your decision between both methods on 
the next pages.  
How to choose the method to determine your outcome 
The computer has filled a container with 1000 beads. First, the computer has 
randomly selected a number between 1 and 1000 and put that many white beads 
into the container (all numbers from 1 to 1000 are equally likely, i.e., each 
number has a 0.1% chance of being chosen). Then, the computer filled up the 
container with black beads until there were 1000 beads in the container in total 
(i.e. Number of white beads + Number of black beads = 1000). 
If you let the computer decide the outcome, the computer will randomly draw 
one bead from the 1000 beads in the container. Every bead is equally likely to be 
picked. Remember that a white bead represents outcome A and a black bead 
represents outcome B.  
It is your task to indicate how many white beads you want in the container, at 
minimum, so that you let the computer draw one bead from the container to 
determine the outcome instead of letting the player in role Y decide. If there are 
as many or more white beads in the container as the number you gave, the 
computer will draw one bead to determine the outcome. If there are fewer white 
beads in the container, the computer will NOT draw a bead and the decision of 
the player in role Y determines the outcome instead.  
 313 
 
For example: Let's say you have indicated that you want at least 591 of the beads 
to be white. So as long as there are 591 or more white beads in the container, the 
computer will randomly draw a bead to determine the outcome. As long as 
there are fewer than 591 white beads in the container, the choice of the player in 
role Y determines the outcome (and the computer does not pick a bead).  
Another example: Let's say you requested at least 753 beads and the container 
actually holds 814 white and 186 black beads. Then, because 814 is greater than 
(or equal to) 753, the computer will randomly pick one of the beads to determine 
the outcome. The probability for outcome A (i.e. that a white bead is drawn) is 
814/1000 (81.4%) and the probability for outcome B (i.e. that a black bead is 
drawn) is 186/1000 (18.6%). If the container holds 165 white and 835 black beads 
instead, the player in role Y will determine the outcome (and the computer does 
not pick a bead), because 165 is smaller than 753. 
Computerised comprehension questions for trustees 
1:  Assume you indicated that you want at least 482 of the beads to be white. 
The container actually holds 390 white beads and 610 black beads. How 
would the outcome be determined?  
 The computer randomly draws a bead from the container 
 The player in role Y picks an outcome 
 Either the computer draws an outcome or the player in role Y chooses 
an outcome 
 Another player in role X decides 
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2:  The number of white beads in the container is higher than the number 
you chose. The computer has now drawn a black bead from the 
container. What is the outcome that will be paid out? 
 That depends on the choice made by the player in role Y 
 Outcome A 
 Outcome B 
3:  Assume you indicated you want at least 261 beads to be white in order 
for the computer to determine the outcome. The player in Role Y has 
picked outcome B. The number of white beads is 836. The computer 
draws a white bead from the container. What is the outcome that will be 
paid out? 
 Outcome A 
 Outcome B 
 Either of the outcomes is implemented randomly by the computer 
4:  Correct or false: The player in role Y is informed about how 
many beads you want to be white in order to let the  
computer draw the outcome.       False 
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Computerised task to set the minimal acceptable number of white 
beads  
 
Computerised instructions for investors to state their 
trustworthiness-beliefs 
Before the study continues, we have another task for you. Please click continue 
for more information. 
There are 8 players in role Y in the room. All of them are asked to make a 
decision between outcome A and outcome B in case this is how their pair's final 
outcome is determined. On the next screen, we will ask you to give your best 
guess about how many of the 8 players in role Y choose outcome A and how 
many choose outcome B. The players in role Y will not be informed about your 
guess. IMPORTANT: If your guess is correct, you will receive 10 points in 
addition to anything else you earn during the experiment. If your guess is not 
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correct, you will not receive any additional points and you will not be informed 
about the correct number.  
Please indicate how many players in role Y you think choose outcome A and 
how many choose outcome B by selecting one of the answers below. Confirm 
your decision when you are done. Remember that if you guess correctly, you 
will receive 10 points. 
0 players in role Y will pick outcome A & 8 players in role Y will pick outcome B 
1 player in role Y will pick outcome A & 7 players in role Y will pick outcome B 
2 players in role Y will pick outcome A & 6 players in role Y will pick outcome B 
3 players in role Y will pick outcome A & 5 players in role Y will pick outcome B 
4 players in role Y will pick outcome A & 4 players in role Y will pick outcome B 
5 players in role Y will pick outcome A & 3 players in role Y will pick outcome B 
6 players in role Y will pick outcome A & 2 players in role Y will pick outcome B 
7 players in role Y will pick outcome A & 1 player in role Y will pick outcome B 
8 players in role Y will pick outcome A & 0 players in role Y will pick outcome B 
 
Computerised instructions for the risk-aversion measure 
On the next screen, you will see 11 rows. In each row, you have the choice 
between option L and option R. Both in option L and option R, you can win 
some amount of money with some probability x or another lower amount of 
money with probability 1-x. For example, in the third row, if you chose option L, 
you would receive £2.00 with probability 20% and £1.60 with probability 80%. If 
you chose option R instead, you would receive £3.85 with probability 20% and 
£0.10 with probability 80%.  
After all participants have made their decisions, the computer plays two 
lotteries:  
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1. Lottery: The computer randomly selects 1 of the 11 rows (each row is equally 
likely to be chosen). The option you have selected in this row becomes relevant 
for your payment.  
2. Lottery: The computer uses the probabilities of the relevant option in the 
selected row to randomly pick one of the two possible outcomes of the option.  
At the end of the study, ONE participant will be randomly selected by the 
computer and receive the amount of money earned in this decision situation in 
addition to everything else earned during the study. When you have read and 
understood these instructions, please click "continue". If you have any 
questions, please raise your hand and a study organizer will come to you and 
answer your question in private. 
 
 
 
